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Human affections are the focus of our enquiry. We will enquire about the nature of 
affections, their role in human morality and their place in political relations. We will 
investigate whether discussions in philosophical ethics and moral psychology can 
assist political theory in conceptualising political society more clearly with respect to 
affections and whether, in turn, theological ethics can assist philosophical ethics, 
moral psychology and political theory in this task. We will seek to discover whether 
inadequate psychological, political and, indeed, theological concepts and language 
have contributed to an improper account of affection and thereby undermined healthy 
political thought and practice.  
This line of enquiry seems very necessary in light of the current challenge to 
the development and maintenance of the practical unity of peoples within their 
particular political jurisdictions amidst the growth of global communications and the 
internationalisation of the popular consciousness. The oft-repeated lament over the 
“democratic deficit” within many western nation-states and continental authorities 
such as the European Union leads us both to question the nature of the deficit and to 
find out what would conduce towards that moral unity which maintains a political 
society in reflective, deliberative and active pursuit not only of its own common 
good but also that of its neighbours. Analysis of such a deficit in terms of voter turn-
out holds some interest. However, it is hardly the deepest way of describing a 
political society’s engagement with its own affairs. What then do we find in the 
profounder reaches of a society’s self-consciousness and activities? What is there in 
these depths that constitutes and sustains common life together? 
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The thesis we will advance is that affections are attracted, participative 
understandings of God’s creation vindicated in Jesus Christ and, as such, are of the 
utmost significance for these deep political relations. Instead of solely analysing 
what affections are in individuals – a worthy task in itself – we will endeavour to 
paint on a broader political and theological canvas. Forgetfulness of the political 
context has been a weakness in non-theological and theological accounts that, with 
understandable eagerness to define personal affective experience, have not 
adequately addressed the affections’ innate interpersonal quality. We will argue that 
affections are basic to the moral unity of political societies in pursuit of their 
common goals since people are bound together morally in their enduring, cognitive 
evaluations of common goods over time. Affections are the beginnings of that 
evaluative understanding in that they recognise good and evil, thereby opening up 
reflection on the nature of good and evil and deliberation about what it is right to do 
with respect to good and evil. Such affections endure by the power of memory 
especially the memory made possible by political institutions, political representation 
and law. We will argue that Christian theology explains the nature of affection most 
coherently since it accounts for the cognitive, attracted and potentially enduring 
nature of affection through examining the intelligible goodness of creation and its 
Creator and Redeemer. Inasmuch as they construe particular values within this larger 
canvas, affections will also be seen to be endings as well as beginnings. We will 
show how affections participate in the thick particularity of creation and, potentially, 
new creation as well as exploring how political conceptions which do not take 
sufficient account of the localised, institutional quality of human identity are liable to 
eviscerate political communities of their common affective understanding and hence 
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of their potential for genuine moral unity. Lastly, we will propose that Christian 
affections serve local churches by constituting their right understanding with respect 
to creation, new creation and Jesus Christ in whom all things hold together. These 
right affections then serve the common good by directing a political community 
towards an affective consensus which will ground and sustain its common practical 
communications. 
Our goal is threefold: first, diagnostic – a theological examination of 
‘emotions’ will involve scrutiny of fundamental concepts which have contributed to 
the formation of modern political society; second, constructive – theological ethics 
will have its own distinctive conceptual organisation concerning the place of 
affections in political relations; third, reparative – a theological account of the place 




To address our questions and sustain the thesis it will be necessary to consider, learn 
from and account for major streams of thought in the field. Unfortunately, the study 
of “affections” or “emotions” has been characterised by considerable linguistic and 
conceptual disagreement and, in most modern accounts, little disciplined attention to 
those theological resources which might offer ways to assess and improve upon the 
numerous popular and scholarly options. Nonetheless, as we shall see, there has been 
a sea-change in philosophic ethics whereby “emotions” are now widely thought of as 
forms of knowledge. The turn towards this “cognitive” account reflects what much 
Christian theology has understood very well, namely that knowing is at least partially 
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constituted by “affections”. On the linguistic front, our prevarication here between 
“emotion” and “affection” points towards the difficulties of terminology. This 
discussion will hold that a conceptually coherent and comprehensive account will be 
assisted by utilising the language of “affections” instead of “emotions” and that such 
an account will reveal more precisely why and how affections play a role in social 
and political relations. There are two advantages of this terminological preference.  
The first is pragmatic and relates to the contemporary moment. “Affection” 
has fewer popular associations with irrationality than “emotion” and our enquiry will 
precisely be concerned with examining whether and how affections might be 
cognitive aspects of human life. Furthermore, “affection” does not necessarily have 
the sense of suddenness which often characterises “emotion” and we will be looking 
to establish the possibility of stable as well as episodic affections. We should 
distinguish our term “affection” from the common usage of the term. In popular 
conversation, “affection” means something like ‘kindness’ or ‘goodwill’ but would 
not include phenomena such as ‘anger’. But here “affection” is meant to cover the 
full range of emotion-type phenomena such as envy, fear, anger, joy and hatred 
among others. 
The second advantage is also pragmatic to some extent but relates to 
principled historical usage. Pragmatically, “affection” is a word in less common 
usage in the twenty-first century than “emotion” and so is more susceptible of 
redefinition. Moreover, in previous periods leading Christian thinkers in this area 
have written extensively of “affection” or its cognates. Jonathan Edwards expounded 
his account of ‘religious affections’ as a key component of experimental religion. 
The source for Edwards was, to a considerable extent, Augustine who, in de civitate 
 
 5 
Dei, returns on a number of occasions to the theme of ‘affectus’ or ‘affectiones’, 
especially when considering rival philosophical theories such as Stoicism and 
Platonism. The term arises especially in relation to these rivals’ accounts of the place 
of passiones, perturbationes and motus in the life of the wise man. Augustine’s 
approach is not to hold tenaciously to any one term but rather to focus attention on 
the nature of the phenomena themselves, as disclosed by Christian revelation. He is 
particularly concerned to move the discussion of the phenomena away from whether 
any particular soul experiences passiones (or motus or affectus) and towards why and 
in relation to what it has the experience. The concern is thus with the cause and 
object of affections that they may be instruments of justice and not with whether 
passio itself is, as some Stoics and Platonists would claim, an essentially vicious 
aspect of human nature which requires control, subjection and even extirpation.
1
 
Augustine will not tolerate this latter view because of its doctrinally unsound roots 
either in a Platonic devaluation of the body, wherein passiones were thought to 
reside,
2
 or in a Stoic rejection of certain affectus which are given clear approval in 
Scripture, not only in the lives of Paul and Jesus but also throughout the biblical 
text.
3
 In the end, though he is happy to use the terms passio and motus, especially 
though not exclusively when in dialogue with rivals, he more often favours affectus 
or affectio in constructive phases of his writing.
4
  
In the present discussion, we should certainly follow Augustine’s lead and 
avoid quarrelling unnecessarily about words or about the frequency of their usage in 
any particular author. What is at stake for Augustine is not any particular word itself 
                                                 
1
 Augustine, City of God (de civitate Dei), trans. Bettenson, H., Penguin Books, 1972, 9.5 
2
 ibid. 14.5 
3
 ibid. 14.8-9 
4
 ibid. especially 14.9 
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but the meaning which the word bears. However, there is a need for terminological 
clarity in today’s crowded marketplace of ideas. A return to the term “affection”, 
held lightly and for largely pragmatic reasons but maintained consistently, is a 
promising move. The combination of its present disuse and prior theological 
usefulness makes it a good candidate for the cup of meaning
5
 which we will need for 
such a time as this. In what follows, I will reserve the term ‘affection’ for the concept 
which this research is aiming to elucidate but will continue to use the term ‘emotion’ 
when discussing those theories which utilise that terminology. Augustine adopted 
this practice by willingly using the term passiones when in dialogue with those who 
preferred it despite the conceptual accretions with which it had become encumbered. 
Thus our present approach seems in keeping with the best of the theological 
tradition.  
 An objector to our choice of “affection” might suggest “love” as a better 
alternative. While this would have strong support in the tradition – Augustine himself 
classified joy, fear, desire and sorrow as forms of ‘amor’
6
 – it will not be so 
serviceable on this occasion. For the term “affection” is a term which is primarily 
deployed in the plural to describe diverse “affections”, such as anger, fear, joy and 
hatred, phenomena which are the chief subject of our enquiry. But “love” is not like 
this since its primary usage is singular, drawing together different types of love under 
a single head. Our concern here is with the multiplicity of the affections and their 
diverse contributions to the common life of a community. Though it would be a 
useful project to indicate the political interrelation of love and the affections, we will 
not be proceeding down that line in this research. For since the theological tradition 
                                                 
5
 Cf. Augustine, Confessiones, Scutella (ed.), Teubner, 1996, 1.xvi.26 
6
 Augustine, City of God, 14.7 
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has used “love” in highly complex ways, using the language of love would involve 
entering a lengthy engagement with sources which, while highly interesting in 
themselves, would lead us astray from the specific enterprise which we have in hand. 
Use of the term “affections” frees us from having to follow such a path and allows us 
to carry out the investigation which lies before us. We should also note in passing 
that “love” has been so blown about by the modern consciousness as to make 
conceptual headway very difficult. It has been so driven into the private and romantic 
that a connection to political affairs is hardly thinkable. So as an apologetic 
concession to the moment, we will adopt another term, namely ‘affection’.  
 
The way ahead  
 
With this terminological clarification made, I will now briefly outline the course of 
the argument. In chapter one, I review the work of cognitivist theorists of emotion 
who oppose both rationalist disavowals of the reasonableness of emotion and 
empiricist fascination with physical sensation. Such theorists hold that emotions’ 
intentional (object-directed), evaluative quality suggests that they possess a cognitive 
aptitude. This finding represents a measure of consensus between theological and 
philosophical ethics. The work of Martha Nussbaum, a leading cognitivist, receives 
sustained attention. The thesis takes this qualified agreement as a starting point from 
which to address substantial philosophical and political questions about the nature 
and role of emotion. Though the Jewish and Christian Scriptures are prominent later 
in the argument, they are less so in chapter one. This allows sophisticated treatments 
such as Nussbaum’s to be heard on their own terms and highlights issues which will 
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need to be addressed in the succeeding chapters. Exploring the political and legal 
questions raised by Nussbaum’s account will be particularly important if the 
theological account of ‘affection’ is to be effective in illuminating the problems 
concerning moral unity experienced by people today. Her work, which is self-




Chapter two proposes an account of “affection” which is intrinsic to 
individuals’ and communities’ complex interrelation with their political identity, the 
created order and creation’s God. Drawing on cognitivist, phenomenological and 
spiritual approaches, the argument enquires as to the nature of affection and its 
relationship to memory and virtue. Jonathan Edwards’ account of affections and his 
doctrine of excellency are also critically considered. With particular attention to joy, 
shame, anger and awe, the affective dimension of political life is then explored in 
chapter three through consideration of certain institutions, practices and traditions of 
modern political societies, ancient Israel and the early church. Affective wisdom 
within institutions of political representation and law are discussed in light of secular 
and Christian political eschatologies.  
Findings from this discussion then guide chapter four’s conversation between 
European ‘constitutional patriotism’ and British conservatism which explores the 
connection between affections and locality. The possibility of the development of a 
post-national consciousness is considered in light of the enduring attachments 
formed by the development of the modern nation-state and the loyalties sustained by 
                                                 
7
 Because of the focus on emotions (affections) and politics, certain important voices will not be 
addressed in depth, most notably Robert C. Roberts’ important contributions: Roberts, R., Emotions: 
An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology, CUP, 2003; Roberts, R., Spirituality and Human Emotion, 
Eerdmans, 1982; Roberts, R., ‘What an Emotion is: A Sketch’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 97, 
No. 2. (Apr., 1988), 183-209.  
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national and ethnic traditions. The concluding passage of the thesis in chapter five 
considers further possibilities in this direction by examining the contribution of local 
churches to the renewal of localised affective understanding. 
In many parts of the argument as a whole, we will be drawing on the Jewish 
and Christian Scriptures of the Christian bible (“the Scriptures”) to furnish us with 
moral concepts.
8
 Therefore, it is important to specify the nature of our approach to 
these writings and to recognise certain assumptions which will be made. We will 
hold that the Scriptures present a rich account of the significance of affections for 
human political relations. The biblical record of the activity of Yahweh in the history 
of Israel culminating in the ministry of Jesus Christ purports to offer profound insight 
into the affective dimension of human creaturely life. The details of this claim must 
be worked out over the course of the discussion and the proof of the pudding will be 
in the eating. However, by way of a preliminary roadmap, we may say that the focus 
in the Old Testament will be on the uniquely affective political consciousness 
designed by Yahweh for Israel, especially as seen in the book of Deuteronomy, 
selected because of its combination of sophisticated legality and nuanced affectivity. 
Without abstracting from the eschatological biblical narrative, we will gain insights 
from Deuteronomy into the affective dimension of human life which are applicable 
to our concern for political relations in general. The New Testament’s account of the 
interrelation of Israel with Christ purports to give the fullest definition to the place of 
affections in creaturely human life today. We will focus on the gospel of Luke and 
on the work of the Spirit in the life of the church as represented in Acts and 2 
Corinthians. This will provide fertile ground for exploring the affective dimension of 
                                                 
8
 Unless otherwise indicated, the text of the English Standard Version will be used throughout. 
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humanity and the possibilities for that dimension which the gospel has opened up. 
Our method to some extent mirrors Augustine’s concern to enquire whether any 
particular usage or account of affections ‘scripturis sanctis congruat’.
9
 Our pattern 
will be to move between moral concepts and the Scriptures, developing and 
correcting our concepts through exegesis of the Scriptures. It is through this 
Scriptural lens that we expect to discover wisdom concerning the political relations 
between governed and government and among the governed. 
Such wisdom is much needed in political theory at the present time and thus 
has considerable apologetic value. For our political landscape is drenched in 
affective or “emotional” language but lacks the wherewithal to understand its 
meaning. The 2009 crisis over the integrity of the UK Westminster parliament, 
following the revelation of elected representatives’ expenses claims and the attitudes 
which at least appear to have pervaded some parts of the political establishment, has 
been closely linked to the “anger” of the people. This anger has led to a shame and 
embarrassment (even humiliation) that has in turn brought about an awakening of the 
representative and the people to the need for action. However, although members of 
parliament have been quick to say that they understand how people feel, there has 
been very little conceptualisation of the situation to make sense of these communal 
emotions and their relation to political action. Our claim here is that the Scriptures 
provide powerful apologetic resources to address our need for an understanding of 
affection both in political situations such as this and in the broader matrix of 
relationships which constitute political society. 
 
                                                 
9
 Augustine, City of God, 14.8 
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Roads not travelled 
 
Our focus on a theological conceptualisation of affection in social and 
political relations will mean that, for reasons of time, space and lack of expertise, 
some important roads will not be travelled or will only be gestured towards. Four of 
the most important will be highlighted now. First, it has been suggested that gender 
is highly significant when discussing affections or ‘emotions’. This suggestion often 
appears on a popular level in terms of simplistic gender stereotypes whereby women 
are often construed as essentially more emotional or intuitional while men are 
essentially more rational though there are those who argue, with philosophical, 
sociological and neuroscientific reasons, for careful distinctions to be made between 
forms of male and female understanding with attention to affections.
10
 These 
arguments cannot be taken up here although their seriousness is recognised.  
Second, there is a highly legitimate and important set of questions concerning 
emotions and mental illness. Although this discussion will engage with specific 
psychological theories, it will not trespass into territory which is properly reserved 
for the medical profession and those skilled in medical research. Thus, although a 
critical investigation of, for example, cognitive behavioural therapy would be an 
useful endeavour, it cannot be pursued here. This is not to say that there is no relation 
between social and political relations, emotions and mental health – the NHS and the 
prison system, for example, are clear loci for examining it – but only to say that 
                                                 
10
 Cf. Chodorow, N., The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender, 
University of California Press, 1978; Nussbaum, M., Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of 
Emotions, CUP, 2001, 161ff, 219ff 
 
 12 




Third, there is the line of research which explores emotions on the level of 
physiology and sometimes on the level of physiology alone. A significant 
representative researcher is Paul Ekman who has suggested that certain emotions are 
universally accompanied by certain facial expressions.
12
 Though we will have reason 
to discuss this theme to some extent, we will not endeavour a detailed interaction. 
Our focus will be elsewhere mainly because of the intentional (object-
directed/attracted, cognitive) quality of affection which we will explore in chapter 
one. This suggests that, although physiological factors may have a very strong 
connection to affection, they are not all that affection consists in.  
Fourth, and most briefly, we will not be venturing into the technical, 
scholarly question of divine impassibility. Our focus is on human affections. 
However, in light of the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, we will consider the way 




With our terms of reference and direction set and with some significant but 
untrodden by-roads noted, it is now time to begin our investigation. The task of the 
following chapter is to elucidate the questions we are seeking to answer, critique 
                                                 
11
 Cf. Bowlby, J., Attachment and Loss, Volumes 1-3, Basic Books, 1973-1982; Winnicott, D., The 
Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment, International Universities Press, 1965; 
Holding and Interpretation: Fragment of an Analysis, Grove, 1986 
12
 Cf. for example, Ekman, P., ‘Facial Expression and Emotion’, American Psychologist, 48.4 (April 
1993), 384-392. Ekman has gathered evidence that there are facial expressions which occur 
universally across cultures in connection with specific emotions and in relation to specific events. He 
does not claim that facial expression alone individuates emotion but rather suggests that brain science 
can supply data which complements external expression and that the two together may effectively 
enable classification of certain families of emotion. For an alternative view see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/8199951.stm.  
13
 For a recent study, see Weinandy, T., Does God change?: the Word's Becoming in the Incarnation, 
St Bede’s, 1985; and Does God Suffer?, T&T Clark, 2000 
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some possible approaches and to gather, sift and coordinate conceptual resources 
which will make our investigation possible. 
 
 14 
Chapter 1: Emotions and affections 
 
Theories of emotion: an exploratory examination 
 
A survey of philosophical contributions to the understanding of ‘emotions’ will begin 
to reveal the nature and importance of the questions under discussion. Initially, we 
will see that Cartesian, Humean and sensualist theories have been rightly set aside by 
modern philosophy because of their failure to account for the intentionality and 
openness to rational assessment which characterise human emotions. David Hume 
accepted the Lockean insight that passions were ‘internal sensations’ of pleasure and 
pain and ‘no more contain any thought than do the bodily sensations that are their 
simple counterparts.’
1
 As such, passions were designated as mental sensations, akin 
to physical sensations but constituting internal mental activities.
2
 Hume denied the 
rationalist claim, largely influenced by René Descartes, that such sensations were in 
need of subjection to reason if they were not to pervert but rather support good moral 
agency. Hume argued that passions were impressions of reflection, secondary 
features of moral psychology which, as material particles in the mind, interact by 
association with each other. In this way, he sought to rescue the passions from a 
rationalist assessment and to argue instead both that reason was and should be the 
slave of the passions and that passion itself was basic to the sympathetic mechanism 
                                                 
1
 Deigh, J., ‘Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions’, Ethics, Vol. 104, No. 4. (July 1994), 824-854, 
825 
2
 Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, OUP, 1978, esp. Book II, Part I, Section 1 
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which sustains the obligations we hold in society.
3
 Hume’s stance puts clear water 
between reason and passion. Though he does seem to allow for cases when passions 
are unreasonable as when ‘accompany’d with some false judgment’ he then goes on 
to explain that it is ‘not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but 
the judgment.’
4
 On this reckoning the passions are not judgments, cognitions or 
thoughts of any sort and so can never be properly classed as reasonable or 
unreasonable. On other accounts, emotions have been classified as inextricably 
linked to and individuated by particular sensations of our bodies. William James, for 
example, focussed on the connection between sensual stimuli and conscious 
passions, arguing that an emotion is simply a feeling of bodily change and is caused 
by environmental factors such as running away to avoid a hungry bear.
5
  
Twentieth and twenty-first century philosophy of emotion, responding to 
these earlier trends, has largely denied that emotions should be identified with mental 
or physical sensations and has argued against the claim that emotions are essentially 
irrational. Philosophers have asked instead whether emotions may be classed as 
cognitive phenomena of some sort. John Deigh helpfully summarises the basis for 
this trend. 
 
Two criticisms are chiefly responsible for the demise of feeling-centered 
conceptions...One is that feeling-centered conceptions cannot satisfactorily account for 
the intentionality of emotions. The other is that they cannot satisfactorily represent 




                                                 
3
 Penelhum, T., ‘Hume’s moral psychology’, Norton (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 
CUP, 1993; Hume, D., Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles 
of Morals, ed. Selby-Bigge, OUP, 1975; cf. Deigh, J., ‘Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions’, 825 
4
 Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, Sect. 3, ed. Selby-Bigge, 416 
5
 James, W., ‘What Is an Emotion?’, Mind 9, 1884, 188-205 
6
 Deigh, J., ‘Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions’, 824-5 
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Cognitivists reckon that the “intentional” nature of emotions and their amenability to 
rational enquiry and assessment indicate that emotions have a cognitive quality. By 
“intentionality”, cognitive theorists mean the way that emotions are typically about 
or directed at something or someone. ‘We are rarely, if ever, simply angry, proud, or 
afraid. Rather we are angry at someone, proud of something, afraid of something or 
someone.’
7
 We say that we are angry at our enemies, that we are indignant about a 
particular case of injustice, that we are sorry for our neighbour whose cat has died, 
that we have an ongoing fear concerning the fidelity of our spouse or that we rejoice 
in the political leader whom we have elected. The italicised words indicate the way 
that the particular emotion is about or directed towards a specific object. Cognitivist 
theorists claim in various ways that this feature reveals that emotions are some form 
of thought, evaluation, apprehension, understanding or knowing. For ‘if anger…is 
always anger about something, then anger will include reference to belief and 
judgment in a way that feeling or sensation does not. We do not ask about the object 
of a stomach ache nor about that of fatigue. But we ask about the object of anger.’
8
 In 
this way, the intentional quality of emotion indicates that it is akin to other such 
intentional operations. The emotion thus seems to be a form of belief or judgment 
and hence is cognitive. Moreover, such theorists observe that we typically allow that 
emotions are open to enquiry and assessment. It is common not only to ask questions 
such as ‘why are you sad?’ or ‘do you think your anger is reasonable?’ and to expect 
answers but also to assess whether sadness or anger of this sort is appropriate to the 
situation. For example, if someone is angry at her political representative over some 
apparent failure to uphold justice or some abuse of office, it is possible to enquire 
                                                 
7
 Lauritzen, P., ‘Emotions and Religious Ethics’, The Journal of Religious Ethics 16 (1988), 307–24, 
312 
8
 ibid. 312 
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concerning the anger and to assess it in relation to factors such as whether there 
really is injustice or abuse, whether the representative is responsible and so on. 
George Pitcher was one of the first to develop an account of the 
“intentionality” of emotions. He emphasised that emotions are ‘very often, and 
perhaps always, directed towards something’ but he also recognised that there may 
be no particular object of an emotion. For example, the fear of falling off a bridge 
into a gorge is not directed at any particular object but is nonetheless intentional in 
the sense of referring outwards beyond the subject of the emotion.
9
 Pitcher’s critique 
of those feeling-centred conceptions criticised by Deigh depends on the distinction of 
emotion from physical feelings such as pleasures, aches and pains which are 
typically not about or directed towards objects. Anger is normally directed towards 
an object such as a person or inanimate item. However, physical or mental sensations 
of pleasure and pain do not have any such referent and so cannot be an exhaustive 
account of emotion. To this we should add the observation that it is hard to imagine 
what a mental sensation which is purely pleasurable or painful might possibly be. 
The mind’s emotions may of course know about something concerning which it may 
experience pleasure and pain. But to say this is already to admit that emotions are 
intentional in the way Pitcher suggested and so to rule out the possibility that the 
emotions are purely sensations. 
For these reasons the idea of emotions as purely sensory phenomena must 
simply be dismissed.
10
 Pitcher sensibly allows that some emotions may be 
accompanied by particular sensations on some occasions but he rightly argues that 
                                                 
9
 Pitcher, G., ‘Emotion’, Mind 74 (1965), 326-346, 326-7 
10
 Deigh, J., ‘Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions’, 826; for a good summary of the cognitivist 
position, cf. Elliott, M., Faithful Feelings: Emotion in the New Testament, IVP, 2005, 17-47 
 
 18 
this is very far from the claim that the emotions are identical with any particular 
physical sensations let alone any putative mental sensations.  
Despite all this, there remains a strong popular and scholarly opinion that 
emotion and sensation are identical. Robert Roberts explains persuasively why this is 
so. 
 
Why are people inclined to identify emotions with physical sensations? Experimental 
psychologists no doubt find bodily states attractive because they are more readily 
measurable than other factors. But the mistake is not just a professional liability; 
ordinary people can be easily induced, with a few leading questions, to think they feel 
their emotions in their bodies. The reason, I think, is that these sensations are 
conceptually simpler and easier to identify than the emotions themselves. This homely 





So emotions are more complex than people think and intentionality is a good 
philosophical starting point for understanding that complexity more deeply. Two 
clarifications and one rebuttal will qualify what we mean by intentionality. First, the 
term “intentional” is not being used here to refer to all deliberate decisions, choices 
and actions made or done by an agent. Certain philosophical traditions commonly 
use it to cover a wide range of phenomena whereby agents act with respect to an 
object in a deliberate way. The meaning of “intentional” relevant here, quite 
specifically the quality of being directed towards an object, is partially related to this 
in that it focuses on an agent’s relation to an object concerning which he may choose 
to act. However, the similarity is only limited because, as we will see, the nature of 
emotion (affection) suggests that the attractive power of objects has more influence 
on human agency than accounts of deliberate action often recognise. Second, 
intentionality should not be confused with the moral power-plays with which 
                                                 
11




“emotivism” is concerned and which Alasdair MacIntyre has so ably elucidated.
12
 
The use of ‘intentionality’ here is not to be associated with the idea of ulterior 
intentions. Indeed, our constructive account of “affection” will have almost nothing 
to do with emotivism. Rather, our interest is in what we will call ‘cognitive 
intentionality’, the intentionality which Deigh and Pitcher have helpfully observed in 
the object-directedness of emotion.   
Third, the objection that some emotions, such as a generalised anxiety, seem 
to be objectless does not cause an insurmountable problem to the claim that emotions 
are commonly intentional in the way described. Cognitive theorists have rebutted this 
objection by either recategorising such apparently objectless emotions under 
“moods” or claiming that there are actually implicit, unrecognised objects in view 
which have not yet appeared to the consciousness of the person but are nonetheless 
attracting his sub-conscious emotional attention. The rebuttal may be further 
strengthened by observing that feeling anxious about apparently objectless anxiety 
itself – a common feature of depression, for example – is evidence that emotions are 
after all intentional.
13
 Indeed, such is the confidence that modern theorists of emotion 
have about intentionality that Penelhum can denounce Hume’s whole theory as 
fatally flawed by ‘a wildly implausible denial of the intentionality of passions’.
14
  
However, theorists who agree that emotions are essentially intentional and 
cognitive have disagreed about whether evaluation of the intentional object is 
essential to this intentionality. For example, sorrow over a failure of a business itself 
seems to include some evaluation of that business and its parlous state. There is a 
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recognition of the value of an object and of some goodness or badness about the 
condition of the object towards which emotion is directed. Indignation evaluates a 
situation as wrong; fear typically evaluates a situation as dangerous in some respect. 
A further step is to claim that certain emotions only evaluate certain types of objects. 
Deigh helpfully summarises this refined, evaluative approach. 
 
If the object of fear must be something that is seen to threaten harm, then fear entails 
an evaluation of its object as the potential source or agent of some bad effect. If the 
object of pity must be someone who is seen to have suffered misfortune, then pity 




If emotion is evaluative in this way, then it follows that emotion is potentially 
partially constituted by having a certain propositional belief, articulating that 
evaluation, about the object of one’s emotion, and that such a propositional belief is 
inseparable from the emotion itself.
16
 The presence of propositional content clarifies 
the way that emotions are cognitive since it would render emotions as of the same 
sort as beliefs, precisely with respect to propositional content. The propositional 
content may not be articulable at the time of the emotional experience but 
nonetheless would seem to be a constituent part of the emotion.  
With all this said, it may still seem counterintuitive to class emotion as 
cognitive, evaluative and intentional. After all, non-evaluative visual perception of a 
snake or a loved one seems sufficient to evoke fear or gladness. However, such a 
challenge is not difficult to rebut. Either one allows that the emotion in question does 
lack evaluative content but then categorises it as peripheral to the normal cases
17
 or 
one argues that there is an implicit, pre-reflective evaluation occurring which is 
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intentional and so cognitive. Cognitive, evaluative intentionality of some sort is thus 
the most persuasive account of emotion to have emerged in philosophy of emotion. 
The account of emotion as purely sensual must be dismissed as inadequate to account 
for this quality in emotions. 
Modern neuroscience lends some support to the cognitivist position by its 
close association of cognition and emotion. For example, Joseph LeDoux is 
especially critical of modern psychology’s tendency to ascribe reality to vague 
departments of the mind and to  
 
carve the mind up into functional pieces, such as perception, memory and emotion 
[since these] are useful for organizing information into general areas of research but 




LeDoux particularly focuses on the way that neural networks interact in the brain and 
aims to show that ‘cognition and emotion are best thought of as separate but 
interacting mental functions mediated by separate but interacting brain systems.’
19
 
He even wonders whether brain evolution may develop so that with ‘increased 
connectivity between the cortex and amydala, cognition and emotion might begin to 
work together rather than separately.’
20
 In light of this, LeDoux is sceptical of those 
who fail to take seriously the study of neural connections and reify ‘reason’, ‘will’ 
and ‘sense perception’ as faculties in some vague interrelationship without 
considering the brain science which is now available. He is also sceptical of views 
which do not distinguish both conscious and unconscious emotions and the 
concomitant influence that such emotions have on our lives. In light of this, he is 
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critical of the trend in cognitive science to adopt emotions as simply the same as 
‘cold’ reasoning and logic.
21
 On some psychological accounts emotions are classified 
solely as forms of cognition in the narrow sense of thinking and reasoning. This has 
been a particularly important development since the 1960’s and has emphasised the 
possibilities of introspective awareness of emotional states as a reaction against the 
behaviourist school.
22
 According to LeDoux, ‘more and more cognitive scientists are 
getting interested in emotions. The problem is, instead of heating up cognition, this 
effort has turned emotion cold – in cognitive models, emotions, filled with and 
explained by thoughts, have been stripped of passion.’
23
 
Martha Nussbaum, a leading cognitivist theorist, is favourable to LeDoux 





 and wishes to account for their urgency (or heat)
26
 rather 
than reducing human minds to ‘souls on ice’.
27
 Nussbaum’s appropriation of LeDoux 
is instructive for it shows how a political philosopher who takes seriously the 
intentionality of emotion does not need to be afraid of research in neuroscience as if 
discovering more about how emotion works neurologically will necessarily be at 
odds with a philosophical or indeed theological interpretation of the role of emotion 
in political societies. From a theological perspective, we may agree with LeDoux that 
emotions (or ‘affections’) are considerably more complex than departmentalised 
psychological thinking seems to allow and are certainly not icy cold. However, it will 
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not be necessary to follow him by adopting a solely physiological account of 
affection (emotion) in order to propose a fruitful interpretation of the phenomena 
which benefits from neuroscientific discovery. The behaviourists’ ridicule of mental 
states, consciousness and mind as ghosts in the machine can be pushed to the 
margins not only by closer examination of brain function but also by the observation 
that there is more to affectivity than meets the microscope, an invisible and even 
spiritual dimension to human life. This is far from special pleading unless all serious 
theological and much philosophical thought counts as such. Moreover, although 
theology is not competent to judge the workings of the limbic system or the thalamo-
hippocampal pathway, it can at least be attentive to lessons learnt from 





If cognitive, evaluative intentionality does characterise emotions, this will affect 
descriptive conceptualisation of and normative recommendations for political 
society. For if emotions are cognitive then they may be articulated and shared in 
common by a number of subjects; and if emotions are evaluative then they will be 
constitutive of a political interest for that group of subjects. Emotions are thus highly 
significant for political relations and understanding more clearly their role in human 
morality and in political life is very important. For example, a project for educating 
the emotions would be much more plausible if emotions are not essentially irrational 
but rather have a cognitive aptitude, an evaluative facility and an intentional nature.  
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Contrasting accounts of emotion will yield differing political conceptualities. 
In Plato’s Phaedo, reason is likened to a charioteer controlling, restraining and 
coercing the emotions. On this account, emotions have no potential to contribute to 
reasonable agency but are rather essentially disorderly and non-cognitive. One may 
learn to handle emotions but emotions are not themselves essentially educable. Our 
account of emotions’ cognitive, evaluative intentionality is sufficient to set aside the 
approach of the Phaedo. Instead, we may take up the political role of emotions for 
individuals, families, communities, institutions and nation-states. For taking a 
position on the cognitive, evaluative or other properties of ‘emotion’ will have a 
bearing on the relevance of emotion to a range of issues in political societies. 
Consider mitigation in criminal trials, the strength of bonds in professional guilds 
such as medicine, the durability of military regiments, the role of rhetoric and the 
nature of political representation. Emotion seems to play a significant role in all these 
cases, some of which will be taken up in the course of our discussion. If emotions do 
have cognitive aptitude, then neglecting them on account of their supposed 
irrationality will not be a wise political practice.  
There is still considerable confusion with respect to this political dimension 
in both academic and popular discourse. Leaving his neuroscience behind, LeDoux 
ventures to trace the history of traditional thought about emotion. Having (rightly) 
rejected the Platonic opposition of reason and passion he claims that 
 
Christian theology has long equated emotions with sins, temptations to resist by 
reason and willpower in order for the immortal soul to enter the kingdom of God. And 
our legal system treats “crimes of passion” differently from premeditated 
transgressions. Given this long tradition of the separation of passion and reason, it 
should not be too surprising that a field currently exists to study rationality, so-called 




This judgment on two thousand years of Christian thought stands as an invitation for 
Christian theology to give an account of the phenomena which LeDoux calls 
‘emotions’. Moral theology may have done and be able to do rather better than 
LeDoux imagines and may not be so associated with Platonic moral psychology as 
he seems to think. Were LeDoux’s charge not so serious, it would be amusing to note 
that the crime for which he arraigns Christianity is precisely that of which Augustine 
finds Virgil and Plato guilty, namely the equation of ‘cupiditatem’, ‘timorem’, 
‘laetitiam’ and ‘tristitiam’ with the ‘origines omnium peccatorum atque vitiorum’.
28
 
In contrast, Augustine takes time to specify the affective richness of the life of the 
city of God in the new heaven and the new earth, a fully bodily life of righteous 
affection, living according to the Spirit and not the flesh.
29
  
Unfortunately, LeDoux fares no better in his unguarded summary of 
jurisprudential wisdom on emotion. For he actually describes the legal tradition 
moving in an opposite direction to what he perceives to be the theological error. 
Emotions would be irrational and culpable according to LeDoux’s theology but 
would be reasonable mitigations of culpability according to his assessment of legal 
theory. This assessment is all confusion and invites more considered attention of 
actual legal traditions, such as that of ancient Israel and the common law, in which 
emotion has a role quite unlike the Platonic idea of emotions as wild horses.
30
 This 
thesis will seek to show that, in stark contrast to LeDoux’s charge, Christian 
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theology’s sophisticated account of emotion (affection) actually clarifies the role of 
emotion in politics and philosophy. 
Popular discourse also tends in diverse and often confused directions 
concerning the place of emotion in political relations but often adheres by default to 
the rationalist account that reason should restrain emotions which are, like wild 
horses, threats to our rational ability to perform duty to self, society and political 
authority. It is often said that judicial authorities should be “unemotional”. British 
Home Secretaries are criticised for taking account either of the “emotion-laden tide” 
of popular opinion about certain crimes such as child abuse or for allowing that the 
sorrowful remorse of a reviled offender, such as Myra Hindley, might change our 
emotional understanding of her and our political judgments concerning her future. 
Such popular opinions suggest that emotion is essentially non-cognitive and should 
be shut out from the cognitive work of political judgment. In contrast to emotional 
interference in politics, the responsible democratic cast of mind is one of cool 
calculation, the rationality of the informed chooser. This chooser is not assisted by 
his or her emotions but requires only a weighing of options and a calculation before 
decision is made. This is our culture’s Kantian inheritance. However, people are 
inconsistent and, alongside their rejection of emotion in public, they often want 
government to be sensitive to the emotional ties which bind them to certain 
institutions such as military regiments threatened with abolition. In recent British 
history, we might think of the rationalisation of regionalised military regiments such 
as the Black Watch into apparently more efficient units. The popular and 
governmental outcry against this suggested that emotional connections were 





 Or again, consider the differing views of Gordon 
Brown’s suspension of normal political affairs when David Cameron’s son, Ivan, 
passed away. Was the cancellation of Prime Minister’s Questions an inappropriate 
incursion of a family grief into what should be an arena free of such essentially 
private emotions and focussed more on the thousands of people dying in Iraq and 
Afghanistan?
32
 Perhaps most obviously, was the extraordinary behaviour of the 
British people after the death of Diana reasonable, unreasonable, essentially 
irrational or something else? It was certainly quite different from Gordon Brown’s 
sombre, orderly leadership which expressed a national sympathy for David Cameron 
and his family but was it is any more or less qualified to play a part in the political 
process? 
These disagreements signal something of importance for our national life. 
What we think of emotion will impact how we organise ourselves in order to sustain 
communities of common action. Consider the recent proposals to inaugurate a yearly 
“British day” analogous to the United States’ Independence Day.
33
 What would such 
plans for a government-supported attempt to deepen patriotism mean about the 
nature and role of emotion? Similarly, consider the proposals that all schoolchildren 
at the age of sixteen should participate in a citizenship ceremony as an aspect of their 
overall education.
34
 Some continue to hold up a banner of ‘Britishness’, depending 
on an underlying, already agreed upon loyalty in which all somehow share. But what 
is this “loyalty” and what would be the conceptual basis for it to be fostered by a day 
or a ceremony? 
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These illustrations point towards larger difficulties in political theory in 
which emotions are often inadequately conceptualised or even excluded. If one 
cannot say with some definition what emotions are, then one will find it impossible 
to explain persuasively why and how they are important for political life. This is the 
case in so-called ‘conservative’ or communitarian thinkers as well as ‘liberal’ 
theorists. Edmund Burke and Roger Scruton, for example, appeal to ‘public 
affections’
35
 or ‘deeper emotions’
36
 but do not define what they mean by these terms. 
There is a nonchalant presupposition that people will instinctively understand and 
value the affective dimension of political existence. Once such instinctual knowledge 
has been lost, the only response which they think can be offered is elegiac rather than 
reconstructive. Indeed, Scruton self-consciously adopts this elegiac register, like a 
Jeremiah proclaiming to all that the nation is in ruins but, unlike Jeremiah, failing to 
tell us where we may find balm for our healing (Jeremiah 8:22, 46:11).   
The difficulties are even more apparent in mainstream liberal contractarian 
narratives. Even though ‘affect’ is sometimes addressed seriously, as in Jürgen 
Habermas’ intriguing account of constitutional patriotism, Patchen Markell notes that 
modern discussions of patriotism have ‘treated “affect” very flatly and have not 
addressed differences among affects, much less the possibility of a plurality of 
affects towards a single object’. Beyond discussions of patriotism, Markell rightly 
notes that his assessment is ‘in large part true of political theory more generally.’
37
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Although emotion is often discussed by psychologists and in some branches of 
philosophy, political theory is reticent on the topic.  
There are important reasons for the paucity of subtle political analysis of 
emotion among contractarians in particular. First, the focus on the location of 
sovereignty has been at the expense of analysis concerning how decisions are 
reached and the reasons for them. Reasoning about political practice has become 
organised around the authority of the autonomous chooser, an approach which has 
not been conducive to examining the role of emotions. Whereas in reality, people’s 
emotional connections with political leaders do constitute at least a part of the reason 
why they vote for them or act in support of their policies, much contractarian 
political theory has encouraged citizens to conceptualise the democratic process as a 
way to become emancipated from other people’s decisions by enthroning everyone 
as the ultimate decision-takers. In John Rawls’ original position, for example, there is 
no political validity to grief over one’s neighbour’s lost job, joy concerning the 
arrival of a significant festival, wonder at a politician’s life story or hate for one’s 
enemy in war. There is no contribution which these emotions make which is worthy 
of serious moral examination. They are ruled out from rational discourse in favour of 
principles – such as the difference principle – which promise to preserve the 
sovereignty of each and to secure rights and equality for all.
38
   
However, there seems no good warrant for neglecting an emotional 
contribution to public reasoning nor does it seem that the laudable aims of achieving 
a just society (however that is then defined) will be best pursued by theoretically 
setting aside a basic aspect of people’s engagement with each other and the world 
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they share, namely their emotions. Contractarianism is a theory which does not 
correspond to the reality of the world and, in its earnest attempts to preserve 
sovereignty, misses large aspects of people’s lives, most especially the affective 
dimension of their existence. 
A second reason for this neglect of emotions in political theory, arising from 
the influence of Humean and rationalist thought, is the common belief that emotions 
are non-cognitive or, at least, not cognitive in a way which can contribute to public 
discussion. There will be a spectrum of opinion as to the extent and significance of 
emotions’ lack of cognitive aptitude. However, as we have seen, one mainstream 
claim is that emotions are uncontrollable impulses which arise and cloud judgment, 
having a physiological rather than rational basis. As such they are akin to hunger and 
thirst but quite unlike rational discourse about how to organise political life to deal 
with challenges such as hunger, thirst, conflict and justice. This common move has a 
double lineage not only in a certain sort of rationalism which strictly divides reason 
from emotion but also in a behaviourist psychology which interprets the physical 
sensation involved in emotion as a sufficient description of the emotion. Through this 
latter line of descent has come the idea that emotion is not an interpretation of the 
world but rather a strictly physiological response to the impact which the world has 
on the individual. If this were the case, then emotion could hardly have a reasonable 
contribution to make to political discourse. It might be the subject of discussion but 
could never constitute any part of the reasonable content of discussion itself as a 
form of cognition. 
One possible, practical effect of the trend in contractarian thought is 





 Justine Lacroix helpfully expounds the former as ‘the social, 
geographical and cultural unit in which individuals are united by their shared 
understandings’ and the latter as that which ‘defines the scope of policy measures 
that legally bind a community of citizens.’
40
 According to Lacroix, the moral and the 
legal do not overlap in Europe today since, despite strenuous efforts at integration, 
there is no common political awareness across nation-states since the people’s 
‘shared understandings’ do not cohere with the representative, legislative authorities. 
This mismatch has created what Cécile Laborde describes as ‘resentment towards 
aloof and acculturated elites’.
41
 In Europe today, this is politely glossed – between 
the gritted teeth of European visionaries – as the “democratic deficit” and is 
illustrated by the European Parliament’s current low status in the eyes of those whom 
it governs and the consistently low turnout at European elections. But there are more 
subtle, anecdotal signs of resentment in cases such as the metric martyrs of London 
markets whose traditions of weighing and measuring have been assaulted by distant 
powers and enforced by local authorities. The growing hatred of far away authority 
which disrupts the warp and woof of local economic and social practices points 
towards a deeper psychological meaning to the democratic deficit.
42
 From another 
perspective, the resurgence of neo-Nazism in Germany and other nationalist 
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The normal turn in political theory at this point is to address the legitimacy 
question. Laborde responds in this way and claims that to be 
 
fully legitimate, political institutions must be perceived by citizens as democratic 
forums of self-rule, where debate is inclusive and comprehensible, representatives 
fully accountable, and decisions publicly justified.
44 
 
Such a move is a serious attempt to reconnect the moral and legal communities 
thereby stabilising polities and diminishing resentment. Our discussion will explore 
whether the deficit may be more fruitfully described and addressed through a 
reconsideration of the place of affections in political societies. Such an approach 
does not diminish the importance of inclusive deliberation, justified decision-making 
and accountable representation but rather seeks to go deeper than the legitimacy 
question to ask about the nature of ‘shared understandings’
45
 and whether 
understanding these understandings is more fundamental to the nature of political life 
than is commonly recognised.  
The inchoate yet insistent quality of the popular claim that our emotions are 
somehow important is one of the most obvious features of modern life: it is a media 
commonplace that people, especially the youth, are ‘disaffected’. However, the 
phenomenon of disaffection is scarcely investigated and so barely understood. There 
seems to be some definite reality which the appeals to ‘emotion’ are attempting to 
pick out, an ‘affective dimension’
46
 which is inextricable from all participation in 
social life. But this dimension has been neglected or misunderstood in mainstream 
works of political theory. If currently used popular, political and theological 
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conceptualisations of emotion are in a state of more or less acknowledged disrepair, 
then there is a need for some reparative work. 
 
Martha Nussbaum’s cognitive-evaluative theory of political emotions 
 
Before developing an explicitly theological account of ‘affection’, it will be 
beneficial to take soundings from the best philosophical attempts to describe the 
affective dimension of reality. Some justification is required for a detailed 
attentiveness to philosophy since its status with respect to theological questions is 
hardly without its difficulties. The widespread exclusion of revelation from its 
considerations distinguishes it from moral theology which follows from dogmatic 
claims concerning God and his works that disclose the nature of reality. Nonetheless, 
as structured human attempts to understand human nature in a particular social 
context, such philosophical accounts both point helpfully towards the affective 
dimension of Yahweh’s design for human community and demonstrate the intriguing 
and sometimes troubling paths societies may travel when they disregard the 
Trinitarian God. Moreover, if our account of ‘affection’ is to have any persuasive 
power within political theory and practice, it would be as well to be in dialogue, from 
the beginning, with those who currently have command of the field, not only to offer 
any correctives which theology might bring but also to learn from such thinkers, 
thereby acknowledging in practice the truth of general revelation. 
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Martha Nussbaum’s work, especially in her books Upheavals of Thought: 
The Intelligence of Emotions,
47
 seeks to fill the void left by discredited Cartesian, 
Humean and sensualist theories of emotion. Her fascinating, moving and insightful 
approach shows how philosophical and occasionally theological concerns influence 
an analysis of the nature of emotions and their role in political society. Since she is 
one of the few who have endeavoured to apply a thesis about emotions to specific 
political structures and laws, her work is particularly important for any writing which 
attempts to understand the place of emotion in the legal and social structures of 
modern nation-states. It is also important to engage with her because she is held in 
high esteem by legal institutions and university faculties in the United States, the 
political and academic structures of which have complex global influence. Moreover, 
Nussbaum is highly suitable as a conversation partner because of her professed 
Judaism and her willingness to take seriously Christian theologians such as 
Augustine. Thus an extended analysis of Nussbaum’s theory will be of peculiar 
importance in highlighting the nature of the field into which Christian moral 
theology must venture. If theology is to offer a compelling account of affection, then 
it will do well first to study, learn from and assess the best offerings of non-Christian 
philosophy.  
Broadly speaking, Nussbaum’s account can be described as part of the 
cognitive-evaluative school of thought outlined above. According to Nussbaum, 
basic human ‘emotions’ are ‘intelligent responses to the perception of value’ which 
‘involve judgments about the salience for our well-being of uncontrolled external 
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 She argues forcefully for the intentionality of emotion – their ‘aboutness’ 
– and their openness to rational assessment. She takes this to be quite obvious when 
contrasted with the way that the wind is not about the object it crashes into and 
pounding blood is not about the reason for its pounding.
49
 She particularly criticises 
any conception which cannot effectively individuate emotions. For example, feeling-
centred conceptions cannot sufficiently account for why anger is different from grief 
since the same physical feeling or change may occur with both emotions. Moreover, 
emotions cannot be individuated by characteristic modes of behaviour such as 
running since the same behaviour with similar physiological change may indicate 
fear or compassion depending on whether one is running from a bear or towards a 
loved one in distress. Instead she argues that what must individuate emotions is the 
cognitive content they have with respect to the objects they are directed towards. 
This crucial move organises emotion around belief rather than physical sensation 
since the belief is a necessary condition of the emotion. She then argues that beliefs 
are not intellectual acts separate from the emotion but rather are constituent parts of 
the emotion. Thus emotions are themselves at least partially constituted by beliefs 
about objects rather than simply parasitic on belief.
50
  
Having established this, her account then adopts the stoic claim that a 
judgment about the world is an ‘assent to an appearance’ of reality.
51
 When a stoic 
has observed that something appears to be the case, her judgment is an assent to that 
appearance, an acceptance that it is the case. Nussbaum adapts this account by 
arguing for a neo-stoic position: namely that a judgment about a valuable object 
                                                 
48
 Nussbaum, M., Upheavals of Thought, ibid. 1-2. Nussbaum also expends great energy on animal 
emotions; however, this aspect of her theory lies beyond the reach of the present discussion.  
49
 ibid. 27 
50
 ibid. 33ff 
51
 ibid. 37 
 
 36 
which is not under the agent’s total control will be an emotional evaluation of that 
object not a mere assent to its appearance. Thus she ‘claims that grief is identical 
with the acceptance of a proposition that is both evaluative and eudaimonistic’.
52
 For 
example, when Nussbaum considers the death of her mother from cancer – an event 
or object which was by no means under her total control – her perception of reality 
involves an evaluative content, namely the emotion of grief by which she 
intelligently responds to this uncontrolled death. Her emotion is intentionally 
directed towards an object (her mother’s death) in the sense that, by her grief, 
Nussbaum sees the object internally, interprets it from her own perspective and 
believes certain things about its value. All human emotions involve these evaluating 
judgments and are characteristically directed to ‘intentional objects’, such as other 
human beings, which are ‘external’ to the subject, that is, beyond her total control. 
We note that ‘external’, for Nussbaum, does not necessarily mean beyond one’s 
physical body since there are many aspects of one’s own body (including the brain) 
that are not under one’s total control. 
Nussbaum goes further by saying that, for her emotion to be an emotion, the 
object of her emotion – in this case, the death of her mother – must be of significance 
for Martha Nussbaum. Emotions are focused on objects beyond the agent’s control 
which are significant to the subject’s ‘eudaimonistic’ plans to achieve a flourishing 
life.
53
 This eudaimonistic dimension is vital for her whole project since it organises 
the way in which valuation occurs and thus the objects towards which emotions can 
be directed. For the sake of conceptual clarity we should distinguish (a) the claim 
that emotions are focused on objects beyond the agent’s total control, (b) the claim 
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that emotions focus on objects valued through eudaimonistic interpretation and (c) 
the claim that valuation is necessarily eudaimonistic valuation. None of these claims 
can simply be inferred from either or both of the others and all will be called into 
question as we proceed. However, Nussbaum links all three so that emotions focus 
on objects which matter to the agent’s conception of her own happiness but which 
are not totally controlled by the agent. In so doing, she introduces the key notion of 
vulnerability into the heart of her account of emotions. On Nussbaum’s story, objects 
which she fully controls cannot be objects of her emotions. However, once an agent 
eudaimonistically values objects which are beyond her total control, she has 
‘hostages to fortune [and] she lets herself in for the entire gamut of the emotions.’
54
 
For whatever befalls the uncontrolled, valued object – be it Nussbaum’s mother or, 
on a more obviously altruistic note, the cause of homosexuals in the USA – will be 
perceived emotionally by the subject. Emotions will change as the fortunes of these 
valued objects change. Thus, as ‘far as the passage from one emotion to the other 
goes, one is in the hands of the world.’
55
 The upheavals of the world come upon us 
and upon the objects of our emotions and bring about corresponding upheavals of 
thought. Thus ‘the geography of the world as seen by the emotions has two salient 
features: uncontrolled movement, and differences of height and depth.’
56
 This move 
also accounts crucially for the urgency – which Nussbaum glosses as ‘heat’ without 
meaning anything physical – that accompanies emotion and which is often confused 
with irrationality by non-cognitivist theorists. As Nussbaum says, ‘bringing thought 
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about well-being right into the structure of emotion, shows why it is the emotion 
itself, and not some further reaction to it, that has urgency and heat.’
57
  
The account follows a highly nuanced path which cannot be traced in full 
detail here.
58
 Suffice to say that emotions, for Nussbaum, are cognitive, evaluative, 
intentional beliefs about external objects which are vulnerable to upheaval and which 
are valuable because of the subject’s eudaimonistic outlook. What is of particular 
interest here is how she specifically develops this theory in the matrix of political 
society. To grasp this element of her theory, one final component of Nussbaum’s 
thought must be briefly reviewed. As we will see, she considers the education of 
emotion an important political goal. But education is conceived in the context of a 
certain account of how children develop psychologically. She analyses human 
emotions by beginning in the infant human experience of attachment to uncontrolled 
objects in the world such as food and care-givers which appear and disappear in 
ways which both support and run counter to the infant’s awareness that all things are 
apparently coordinated to the infant’s needs. The infant’s experience of being totally 
dependent on uncontrolled objects of great importance to its well-being forms early 
object relations and emotional attachments. 
Nussbaum shows how these emotions arise again in a seemingly uncontrolled 
way at inexplicable moments in adult life and are thus mistakenly thought of as non-
cognitive, uncontrollable forces like the wind. What is happening in adult emotions 
is that our complex infantile and childhood experiences are continuing to shape our 
thoughts about reality. As infants, we struggle with our lack of control and utter 
dependence; we only come to understand it later when our self-consciousness 
                                                 
57
 ibid. 78 
58
 Cf. ibid. 24-88 for Nussbaum’s full cognitive account. 
 
 39 
emerges and we learn to distinguish ourselves from our carers and appreciate them as 
others. But because of these infant experiences, Nussbaum argues that the 
 
roots of anger, hatred and disgust lie very deep in the structure of human life, in our 





Nussbaum is by no means suggesting a return to a rationalist thesis that we should 
bring these infantile emotions under the control of reason or that we should “grow 
up” into unemotional, adult choosers. Nor is she inviting us to become ashamed of 
our human neediness, fragility and lack of control from which emotions stem. Rather 
her goal is to explain how our emotions, as thoughts about the world derived from 
our contingent, uncontrolled, initially infantile personal narratives, should evaluate 
our fragile reality and thereby contribute to an emotionally healthy common life. 
Such a life will not be one of infantile dependence nor of atomic independence. 
Rather, since we all live needy lives, what we all need is ‘mature interdependence’. 
In this state,  
 
the child is able to accept the fact that those whom she loves and continues to need are 
separate from her and not mere instruments of her will...[She is then willing to] 




Adult love is not possessive but rather respects the separateness of the other while 
identifying with the other as a fellow vulnerable person. From here one can see why 
Nussbaum believes that the central emotion which ought to characterise this mature 
interdependence in political relations will be compassion since others with whom we 
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share interdependence are vulnerable to suffering just as we are. For we are all 
equally ‘in the hands of the world’.
61
  
In developing her psychological account, she is highly sensitive to the way 
that political authority operates to educate emotions in particular traditions and 
cultures. One tradition may favour some emotions over others such as the Norwegian 
preference for the gloominess of the forest. Others may have cultural practices which 
must be considered when implementing a political programme such as the tendency 
of Western mothers to gaze into the eyes of their children when contrasted with the 
Indian practice of carrying children on the hip and so out of eye contact.
62
 Thus she 
perceives that ‘beliefs can be powerfully shaped by social norms’
63
 and that the 
‘nature of this framework [of beliefs] will shape the emotions.’
64
 
It is in light of these observations that Nussbaum develops her political 
programme. She strongly supports the study of literature and especially tragedy in 
schools. Such studies, she believes, enable the ‘extension of concern’ among citizens. 
Tragedy deepens ‘the ability to imagine the experiences of others and to participate 
in their sufferings.’
65
 Through witnessing such performances, people can learn an 
emotional repertoire which is then turned to making appropriate judgments in real 
life when facing comparable circumstances. Such education is but one example of 
Nussbaum’s political programme which also touches visual art, music, the media, 
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welfare provision and criminal procedures.
66
 The overall goal is ‘to overcome mental 
obstacles to full political rationality’ which includes ‘rationality in emotion.’
67
  
Having established that mature interdependence is the core of a healthy 
political society and that compassion is the paradigm political emotion, Nussbaum 
proposes three cognitive judgments which are intrinsic to the emotional reasoning by 
which compassion is directed to another human being in any given situation. 
Nussbaum reckons that each of these judgments is a constituent part of and necessary 
condition for compassion, that all three judgments are jointly sufficient for 
compassion and that the simultaneous presence of the three judgments will constitute 
compassion.
68
 The first judgment examines the seriousness of the situation which 
another human being is experiencing – whether it has ‘size’ or is merely trivial. A 
traffic jam would normally not be sufficiently serious to warrant compassion (unless 
the jam was making one late for a funeral, for example) but an abusive husband 
would almost certainly qualify. The second judgment considers whether it was the 
person’s fault that she was in trouble or whether a dreadful calamity had befallen her 
or, as often happens, there was a mixture of the two. In a mixed case, further 
discernment is required though this discernment is left somewhat vague by 
Nussbaum. Compassion will be more appropriate, nonetheless, in the case of 
calamity than in the case of fault.  
The third judgment ascertains whether the predicament affecting the other 
person (the external object) – perhaps starvation, poor schooling or an unjust tax 
burden – falls within the subject’s own plans for the good life yet is not fully under 
her control while also – though this is less important – being a predicament which the 
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subject herself can imagine suffering. This third is the eudaimonistic judgment which 
restricts compassion to cases where the one feeling compassion (the subject) 
understands the external object to have significance for her.
69
 The imaginative-
epistemological qualification to this third act of judgment stems from Aristotle’s and 
Rousseau’s criterion concerning the similarity of persons. This criterion works by 
reckoning that each person is acutely aware that the predicament another person 
finds themselves in could potentially become their own predicament. Thus an 
awareness of one’s own weakness and vulnerability is an epistemologically valuable 
aid to becoming aware that the cognitive-evaluative requirements for compassion 
have been met in any given situation. When these three judgments are present 
together, compassion – a belief about the situation of the person (or animal) in 
question – will also be present. 
Compassion is open to rational assessment on Nussbaum’s account. Since we 
are at least partially responsible for our development into mature interdependence so 
that we no longer remain in the infantile state, it would be a failure in maturity if we 
were not to be compassionate when appropriate. This is not to say, as we will see, 
that Nussbaum simply blames people for not displaying compassion. A failure to 
grow out of infantile emotional fantasies is a moral failure for which we may be 
partly responsible but for which others, such as early childhood carers, may well 
share responsibility. However, it does mean that, for Nussbaum, emotions such as 
compassion are essentially ethical and political since they shape our view of the 
world and so our understanding of the kind of actions which are appropriate. 
Although emotions are not actions, they are intrinsic to practical reasoning as 
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evaluations of objects concerning which action might be taken. Thus emotions are 
open to ethical scrutiny along with other aspects of practical reasoning.
70
  
Nussbaum applies this basic thesis about the ethical nature of human 
emotions to a variety of human social and political experiences. Emotions are not 
simply psychological adjuncts to practical reasoning but rather, as cognitive-
evaluative forms of judgment, are of the essence of a particular subject’s view of the 
good life or flourishing. Since similar emotions are often commonly experienced by 
many people in the same society, emotions are also essential to a society’s view of 
the common good. For emotions, as acknowledgements of value, will influence what 
we do in some way with respect to that value.
71
 And so it matters enormously 
whether and concerning what and on what grounds a society feels compassion. 
Emotions, including compassion, which do not accord with mature interdependence 
will not value what serves the good of a particular subject or what conduces to the 
good of society. Immature emotions will not see and judge the world rightly. Without 
mature emotions, the actions of individuals and of the political representatives of 





Further elements of Nussbaum’s theory of emotion will be examined at a later stage 
in the thesis. At this juncture a preliminary assessment of her contribution will 
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introduce issues which will be of repeated interest. This assessment will come in two 
parts: first, more briefly, examining the account of emotion itself; second, 
considering the broader political implications of the account. 
First, the thesis proposed here will cohere to some extent with Nussbaum’s 
central claim that emotion (affection) is at least partially defined by cognitive 
intentionality. The critical arguments against feeling-centred conceptions of emotion 
which were presented above seem conclusive. Moreover, the arguments in favour of 
a cognitive account of emotion are also persuasive: philosophy of emotion in the 
twentieth century has been wise to observe that emotions have objects and that they 
are some kind of thoughts or beliefs about those objects. Our concept of affection will 
be likewise intentional and cognitive. More precision concerning what kind of 
intentional thoughts affections are and how they relate to valuation and agency will 
be taken up in detail in chapter two. However, it is hoped that enough has been said 
by this point to establish that any account of emotion (affection) will have to take 
very seriously their intentional, cognitive, evaluative nature.  
In order to assess what bearing Nussbaum’s thesis may have on a theological 
account of affection, we should observe that she focuses her analysis on emotions 
such as fear, anger, envy, jealousy, grief and compassion. Nussbaum’s attention to 
the weakness and neediness of human experience is exceptionally sensitive and 
thorough, illustrated by her own careful introspection on her experience of her 
mother’s death while she, a helpless daughter, was still in an aeroplane on her 
hurried way to the hospital. However, her understandable focus on human 
vulnerability in a world of upheavals means first that the emphasis falls on those 
emotions which relate to frailty and weakness and second that other emotions which 
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might seem to pertain to more settled objects assume an ambiguous position. This is 
particularly apparent in her treatment of joy. Grief and fear are common features of 
Nussbaum’s account of vulnerable objects but joy is seen much more rarely in the 
text and is given a much less significant place in the system. Its first important 
appearance is at the funeral of Nussbaum’s mother where ‘joy masters grief’ because 
of the ‘judgment that [her] mother was in certain crucial respects not gone from the 
world.’
72
 Nussbaum reports that this judgment was itself based on ‘the speeches of 
many whose lives she had helped…since they proved the continuity of her influence 
in the world.’
73
 Later we come close to a systematic account of joy which says that 
only ‘[s]ome varieties of joy’ are characterised by ‘vulnerability to reversal’ while 
other varieties are not like this but are still emotions.
74
 Such an account shows 
intellectual honesty since Nussbaum is not trying to press all emotions into one 
definition all of the time. However, it raises the suspicion that her focus on 
vulnerability and her way of dealing with it bring about a certain implausibility. This 
suspicion only grows with respect to Nussbaum’s account of ‘background’ joy.
75
 
Background emotions are emotions which continue to be present even when they are 
not felt and which are judgments that are enduringly present as acknowledgments of 
what is valuable in life. Specifically, background joy may be present ‘when one’s 
work is going well, when one’s children are flourishing, when an important 
relationship is going smoothly.’
76
  
The central difficulty for Nussbaum’s approach comes with reconciling this 
account of joy with the idea that emotions are characteristically directed towards 
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unstable, vulnerable objects. It seems that most forms of joy are quite different from 
this and are directed towards apparently stable, relatively safe objects. The 
descriptions of the kind of objects Nussbaum specifies are just like this. Things seem 
to be going along well and there are no obvious threats or perils to contend with. 
Even Nussbaum’s delicately expressed joy at her mother’s funeral was a joy in some 
sort of stability which arose after the death of her mother in the form of memory. But 
such joy is quite different from an emotion focussed on a vulnerable object in a 
world of upheaval. No doubt Nussbaum’s emphasis on vulnerability is traceable to 
her neo-stoic position which rightly counters stoicism’s approach to emotion which 
denied that vulnerability was the mark of the wise man. However, it seems as though 
her way of handling vulnerability and her concomitant attention to grief and fear 
makes a thorough or plausible account of joy harder to attain. If a steady joy 
corresponds to anything in her account it must be to those varieties of joy which, 
contra the Stoics, are emotions but are not really typical emotions. If this is her view, 
then settled joy is not a mainstream emotion. Nussbaum’s account of the world’s 
upheavals and our helplessness in face of them renders that kind of joy illusory and a 
relatively unimportant emotion-type. For her, the joy of an infant in being held is 
coloured by the infantile narcissism which believes that the world revolves around 
him.
77
 Dispelling the illusion of such joy and replacing it with emotions geared to 
interdependent fragility is what the learning experience of maturity is substantially 
about. While taking very seriously the fragility of earthly life, Christian theology 
offers a substantially different account of joy which has a contrasting approach to 
vulnerability and will be explored in chapter two. 
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A further observation is that Nussbaum’s particular understanding of 
intentional emotion reflects a concept of the moral subject as the centre of a world 
which stands in sharp distinction from and over against that subject. Although little 
rests on etymology per se, ‘emotion’ has a linguistic bias which is peculiarly 
appropriate to Nussbaum, stemming from a Latin root indicating a “moving-out-
from”. What is important is Nussbaum’s conceptual emphasis on emotions as 
unstable outwards movements. This “moving outwards” does not necessarily refer to 
any sense of physical distance since Nussbaum has already argued that ‘external 
objects’ are not necessarily physically outside the agent in question. Rather, 
Nussbaum’s concept of emotion renders the individual subject the uncontested centre 
and prime determining feature of any emotion and thereby designates the rest of the 
world as something alien to the subject, that out towards which the subject 
eudaimonistically thinks and acts. The radical subjectivisation of emotion within a 
eudaimonistic framework implies a conceptual dissociation of the subject from the 
world. The subject appears apart from and at odds with a world which at any moment 
may itself lunge into the subject’s deep wounds like a knife and then be grasped in 
emotion.
78
 Thus, although for Nussbaum emotions are judgments about the world 
and although these judgments are carefully located within social and psychological 
narratives,
79
 they are still judgments about the world from within a significantly 
individualistic account of human existence in which the emotional individual is not 
of the same order as the world but encounters it as something other than herself and 
normally threatening. Although the Christian doctrine of the Fall will share 
something with Nussbaum’s account of a dangerous world, the Christian doctrines of 
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a good created order within which creatures are at home and a new creation towards 
which creatures journey as pilgrims run quite counter to the view of the world as a 
knife.  
Second, Nussbaum’s far-reaching philosophical framework has particular 
implications for the political role of emotions. In itself, this is unexceptional. All 
definitions of emotion will operate within some implicit or explicit philosophy which 
will have some bearing on politics. However, for Nussbaum, the philosophical 
framework has assumed an impressively organising form so that all human life is 
conceptualised eudaimonistically and emotions are only conceptualised in relation to 
those partially or totally uncontrolled factors which surround an agent’s and a 
society’s eudaimonistic plans with uncertainty. This philosophical commitment does 
important political work for Nussbaum. It enables her to coordinate her theory within 
a liberal democratic framework which aims to secure an individual’s freedom to 
choose concerning his or her vision of the good over against a world which might 
seek to threaten that freedom. Such a description of emotions operating at the 
frontiers of an individual’s area of control amounts to a psychological version of the 
Millian harm principle.
80
 Emotions are the way in which individuals psychologically 
negotiate the difficult terrain which sets the scene for life in a fragile world where 
other-dependence is essential and yet where threats to vulnerable objects are 
pervasive. Emotion towards objects within the agent’s area of total control is 
typically not possible on Nussbaum’s account; it is almost always when valuable 
objects are out of the agent’s control that emotion comes into play. However, as 
noted above, she wisely does not make the dogmatic move that emotions are thus 
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essentially to do with objects that are vulnerable to surprise and reversal. Indeed, she 
moderates her initial series of claims about emotions by saying that ‘most of the 
time’, emotions are about uncontrolled objects. She admits that some ‘varieties of 
love and joy’ may not involve ‘instability’ in the sense of vulnerability to surprise 
and reversal and she distances herself from the Stoic position that these are not really 
emotions. However, it remains the case that the typical emotion will record a ‘sense 
of vulnerability and imperfect control.’
81
  
 The implications of this position are intriguing when set in a political 
context. For emotion, on Nussbaum’s reckoning, is perfectly suited to a person who 
is navigating between other citizens in a liberal democracy where relationships are 
organised around control. A citizen has some level of control of himself as a bodily 
being and certain other objects such as his vote, property, labour, children and 
activities to achieve social justice. According to Nussbaum, emotions are directed 
towards those objects inasmuch as they are partially uncontrolled by the citizen in the 
context she finds herself. Other citizens, government authorities or simply changing 
circumstances are all potential threats (or supports) to the citizens’ eudaimonistic 
plans. But the overwhelming factor which determines whether and what emotion is 
appropriate remains whether or not valued objects are totally ‘controlled’ by the 
individual. 
Two observations are pertinent here. On the one hand, one might object that, 
by allowing ‘external objects’ to dictate our emotions which have substantial 
influence on action, Nussbaum is diminishing the dignity of human agency by 
defining it so closely in relation to uncontrolled aspects of human experience. 
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Nussbaum is able to escape this critique by challenging this view of autonomous, 
autarkic control with her account of mature interdependence which recognises the 
inevitability of uncontrol. Interdependence contrasts with traditional Kantian 
accounts of autonomous control which promote the illusion of self-sufficient 
imperviousness to the world and especially to our need for others. Nussbaum is 
particularly critical of political environments which encourage this illusion such as 
the cult of impenetrable, steely German soldiers
82
 and the modern American 
‘cultivation of a body image of perfect muscular power and hardness’.
83
 She is also 
critical of the contractarian myth which she reckons fuels such illusions of 
independence. On these points, her analysis seems persuasive.  
On the other hand, not all cultures or worldviews conceptualise human 
subjectivity with respect to control of an uncontrolled and substantially 
‘ungovernable’ world.
84
 In a world conceived in this way, however, the role of 
government as a form of control is essential in order to provide a relatively peaceful 
environment for people to grow into mature interdependence. Although Nussbaum 
gives a sophisticated treatment to some cultures, she seems to think politically solely 
in terms of a certain kind of constitutional liberal democracy. This is especially clear 
in her defence of ‘compassion’ as the paradigm political emotion. Compassion, on 
Nussbaum’s account, is constituted by the three judgments (seriousness, fault, 
eudaimonistic-epistemological considerations) and acknowledges that another person 
is in need and that that need is not totally controlled by the one feeling compassion. 
So far, so clear. However, difficulties arise on a political level when one seeks to 
define what counts as an appropriate object of compassion. Nussbaum comments that  
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we want not just any and every type of compassion, but, so to speak, compassion 
within the limits of reason, compassion allied to a reasonable ethical theory in the 




That standard turns out to depend on ‘basic rights and liberties’ guaranteed by the 
constitution and concerning ‘certain basic goods’ which are in turn ascertained 
‘through a process of judicial interpretation.’ Nussbaum names these rights and 
liberties as a set of ‘capabilities, or opportunities for functioning’ and then proceeds 
to list and briefly to describe the core capabilities which define the way that 
compassion should function. Two examples will suffice: according to Nussbaum, 
compassion will be appropriate towards those who do not have the opportunity to 
fulfil their capability to form affiliations with others involving the giving and 
receiving of concern and respect; compassion will also be appropriate towards those 
who do not have opportunity to fulfil their capability of bodily integrity which 
includes ‘choice in matters of reproduction’.
86
 Consideration of capabilities like these 
is intended to bring a rational conclusion to any disagreement about what constitutes 
public compassion and, as such, will bring an end to emotional disagreements. 
 This treatment of compassion makes explicit Nussbaum’s rationale for the 
political significance of emotions. She believes that societies need people who have 
matured in such a way that they conform to rational compassion and so acknowledge 
that they themselves should be concerned for others’ needs. Such an 
acknowledgement will influence people’s view of society and so assist political 
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action in addressing the needs which have been acknowledged in emotion. Without 
the acknowledgment, people’s needs will be neglected.  
Nussbaum’s belief that judicial process is the key to determining the 
rationality of any particular example of compassion is not without its difficulties. Her 
account is dependent on ‘judges who exemplify rationality…[which means] judges 
who are properly emotional.’
87
 In this moment, she recognises that she cannot herself 
adjudicate between possible examples of rational compassion and instead entrusts 
that task to the discretion of judges. This seems to be an evasion of philosophical 
responsibility. For such a move by no means decides what the right kind of 
compassion is and furthermore opens up a whole new question as to what constitutes 
the right sort of judge. Philosophers may of course theorise about the discretion of 
judges but it seems that Nussbaum is actually recruiting them to complete the 
unfinished aspects of her theory. One wonders whether she would be quite so willing 
to move in this direction were the voting majority of the US Supreme Court such as 
not to feel compassionately for the woman whose capability legally to abort an 
unwanted fertilised embryo was not supported by her state legislature. A trust in 
judges seems hardly suited to serve Nussbaum’s own political programme. 
In any case, grounding compassion in the decision of judges who preside over 
lists of rights/capabilities is far too closely tied to quite particular claims about 
constitutional liberal democracy for it to gain widespread support. An appeal to the 
courts to determine the rationality of compassion is not an obvious move in many 
cultures, even democratic ones. Traditions and institutions which are not essentially 
bound up with coercive judgment may well provide much more coherent ways of 
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thinking about compassion than legally enforceable judgment. Nussbaum would be 
far from denying that institutions are of great importance for creating what she would 
call ‘facilitating environments’.
88
 However, it seems uncertain whether her 
commitment to the judicial and procedural elements of liberal democracy is as 
hospitable to institutional emotions as she believes. The claim that institutions, 
tradition and the memory they contain should be conceptualised differently cannot be 
defended in any detail here but will be explored in the rest of the thesis, especially 
chapters three and four. 
 But how is all this related to control, that essential element in Nussbaum’s 
concept of emotion? Quite simply, the appeal to the judicial process is a bid for some 
sort of control in an otherwise uncontrolled world. Just as, on the standard liberal 
contractarian story, autonomous individuals are limited by the government they have 
jointly established, so emotion needs some ordered limits lest consensus about what 
counts as appropriate compassion be constantly overturned by the upheavals of the 
world. Government and the courts provide those limits and so regulate the central 
political emotion. However, this bid for control is only necessary because of the prior 
claim about the nature of the world we inhabit, namely that it is essentially 
uncontrolled and needs to be tamed by the forces of man, especially their political 
force. Grief, fear and indignation will receive greater attention than joy in such a 
world since politics is essentially about engagement with uncontrolled objects which 
give rise to those negative emotions.  
 Human control exerted amidst uncontrolled disorder is hardly the only way of 
understanding the place of politics in the world. Christian political thought has 
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offered a variety of ways of interpreting reality which allow both for the sovereign 
presence of Almighty God and for an ongoing order within creation which political 
authority is called to preserve and foster. On this reckoning, politics does not create 
order but rather is itself created and given to humanity for its benefit by God. There 
is theological disagreement about whether such authority was given before or after 
the entrance of sin into the world. On an Augustinian reading, for example, human 
political authority is a necessary provision against sin and is treated as a temporary 
expedient for the sake of the maintenance of peaceful creaturely life in a 
providentially governed moral order rather than as the ultimate form of control in an 
otherwise ungoverned and ungovernable world of upheavals. On a Thomist view, 
political authority was already given in creation that humanity might hold it for the 
common good but was then adapted in function in light of the Fall. Whichever 
approach is taken, the sovereignty of God is recognised. Without some assumption of 
the sovereignty of God in human affairs whereby political authority is raised up, 
political theory must establish its own account of sovereignty. The contrasting 
Christian account of politics undermines the need for humans to create control first 
because order is already present within the structure of the created order which, 
though fallen, is still good and second because it is God who raises up the political 
authorities that exist. As we will see, modern political philosophy’s lack of aptitude 
and plausibility with respect to affections can be traced to some extent to this self-
imposed quest for self-sufficiency. Nussbaum’s marked tendency to prioritise 
negative emotions and uncontrol in political relations and to theorise order through 
the courts rather than primarily through God is one highly sophisticated instance of 
this approach.  
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In summary, Nussbaum’s account of emotions systematically lays out issues 
and questions which this account of affections must address. The problems of 
intentionality, evaluation and cognition are given sensitive, sustained and, at times, 
compelling treatment. She also indicates the reason why emotion is relevant to 
political considerations in her analysis of the cultural and social formation of 
emotion and her proposals for education, media and law reform. Whether the 
expensive metaphysical and eudaimonistic postulates adopted by Nussbaum actually 
pay their way as explanations of human life remains to be seen. This discussion will 
return to whether Nussbaum’s account is sufficiently supple to explain those human 
“affections” which a theological account would have great concern for namely 
gladness, joy and wonder. It will be particularly important to see whether an account 
of the settled nature of a created and vindicated moral order and, indeed, the presence 
of extraordinary forms of control or ordering, such as God’s eschatological, 
providential activity and the work of the Holy Spirit, have greater explanatory power. 
Notwithstanding these possibilities, this survey of Martha Nussbaum’s weighty 
contribution to the theory of emotions has opened up some important issues which 
will be of central concern to the theological approach we will be developing. We 
now need to examine in more detail the nature of “affection” and its role in human 
morality. This will be the task of chapter two and will lay the groundwork for our 




Chapter 2: Affections 
 
We began by asking about the nature of affections, their role in human morality and 
their place in political relations. We will now explore the first two of these questions 
in greater depth. To conduct this exploration, we will first argue for and describe the 
way that affections are the beginnings of our understanding and thus key to human 
morality. We will then proceed to enquire whether and how affections might endure 
over time, might be shared by a number of people and might also have a role at the 
end of our understanding as well as at the beginning.  
 
Section I: Affections as the beginnings of understanding  
 
To begin with “beginnings” requires some explanation. Our claim in this section is 
that affections are the beginnings of understanding. What is intended by 
“beginnings” is the way that moral reflection and deliberation are initiated or entered 
into by a person or group of people. A beginning is the start of a process of moral 
thinking, the way that individuals and communities get going in moral reflection, 
deliberation and action. When we claim that affections are the beginnings of 
understanding, we are saying both that people have some understanding of the world 
in which they plan to act before they set about their moral reflection, deliberation and 
enterprises and that their understanding is at least partially affective. Whether or not 
this initial, affective understanding is a right understanding of the world is another 
question. The focus of our argument at this point is towards showing how affections 
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have an initiatory role in understanding the world which is then followed by further 
moral reasoning.  
So what is not intended by the term “beginnings” is an aspect of life which is 
abstracted from the narrative of a particular moral agent, community or political 
society. A “beginning” is not a completely fresh start, an unattached, de-historicised 
foray into the world. Beginnings are always beginnings within a particular life which 
is, in turn, set within a certain culture, history and tradition. Moreover, beginnings 
will be preceded and followed by other beginnings. Thus we might have a process of 
moral reflection and deliberation which begins, proceeds and reaches a conclusion 
which then, in turn, leads on at some point to further beginnings of moral reflection 
and deliberation.  
Investigating how we begin our moral reflection and deliberation is important 
for our purposes primarily because what we think about how we begin will affect 
what we count as an acceptable beginning. For example, we may regard our own or 
others’ moral reasoning and practical enterprises which are initiated in the midst of 
‘emotion’ as of more dubious moral worth than those begun without the presence of 
strong feelings or, indeed, feelings of any sort. Moreover, whatever view we take 
concerning beginnings has the potential to affect how we actually do begin which in 
turn may affect how and whither we proceed in our thought and action. Were we 
self-consciously to determine that our emotions or some other feature of our 
cognitive abilities were to initiate all our subsequent decision making, then this 
would be highly significant for the conduct of our lives. Thus when we investigate 
the beginnings of our practical enterprises we are, in an important sense, 
investigating the whole of morality. This is not to say that the beginning one makes 
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determines the end one reaches but rather that the nature of the journey which our 
practical reasoning and engagements takes will be substantially organised by what 
kind of beginning we make.  
 
Beginnings in Aristotle 
 
In order to explore what might be an accurate account of beginnings, we will now 
consider several different conceptions of beginning. We turn first to a classic 
problem in Aristotle’s writings which concerns just this issue of how moral thought 
and practical enterprises are begun. Aristotle is peculiarly important to our research 
both because of the account he gives of emotions (pathe, πάθη) and because of the 
influence his ethics have had on Christian moral epistemology as we shall see both in 
this chapter and later on. On the specific question of beginnings, scholars contest 
whether Aristotle’s practically wise man has a highly defined, reflective knowledge 
of the nature of the supreme good for man, eudaimonia (εὐδαιµονία), before he 
begins to deliberate about action. The practically wise man is able to engage in moral 
reflection concerning the supreme good inasmuch as he is able to see the structure of 
goods in which the supreme good consists. Moral deliberation about what to do in 
relation to the supreme good and its constituent parts journeys from that reflective 
knowledge of reality towards decision about action. The controversy surrounds how 
comprehensive a reflective knowledge is possible before deliberation begins.  
An illustrative exchange appears in David Bostock’s discussion of Sarah 
Broadie.
1
 Broadie holds that Aristotle did not believe that a highly detailed pre-
                                                 
1
 Bostock, D., Aristotle’s Ethics, OUP, 2000, 82-96 
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deliberative knowledge of the good was possible. She supports this claim by 
observing that Aristotle neither describes the supreme good in detail, nor any people 
who have such an end in mind nor an indication of how we might come to specify 
what such an end is.
2
 By contrast, Bostock believes that Aristotle’s detailed argument 
indicates that he did think that the practically wise man must have an exhaustive 
account of the end. Although Aristotle may not claim to be able to define such an end 
himself, he seems to believe that the practically wise man, since he has all the virtues 
– what Bostock calls ‘full virtue’
3
 – must have what Socrates called ‘knowledge of 
the good’ which, in Aristotle’s terms, is a ‘true apprehension’ of eudaimonia. Thus to 
make sense of Aristotle’s claim that ‘as soon as this one thing, practical wisdom, is 
present, all the virtues will be present too’
4
 one ‘must take it that [Aristotle’s account 
of ‘true apprehension’] includes a clear view of all the different things that go 
together to make up εὐδαιµονία, and of how they fit together.’
5
 Thus, though 
Aristotle does not hold simply to the Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge, he does 
believe that there is a clear knowledge of the end which goes hand in hand with 
virtue. With this and other arguments, Bostock persuasively sets aside Broadie’s 
position.  
According to Bostock, the full, reflective knowledge of the good prior to 
deliberation is arranged around a certain teleological conception of moral reality. 
Aristotle’s teleology is thoroughgoing in the sense that it permeates not only the 
natural order of relations but also the form of the moral life, so that the two are 
construed as one organic whole. By this move every kind of question about what the 
                                                 
2
 Broadie, S., Ethics with Aristotle, OUP, 1991, 198 
3
 Bostock, D., Aristotle’s Ethics, 86-7 
4
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bywater (ed.), OUP, 1894, 1144b32-1145a2 
5
 Bostock, D., Aristotle’s Ethics, 87; italics original 
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good is and what to do about it can be considered and decided on in advance by 
being coordinated teleologically within the supreme good. In Aristotle, reflection is 
not a matter of constant, engaged exploration and consideration of the world. Rather, 
according to Bostock, Aristotle posits the possibility of attaining complete, reflective 
knowledge of the good before deliberation about how to achieve the good begins, 
thus excluding the necessity of an ongoing process of investigative reflection.  
Bostock asks whether Aristotle holds that this knowledge of eudaimonia, as a 
necessary first principle of action, is provided by socially habituated virtue of 
character or by nous (νοῦς), an intellectual capacity which is capable of 
apprehending both particulars and universals perceived through those particulars. He 
shows that nous is the key to attaining this knowledge while habituated virtue 
prevents vice from obscuring the intellectual grasp of the supreme good specified in 
the detailed account of eudaimonia. On Bostock’s thesis, when Aristotle describes 
virtue of character as a mean disposition to have the right feelings which are 
themselves in harmony with reason and thus lead to right actions, those virtues, 
feelings and actions are all organised towards a highly detailed, intellectually defined 
vision of the good life, a vision already known and depended upon at the beginning, 
before deliberation may begin.  
With Bostock’s interpretation in mind, we consider Aristotle’s treatment of 
emotions or ‘feelings’ (πάθη). Aristotle proposes that just as actions need to be done 
at the right time and in the right way so too feelings, as belonging to the semi-
rational part of the soul which can listen to reason (as a child listens to his father) but 
does not have reason ‘in itself’,
6
 should be similarly coordinated to the mean. 
                                                 
6
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a1-3 
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Feelings are important for Aristotle because the virtuous action is only virtuous if the 
agent has pleasurable feelings for the virtuous action for its own sake. Moreover, 
such feelings in accord with right reason can only come about by habituation and 
training from one’s youth.
7
 
This account is not without its difficulties. Not only does Aristotle suggest 
that the mean may apply to feelings independently of its application to actions
8
 but 
he also does not specifically connect particular feelings to all particular virtues. 
Instead he interprets some virtues as dispositions simply to act but other virtues as 
dispositions to feel and then act: neither the generous man nor the magnificent man, 
for example, is described in terms of their feelings.
9
 Feelings are thus not thoroughly 
integrated into Aristotle’s account of virtue and action in his doctrine of the mean, 
which, as the notorious example of the virtue of honesty shows, is itself hardly 
without its problems.
10
 Moreover, there are further difficulties as to exactly how 
feelings might hit the mean since it is clear that feeling in a middling way in some 
situations would be inappropriate (e.g. only feeling anger in a middling way about 
something which one should be extremely angry about). Although there are 
charitable readings of Aristotle which seek to interpret the doctrine of the mean as 
emphasising the frequency of emotion or the object of emotion, even such readings 
do not attempt to excuse him from all confusion.
11
 Most important for our purposes 
                                                 
7
 ibid. 1104b3-11  
8
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1107a8-12 
9
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1107b8-21; Bostock comments that ‘Neither of them are 
characterized in terms of any emotion, but simply with respect to their actions.’ Bostock further notes 
that honesty, ready wit and friendliness are similarly unconnected to particular feelings and that the 
attempt to connect justice to a particular feeling is ‘notoriously unsuccessful.’ (Bostock, D., Aristotle’s 
Ethics, 48) 
10
 ibid. 45-50 
11
 ibid. 43; also 35fn10: ‘The truth is that Aristotle’s division of the soul (in the EN) is not given in 
sufficient detail to allow us to answer many of the questions that one might wish to raise about it.’ 
Moreover, it seems that there are occasionally direct contradictions between Aristotle’s views in the 
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and in light of modern theory of emotions, the intentional quality of emotion which 
indicates that emotions do have an essentially cognitive quality did not impress 
Aristotle sufficiently to allow that emotions have reason in themselves. This is a 
significant parting of the ways, a conceptual separation which is not overcome by 
Aristotle’s claim that emotion can listen to reason. For it is this subordination of 
emotion to reason in the wise man which suggests that the right sequence is that 
emotion is not a suitable beginning to moral reflection and deliberation. By contrast, 
the idea that emotion is essentially cognitive suggests that it is at least possible that it 
does and should have an initiatory role. 
A more lengthy discussion of Aristotelian doctrine – if there is one single, 
coherent Aristotelian doctrine – is not required for our purposes. From what has been 
said, we may make the following five substantial points which assist us in answering 
our basic questions: first, that what Aristotle thought about the humanly possible 
level of specification of eudaimonia is much disputed though it seems that the weight 
of the evidence of the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics points towards Aristotle 
holding that a highly specified knowledge of the end is both accessible to the 
virtuous, practically wise man and is the necessary precursor to deliberation; second, 
that the way to grasp this specified end is by nous, supported by habituated virtue; 
third, that the success of the work of deliberative moral reason in reasoning about the 
means to the end (ta pros to telos, τα προς το τέλος) must then depend on the prior 
excellence of the work of nous in establishing the end; fourth, that feelings, since 
                                                                                                                                          
Nicomachean Ethics and in the Politics. This is especially striking with respect to βούλησις (boulesis): 
in the Ethics it is distinguished from επ̓ιθυµία (epithumia) and θυµός (thumos) as that which has 
reason in itself compared to the other two which only partake in or listen to reason (Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, 11667b7-8; 1095a10-11; cf. 1111b11-30 for the basic division into the three 
varieties of appetition; cf. Bostock, D., Aristotle’s Ethics 34fn6); but in the Politics, βούλησις is 
explicitly assigned to the unreasoning part of the soul. 
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they ‘partake in reason’ only by ‘listening to’ the deliverances of nous, do not 
precede reflective knowledge of the nature of eudaimonia and are thus not 
“beginnings” in our sense; fifth that feelings, although they may, when obedient to 
reason, have some role in the pursuit of eudaimonia with respect to select virtues of 
character, are not convincingly or fully integrated into Aristotle’s account of the 
virtuous life.  
Thus, for Bostock’s Aristotle, the necessary beginning for deliberation is 
knowledge of a highly specified account of the end of the good life. This beginning 
is arrived at by nous, assisted by the virtues of character. Feelings thus come after 
that beginning and then only in a supporting but not integrated role. The full 
knowledge of the end from the beginning is the first and last principle of the pursuit 
of the end.
12
 The fact that only very few people have the requisite intellectual virtue 
to know the end at the beginning is not a problem for Aristotle. For he proposes that 
this knowledge is not for the people at large but for certain virtuous men as leading 
members of a particular polis (πόλις). Only these men, bearing the responsibility of 
government, have a need for such knowledge in order that they might deliberate and 
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 Support for this claim is found in the fact that the terms in which Aristotelian deliberation is 
conducted and the direction in which deliberation proceeds are decided before deliberation has begun. 
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and ‘cleverness’, (deinotes, δεινότης) a form of practical understanding which is simply a matter of 
finding a way to achieve any already established end, hints that this is the case. For if cleverness can 
be a synonym for practical wisdom, the process of deliberation would not itself involve openness to 
discover something new but would rather consist in putting into practice what has been already 




Beginnings in Lacoste 
 
However, this hardly seems the only possible version of the beginnings of moral 
reflection and deliberation, still less one, as has already been noted, which is 
impregnable to criticism. As an alternative, consider the conception of beginnings in 
Jean-Yves Lacoste’s account of “affections” as it emerges in his discussion of the 
phenomenological work of Max Scheler.
13
 Lacoste holds that values appear to the 
affections and that we should thus understand affections as ‘affective recognitions of 
value’. Such recognitions are the beginnings of processes of moral reflection and 
deliberation which lead to the disclosure of moral norms. He prepares for his account 
of affective recognition through a critique of Scheler who holds that sentiment 
(Fühlen) is epistemologically monarchical in the recognition of value. Scheler’s view 
is that sentiment is a moral ‘intuition (affective intentionality in its moral 
application)…armed with a cognitive power that is as strong on its own ground as 
the cognitive power of perception is.’
14
 Scheler’s sentiments are intuitions which, 
coming neither before nor after but with perception, hold the same force of certainty 
as perception. As one sees a painting, one simultaneously experiences a sentiment 
concerning it, a sentiment demanded by the object. These sentiments are experienced 
by the individual as first and last words on the value of any particular features of 
reality as they appear, such as the goodness of an object or the rightness or 
wrongness of any particular courses of action. This position elides any distinction 
between moral reflection about the nature of the good and moral deliberation about 
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 Lacoste, J.-Y., ‘From Value to Norm’, trans. O’Donovan, O., (unpublished) from ‘Du phénomène 
de la valeur au discourse de la norme’, in Lacoste, J.-Y., Le Monde et l’absence d’oeuvre et autres 
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what it is right to do with respect to that good. For if the right is simply felt as right 
just as the good is felt as good, then the distinction falls away – both are known 
directly by one sentimental, epistemological movement without the necessity or 
possibility of discussion. As Lacoste says, what is  
 
supremely important…is that on Scheler’s account, the approval with which we greet 
the appearance of values enjoys the privileges of a unique foundation, and so can 
always dispense with the demonstrations of moral argument…there is no other moral 
evidence than that which sentiment supplies; there is no other way that values are 
present to us than by their appearance in the realm of the affects.
 15
 
   
In common with Scheler (and Nussbaum, though she is not mentioned), 
Lacoste holds that affections have an intentional quality
16
 and a cognitive aptitude.
17
 
But Lacoste disagrees with Scheler’s way of interpreting cognitive intentionality, 
criticising him on the grounds that his monarchy of sentiment fails to allow for the 
very possibility of moral enquiry. In contrast to Aristotle, for whom feelings were a 
secondary feature of ethics dependent on reason’s prior epistemological guidance 
within the overall account of the good life, Scheler’s approach elevates the affections 
to a place of total epistemological authority. This, however, leaves no meaningful 
role for moral reflection and deliberation after the sentimental experience. For there 
is no need for further investigation of the good or consideration of the right once 
value has been perceived by sentiment.  
On this basis, Lacoste claims that Scheler ‘sinned in wanting to know too 
much’
18
 ‘and to know it too quickly’
19
 and that this had a result of paramount 
importance: that Scheler had developed a phenomenological version of emotivism. If 
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sentiment discloses a first and final word on value then there can be no further 
discussion. In the case of disagreement between two people perceiving value, there 
may only be sentiment and counter-sentiment, the phenomenological equivalent of 
two people saying what C.L. Stevenson summarised as ‘I approve of this; do this as 
well.’ This is a ‘rationality beyond rationality’ and of no use to those who see the 
need for persuasive moral argument.
20
 The unbridgeable chasm for Scheler lies, 
therefore, between “I feel” and “we feel”, between an individual’s affective 
recognition of a value and an inter-subjective affective agreement on the value. For 
Scheler, there can be no ‘interaffectivity’ or ‘communities of affective recognition.’
21
 
His theory inevitably tends to the position that an individual’s affective recognition 
of value is an incommunicable sentiment which cannot contribute anything to a 
shared, social enterprise of reflecting on value and deliberating about right action 
towards the common good. The basic reason for this is by now obvious: that he has 
placed too heavy an epistemological burden on our powers of affection by equating 
them unreasonably with our powers of perception. Contra Scheler, value is not 
immediately perceptible in the same way as one sees a pipe.  
Having established this critique, Lacoste undertakes the charitable task of 
elaborating Scheler’s thought to show how it might be adapted to have ethical weight 
and escape the charge of emotivism. Explaining this elaboration requires further 
elucidation of what Lacoste means by ‘value’. On Lacoste’s view, value may take 
many forms, whether good, bad or some point on the range that lies between. By way 
of examples (not his but mine), consider the beauty of the call of a bird of paradise, 
an environmentally damaging oil slick, the aesthetic splendour of an English 
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Cathedral, the sorry condition of an abandoned orphan or the face of an apparently 
charismatic and far-sighted political representative, such as Barack Obama. 
Furthermore, although Lacoste does not say this, it is reasonable to suppose that 
value may appear to a person in a remembered action or situation from centuries ago 
or in a remembered action of the more recent past which was witnessed by the 
person. Consider a past act when a man saved a drowning child, who was previously 
unknown to him, by diving into a dangerous river. As such, it seems likely to have 
been the right action to have done and it is valued objectively by the subject as a 
good of the near or more distant past. Equally, an agent may remember wrong past 
acts or states of affairs and, through affections, recognise their value as less than 
good. We note here then that the distinction between the good and the right depends 
on the passage of time. The right about which we deliberate is singular in the present 
for it refers chiefly to the open moment which we inhabit in the here and now – one 
must do one thing or another. As that moment moves into the past, the action done 
may be reflectively valued with respect to its goodness as well as its rightness since it 
takes its place among the range of remembered actions which we may consider and 
evaluate. 
Lacoste’s elaboration of Scheler allows that affective recognitions of value, 
whether past or present, may potentially be shared by a (possibly large) number of 
individuals. Lacoste draws on the idea of a shared ranked order of value (or ordo 
amoris) to explain this and suggests that affection ‘discerns value in a ranked order. 
Any given discernment of value may indeed afford a valid entrée into that order’. 
That is, any recognition may provide a way into a shared value system in which 
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common, ongoing, moral reflection and deliberation may then occur.
22
 Entry into an 
order does not presuppose an exhaustive knowledge of the order as a whole nor that 
value has been rightly recognised. Rather, according to Lacoste, an order of value 
should be viewed as a shared way for a number of subjects to sort and reflect on 
values grasped in affective recognition rather than a total account of the good which 
itself can be comprehensively known.  
Lacoste’s move here relies on Heidegger’s account of worldly affectivity 
whereby the ‘world’ is reality as it appears to us, known affectively but dimly by 
moral recognition, a beginning of moral understanding which is not yet moral 
knowledge.
23
 Lacoste distinguishes this ‘world’ from the ‘cosmos’, the moral order 
as it actually is. He argues that ‘The life of the affections gives access to a moral 
logic, yes; but it is the logic of a “world”, not a “cosmos”.’
24
 Scheler’s fault was that 




At this point, we can see how Lacoste’s own account of beginnings emerges 
as a genuine alternative to both Scheler and Aristotle. Whereas (Bostock’s) Aristotle 
argued that the first and last principle of action was a vision of the good attained by 
nous, supported by habituated virtue of character and whereas Scheler argued that the 
first word is the last word and is spoken by sentimental intuitions, Lacoste denies the 
possibility of a comprehensive knowledge of the good under the conditions of 
worldliness, agrees with Scheler on the importance of a phenomenology of value but 
argues that values appear to the affections as the first ethical facts, the half-light of 
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ethics. The valuable facts recognised are thus not like the bright ‘facts’ of natural 
science but rather are the dimly lit first facts of ethics. This Heideggerian worldly 
affectivity is a crucial one step removed from the perceptual immediacy which 
Scheler championed. There are shared ranked orders of value (or ordines amoris) in 
the world by which affections may be shared and discussed. But the light affections 
shed on an order of value is a half-light not a bright light. This half-light is precisely 
what is necessary if the disclosure of norms is to follow the recognition of values. 
On this thesis, facts, grasped affectively and normally incompletely as first 
words and not last words, are value-laden but are preliminary to the process by which 
moral norms are disclosed, a process which is conducted through patient moral 
reflection and deliberation. Although affective recognition remains cognitive, 
intentional and evaluative, its fundamental mode of evidentiality
26
 is thus ‘penury’, 
the penury of worldly – not cosmic! – epistemology.
27
 This recognition of the penury 
of the affections will be of importance as the argument proceeds. Although there will 
be reason to differ from Lacoste at points, the penurious challenge to an over-hasty 
intuitionist account of affections seems to be at least part of a plausible account. 
Reflection and deliberation precisely follow affection since affection does not know 
everything. As Lacoste rightly says, ‘is not the most self-evident thing about our 
feelings precisely the fact that we need to discuss them?’
28
 The necessity and 
possibility of discussing affections, which depend upon affections’ cognitive 
intentionality, opens up the project of ‘intersubjective verification’ of values 
recognised in affection.  
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Intersubjectivity of affection (or ‘interaffectivity’) is the sharing of affective 
understandings in order that any particular recognitions might be verified as true 
recognitions or set aside as false recognitions. Penury and intersubjectivity are 
closely linked. First, affections’ penury enables human discovery of new features in 
the moral order as it is or, more precisely, things which only appear new to the agent 
but ‘which are yet not new but were there…from the first’.
29
 Since they are 
constitutionally incomplete reports about the nature of the moral order they are fit 
beginnings to moral thought especially ‘Christian thought [which] has tended to 
insist that every moral decision should be approached de novo, with complete 
openness to the moral field’.
30
 They are fit precisely because they have not already 
decided on the nature of reality but are dependent, for their epistemological power, 
on engaged, committed, attracted participation with the reality they seek to discover.  
Affections are thus indispensable to moral thought but insufficient to do all 
moral thinking; indeed, their insufficiency is of the essence of their indispensability 
precisely because through them we are attracted into the world, no longer lingering 
tentatively on the edge nor skating over its surface. They are fit for their purpose, 
namely to enable the participatory beginnings of moral thought. Affections are our 
way of being committed to making moral discoveries and thereby being attentive to 
reality but also, through their insufficiency to carry out all the work of moral 
reflection and deliberation, to the fact that it is truly a moral discovery that we are 
making. Their nature shows that we do not engage with the world knowing all the 
answers about the good and the right beforehand.  
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Second, their penurious insufficiency combined with the cognitive quality 
precisely invites intersubjective discussion of the recognitions they make. By way of 
a visual illustration, affections are like watchmen on the walls of a city whose job is 
partially constituted by their alertness to newness. As the dawn rises in the east one 
watchman will cry to another, “The dawn, the dawn! Do you see it?” and the other 
will reply, “Yes, I see it! The dawn, the dawn!” The initial perception of the one is 
“intersubjectively verified” by the perception of the other, their common perception 
is objectively verified by the first of the sun’s rays and so the trumpet sounds and the 
city awakes to a new day of reflection, deliberation and activity. But on the next day 
one watchman looks out and cries, “The dawn! The dawn! Do you see it?” and the 
other looks hard to the east and responds, “No, it is not the dawn but only the 
morning star rising.” So the intersubjective verification does not occur, the watchmen 
continue to wait and the city’s reflective, deliberative activity is postponed. Affective 
recognition has some resemblance, as Scheler argued, to visual perception or a way 
of seeing but, contra Scheler, may be seriously mistaken and must be submitted to 
intersubjective verification followed by the process of moral reflection and 
deliberation which the affective recognition has initiated. Thus, just as the first 
watchman’s incorrect perception was intersubjectively corrected by the second’s 
response and objectively corrected by the rising of the morning star, so affective 
recognitions may be corrected. People, in the course of further reflection and 
deliberation, may come to some deeper understanding which in turn casts doubt on 
the original quality of the affective recognition. Setting aside the metaphysical 
disagreements which we have with Martha Nussbaum, there remains some 
correspondence between this account of affections in politics and hers. For she too 
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emphasises the communicability and corrigibility of emotion though, for the latter, 
she appeals, as noted, not to the moral order as it is, but rather to the courts who 
arbitrate with respect to capabilities. 
Thus, over against Scheler’s privatised, incommunicable sentiments, we see a 
public role for the affections as the beginnings of corporate, discursive moral 
reflection and deliberation. As cognitive beginnings, affections themselves require 
discussion and this discussion gives intelligible structure to intersubjective 
verification for, in discussion, we may reflect more fully about the nature and object 
of a particular affection to enquire whether such a recognition is jointly and 
appropriately experienced. Thus affections, when intersubjectively shared, are ways 
that we engage with and awaken together both to the world as it appears to a 
community and to the world as it is. They are commitments concerning value which 
will, at some stage, concern what we should do for our neighbour. The stability 
remains in the moral order whereas the people, in their affective recognitions, come 
to that order, via their own order of value, to discover what is actually there.  
 
Beginnings as attracted participations in the moral order  
 
If the worldly penury and initiatory role of affective understanding is accepted, an 
unmistakeably theological question presents itself, namely whether there are 
possibilities for the convergence of a worldly, shared order of value (ordo amoris) 
with the moral order as it is (cosmos). Such a convergence would result in a person 
coming to a closer cosmos-attentiveness and even becoming more ordered to the 
world as it is (cosmos). On this hypothesis (mine not Lacoste’s), a person would 
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approach the world as it appears in epistemological humility, affectively recognising 
value in first ethical facts, not claiming exhaustive knowledge of the moral order as it 
is but rather hoping to reflect on the values recognised by herself and others through 
her and her community’s shared order of value in order that she might sort and 
reflect on them intersubjectively within her community. However, she would also 
know that such an order stands in relation to the moral order as it is and so seek 
penetrating, affective understanding of that moral order. An order of value, such as 
the tradition of a society, family or even of a church, would not, therefore, function 
in the same way as the comprehensive account of eudaimonia in Bostock’s Aristotle 
nor even as in Lacoste’s Heideggerian elaboration of Scheler. Instead, it would be a 
structured, social way of bringing together the world as it is with the world as a 
person or community perceives it to be, a way begun in affection. Affection offers 
itself as the suitable candidate for beginning moral reflection and deliberation in this 
way since (a) the recognition of value is what must come first by way of entry into 
both an order of value and the order of value within the cosmos and (b) only by 
affection can value be recognised. Thus affective evaluation emerges as the 
beginning of our understanding of our own orders of value and, via them, the cosmos 
itself. This is our basic account of how affection is the beginning of a genuine moral 
understanding that is able to move between the world as it is and world as it appears 
to us in order that our affective recognitions might be more ordered to the world as it 
is. 
In considering the possibility of becoming ordered to ‘the world as it is’, the 
objective reality of the cosmos or moral order, we walk in contested epistemological 
territory. The post-modern challenge, by attending to the diversity of cultural 
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perspectives, categorises epistemological claims of this sort as power-plays rather 
than pointers to human possibilities. By suggesting that ‘the world as it is’ is 
accessible, we have suggested that there might be a meaningful relationship between 
the recognition of value which occurs through a particular order of value and an 
objective moral order. Such a claim does not imply that the objective order can be 
exhaustively mirrored by a particular order of value so that subjectivity and 
objectivity are collapsed one into the other, a Hegelian or communitarian claim 
which will always fall prey to sceptical and post-modern critique. Rather, the claim is 
that there is a created, objective moral order of ‘ends’ and ‘kinds’ which has been 
vindicated in the resurrection of Christ, a reality in relation to which other ranked 
orders of value should stand to attention. Thus the created moral order provides ‘the 
only [epistemologically certain] point of reference’
31
 by which human creatures may 
reflect on the good and deliberate concerning the right.
32
 Affective recognitions of 
value enable entry into a particular order of value and so serve to bring the 
community together to discuss the order by which value is judged, the moral order 
created by God which has been decisively vindicated and whose future has been 
revealed in Jesus Christ. On this account, affections are not only communicable 
forms of understanding which may lead a person from their particular perspective on 
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reality into an activity of intersubjective communication. Affections are also, by 
general grace, revelatory forms of understanding, as they are drawn to penetrate 
through a particular order of value to grasp the world as it is and, by special grace, 
revelatory forms of understanding of the world as it is in Christ. 
Such a claim in part depends on particular orders of value being in an 
intelligible relation to the created, vindicated moral order. Inasmuch as the order is 
created, this is what we might call a natural law account of affective recognition 
whereby the order of value in a human community is to the generically and 
teleologically arranged order of value within the created cosmos as the human law is 
to the natural law. Affections are naturally drawn out by the created order which, 
though fallen, yet retains an intelligibility which the human mind may understand. 
Created value continues to make demands upon our affective attention despite our 
own and the world’s corruption. In awakening through natural affection to such an 
interconnection between the self and the world, the human comes to a measure of 
self-understanding. That self-understanding is not a reckoning of the self as over and 
above the created order but precisely as a member of it, a creature among the 
creatures. In this way, the Christian view retains an appropriately anthropocentric 
view of creation while avoiding the elision between self-understanding and 
eudaimonism which characterises Nussbaum’s thought. Her ‘emotions’ refer to the 
self only as they refer to the self’s eudaimonistic projects. Emotional self-awareness 
is at the service of eudaimonistic self-consciousness not of consciousness of self 
within an objective created order. She fails to see the deep interconnectedness of self 
with creation and may only gesture somewhat despairingly towards it, conceiving the 
agent as in the hands of the world. 
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The interrelation of natural loves and natural law is a precursor to the 
affective possibilities which follow from the accomplishment of Jesus Christ by 
whom the true nature of moral order was disclosed, in whom the cosmos now holds 
together and before whom all orders of value are now judged. Moral theology has, 
among other tasks, the peculiarly apologetic task of describing the evidence for these 
claims in a way which may be persuasive to moral philosophers and giving them 
alternative imaginative resources. This work is begun by observing that the moral 
order of creation is not immediately accessible in bright, sharply defined detail – 
such a claim would simply fall back into Schelerian intuitionism and the endless 
disagreement which follows radically different claims to intuitive knowledge. 
Nonetheless, despite the partial opacity of the created order there is, according to 
Oliver O’Donovan, a moral learning (or ‘sanctification’) which can occur which is  
 
the intellectual penetration and exploration of a reality which we can grasp from the 
beginning [my italics] in a schematic and abstract way, but which contains depths of 




What O’Donovan is describing in terms of ‘penetration’ and ‘exploration’ is the 
Christian approach to ‘reflection’ which holds that human knowledge of the 
teleological and generic goodness of the cosmos and its God is never final but always 
open to further depths and correction. The beginning by which we grasp the gestalt 
of the cosmos seems necessarily affective in light of the theological claims that the 
moral order as created by God is, as Genesis 1:31 announces, ‘very good’ and that 
the resurrection of Christ from the dead reaffirms that ‘very good’ and promises its 
eschatological fulfilment. Affections evaluate this goodness in its many and varied 
forms and lead on to the deeper understanding of the nature of the moral order which 
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reflection achieves. Christian moral reflection is the creaturely task of knowing-and-
valuing the objectively value-laden, vindicated, created moral order which exists 
now in fallen state. Such a position stands opposed to the familiar modern separation 
between fact and value. “Knowing” information as “bare fact” is different from that 
knowing-and-valuing which is the substance of Christian reflective knowledge. 
Indeed, the Christian claim is that knowing which does not value is not a true form of 
knowing. By contrast, Christian reflective knowing is an ongoing, repeated form of 
moral thought which may always involve deeper penetration of the created moral 
order as its different aspects and their interrelation come into sharper focus. This 
good vindicated creation is the object in relation to which affective recognitions of 
value, though mediated by diverse orders of value, stand as subjects.  
The goodness of the created moral order vindicated in Christ points towards a 
key feature of affections as beginnings of understanding, namely the unity of 
affective attraction and affective intention. Affections’ cognitive intentionality 
towards objects is not simply at the disposal of the subject who may choose or not 
choose to deploy his affections. Instead, affective understanding, refracted through a 
particular order of value, is attracted by objects which are themselves features of the 
generically and teleologically structured created order. The world as it is, the cosmos, 
draws out, evokes and even demands affective understanding. The subject’s 
affections are dependent to some extent on the way that her particular order of value 
sorts and reflects on the attraction which the cosmos naturally elicits. Thus the 
intentionality of affection is not simply “up to us” but is correlated both to the 
attractiveness of the good creation and to the particular cultural situation in which we 
find ourselves which represents to us a particular version of that goodness. 
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This attracted intentionality is a significantly different concept than that of 
Nussbaum who explained the ‘heat’ of emotion in relation to our experience of 
instability impinging on our eudaimonistic plans.
34
 By contrast, the Christian claim is 
that it is the very goodness of the moral order which draws forth our affective 
recognitions. Its living energy organised within the matrix of generic and teleological 
ordering attracts us. Indeed, such is the goodness of creation that even its fallen form 
has an attractive power, drawing forth from us affective understanding. Thus the 
attraction of intentional affection is dependent on the goodness of the created order 
which, though now fallen, is yet firmly established and cannot be moved. The nature 
of the affection attracted will vary widely depending on the way that the world 
appears to the subject (her order of value) and on the particular feature of the created 
order which is the object of attracted, affective cognition. By highlighting the 
fallenness of human epistemology without denying the possibility of epistemological 
sanctification this move accounts sufficiently for the Heideggerian description of 
worldly affectivity as dimly-lit. Despite the Fall, there is an ongoing, created moral 
order, a generic order of valued goods with teleological orientation, which calls forth 
from us an ordered affective understanding which is then reflected in diverse orders 
of value. Again, this contrasts with Nussbaum’s account especially her idea that we 
are ‘in the hands of the world’, a claim linked to her eudaimonism. For we are saying 
that we are creatures among other creatures, drawn affectively into an understanding 
of our place within the created order, not assaulted by the world as with a knife. 
Attracted affectivity is a form of intentionality which makes sense of both the 
givenness and responsibility of our moral situation. Affections as the beginnings of 
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understanding are deeply embedded within an already given structure of valuation in 
the form of the created, fallen, vindicated moral order. 
Our account of attracted, affective, cognitive penetration of the moral order 
can be helpfully illumined through Daniel Hardy and David Ford’s discussion of 
participatory knowing and praise. Although one may affectively recognise that the 
moral order is good, one also understands that the moral order is not immediately and 
clearly accessible because of the fallenness of human knowledge in a fallen world. 
What is required is a way of conceptualising our entry not only into the shared order 
of value of any community but also the moral order itself, thereby gaining a critical 
distance on the particular shared order which we inhabit. Hardy and Ford write of 
divine and human knowing as ‘being knit into all that there is’, a form of 
participative knowledge.
35
 God is ‘knit into all that there is’ in 
 
that [He] is open to all of [creation’s] reality, including its distortions and agonies; 
[God] refuses to avoid the truth and so is involved in enjoying or suffering it. The 
crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ are the main Christian criteria of what 





We will return to God’s knowing through the God-man Jesus Christ in chapter five. 
From the solely human side, the central and highest affective form of knowledge 
whereby we participate in God and his world is joy expressed in praise, the affective 
form of what we call ‘dogmatics’. Praise is an affective expression of joy’s 
recognition of goodness which begins our reflection on the pluriform nature of the 
good itself. Joyful praise has the widest possible range of recognition, 
acknowledging the goodness within every human society and within the full expanse 
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of creation’s goods. From a theological perspective, it is the only right beginning of 
beginnings since it acknowledges not only value but also, in the same moment, the 
source of all value and object of ultimate joyful praise, the One who is alone good.  
We will return more systematically to joyful praise in chapter five, where it 
will be seen to be the beginning and the end of all affections but will now take a step 
towards that conclusion by taking up Hardy and Ford’s language of “participation”. 
This language equips us to say that affections are creaturely, participatory forms of 
knowing, the proper preliminaries to reflection and deliberation and the beginnings 
of being knit into all that there is, when ‘all that there is’ is interpreted by the name 
of ‘moral order vindicated in Christ’. Human affective recognitions of value are the 
first moments of moral understanding in that they initiate a weaving of human moral 
thought and enterprises within the teleological warp and generic woof of the world. 
They are the beginnings of participation and the form of initial committed, attracted 
engagement open to us as human creatures in the moral order. Indeed, there is no 
other way of being human than being committed or engaged in the world in some 
way. Affections are inescapable for we cannot stop ourselves from valuing and from 
reflectively exploring those values. The ultimate reason for this, as we have seen, is 
the created, attracted relation in which we stand to the cosmos which draws us as 
creatures into its order of value. 
The emphasis on the preliminary or initial work of affection which was 
suggested by Lacoste requires further theological examination in light of these 
claims. Lacoste holds that ‘an affective grasp may be weak, and it may be mistaken: 
the important thing is that it may be dead right.’
37
 But he modestly holds back from 
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an account of how affections might become permanently ‘dead right’ about the world 
as it is, about whether ‘feeling will ultimately have the answer to everything’.
38
 Thus 
it remains unclear whether Lacoste believes that the penury of affection is due to 
humanity’s created nature or to the fallenness of that nature. He does not disclose 
whether penury is a permanent characteristic of human affectivity or a temporary 
indigence suffered by a fallen humanity in a fallen world. Hints of eschatology 
emerge in the course of the essay but, as Lacoste says, he has been focussing on the 
first word rather than the last.  
Saint Augustine’s eschatological reflections on affections enable us to go 
further in accounting for penury than philosophy can venture. According to 
Augustine, Adam and Eve experienced a rich affective life before the Fall. The 
overriding affection was a ‘grande gaudium’ (‘great joy’) which proceeded from a 
love of God.
39
 This claim in book fourteen must be seen as an answer to Augustine’s 
unanswered question in 9.5 as to whether ‘ad vitae praesentia pertineat 
infirmitatem…huiusce modi perpeti affectus’
40
 – i.e. whether humans experienced 
emotions in Eden and will experience them in heaven. There he ponders the apparent 
lack of emotions among the angels and in God but then seems unconvinced of this 
because the Scriptures do seem to ascribe an emotional life to God and the angels. 
Nonetheless we can piece together what must have been Augustine’s view by 
considering his account of joy and memory in Confessions book 10. He speaks there 
of a ‘gaudium pristinum’,
41
 a joy of long ago, reflection on which immediately 
makes him question afresh as to where and when he experienced the happy life. This 
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joy seems to be the same as the ‘grande gaudium’ which Adam and Eve experienced 
in long time past. But Augustine’s concern in these chapters of book ten goes beyond 
Eden since he is seeking to explore humanity’s current condition. He finds that all 
now seek after and take joy in happiness though many mistake the proper object of 
joy by seeking happiness in the creation rather than the Creator. Nonetheless, the 
common human desire for happiness and for joy in the object which represents that 
happiness indicates that there is a ‘modicum lumen’ (a ‘half-light’, in Lacoste’s 
terms) which survives in people after the Fall whereby they desire happiness but with 
limited understanding. Augustine is entirely clear about the proper object of joy, God 
himself. There are many idolatrous versions of the truth in which joy may be rooted 
but genuine ‘gaudium de veritate’ is the joy which is both grounded in and attracted 
by God, the ‘beata vita’ which Christians are to experience in heaven.
42
 Three 
important conclusions follow: first, that Augustine did expect affections – 
specifically joy – to mark the human experience of heaven; second, that there are 
degrees of truthfulness which mark human affections; third, we may say that the 
current fallen state of the world has reduced affection to its initial, preliminary form 
of understanding – the ‘modicum lumen’ consists, at least partly, in a penurious 
affectivity.  
The modest epistemological power of penurious affections fits well with an 
account of humans as sinful moral subjects in an objective, teleologically ordered, 
generically defined, moral field which is both fallen yet also vindicated by Christ’s 
resurrection. Though sinful, our ‘task as moral agents is to participate in this order, 
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understanding it and conforming to it in what we think and do.’
43
 When set within 
such a grand canvas as the entire order of created goods, epistemological modesty 
makes good sense both because of our fallen condition and because of the 
dependence of our subjective, affective recognitions on a shared moral order of a 
particular society which may approximate more or less well to the moral order. The 
penury of human affections is thus a very plausible proposition. For if the first 
affective moment claimed to have revealed an exhaustive account of value, then 
intersubjective verification of value within a shared order of value would have no 
purpose. But, as Lacoste says, we really do want to talk and are able to talk about our 
affections. On the other hand, if the first affective moment had no possible 
connection at all with the world as it is, the moral order vindicated in Christ, then 
affections would collapse once again into radical perspectivalism or monarchical 
intuitionism. Discussion is terminated at its inception, reduced to an anti-social 
mathematical point.  
But a theological account of the beginning of shared moral reflection and 
deliberation will avoid these dangers and combine both the epistemological penury 
and the epistemological possibilities of affections as attracted, intentional cognitions 
which are open to intersubjective sharing and verification. In summary, by insisting 
that the affective recognition of first ethical facts is the initial half-light of moral 
understanding, this account has a more modest epistemological role for the affections 
than Scheler and stands in sharp contrast to Bostock’s reading of Aristotle’s account 
of beginnings. However, at the same time, we are proposing a greater confidence 
about the possible accessibility of the created moral order to human affections than 
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Lacoste ultimately exhibits in his insightful essay.
44
 Despite the difficulties with his 
account, Aristotle has raised important questions. By suggesting that knowledge of 
the supreme good is available to man he has pointed us towards the question of the 
end of man. We have defined affections in terms of the beginning of understanding. 
But in what relation do affections stand to the end of our understanding? We have 
spoken a good deal of initial, affective participation in the goodness of the created 
order and its God by way of first ethical facts. How might affections contribute to 
our understanding of this good in its totality? To these questions we shall return in 
the concluding section of this chapter. For now we will pursue a more limited task, 
namely to enquire further about affections as penurious beginnings of moral 
understanding. 
 
Section II: Enduring affections 
 
If affections normally have an initially modest epistemological role in human 
morality, then it seems sensible to enquire how important their role in human 
morality actually is. We may grant that the beginnings of moral reflection and 
deliberation are significant without seeing the lasting significance of beginnings and 
their ongoing influence in morality. With these questions in mind, we proceed to 
discuss how the affective beginnings of moral thought might come to endure. This 
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line of enquiry is particularly important in light of our concern with the place of 
affections in political relations, the theme which will be taken up in later chapters. 
Political relations do endure over time. Therefore, if affections have a significant role 
in political relations, it seems highly plausible that affections too will endure in some 
way. On our thesis, enduring affections are tremendously important since they enable 
people repeatedly to begin to understand an order of value and the moral order in 
such a way that they may reflect, deliberate and act together in a relatively 
consistent, cohesive way.  
To investigate further we will reflect on the differences between the 
O’Donovan-Lacoste approach and the approach represented by Bostock’s 
interpretation of Aristotle. Implicit to this point has been a concept which Scheler, 
Bostock, Lacoste, O’Donovan and Ford hold in common in one way or another, and 
which we will here call “stability”. “Stability” names the solidity of the 
epistemological foundation on which a people build as they begin their moral 
reflection and deliberation. Stability characterises the basis on which reflection and 
deliberation can, so to speak, put its weight before pushing out towards action, the 
epistemological rock beneath its feet.  
Stability is especially important for a plausible account of affections as 
enduring aspects of human epistemology. It seems intuitively apparent that fear, joy, 
hate and other affections often have such an enduring quality. One thinks, for 
example, of the steadiness of many Poles’ hatred of Russians during the twentieth 
century which has continued to this day. Stable or enduring affections are as constant 
a feature of human life as momentary or ‘episodic’ affections (the nature of their 
interrelation will be expanded further below). Thus if affections have epistemological 
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aptitude – if they are forms of understanding – the stability of a people’s 
epistemology will be partly constituted by the stability of a people’s affections, the 
joy, hatred and fear (for example) by which they repeatedly evaluate and understand 
some features of reality. Enduring affections, on our thesis, would thus be enduring 
beginnings, initial understandings which stably characterise an epistemological 
outlook. 
The moral life of a people who perceive that they have a stable 
epistemological foundation will be characterised in a number of ways. First, 
perception of a stable foundation enables a community to believe that reflection, 
deliberation and action are repeatable – having launched out stably on one occasion, 
one can do the same again. Second, perception of a stable foundation leads people to 
believe that reflection, deliberation and action are adaptable since a secure 
foundation provides a context for trial and error. Adaptation of reflective, 
deliberative action is intelligible precisely in relation to a series of preceding, 
repeated actions, remembered and reflected upon. Third, repeatability and 
adaptability together present the appearance of stability back to the community 
which, when self-consciously recognised by the community, will further bind them 
together in reflection, deliberation and action. This feature of stability enables the 
construction and development over time of a common culture, shared by multiple 
agents, a theme to be developed in chapter three with respect to social and 
institutional memory. 
That a political society is conscious of a high degree of stability is no sure 
sign that it has an actually stable epistemological foundation. For example, Bostock’s 
Aristotle saw stability in a highly specified account of the good life protected and 
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promoted by virtue of character. The stability of this particular foundation is a 
detailed specification of what counts as good and bad, right and wrong in the 
community which Aristotle’s particular tradition developed by relying on a certain 
teleological account of social order and of the place of his particular social order 
within the cosmos. For him, the social order follows the same kind of teleology as all 
the natural order: just as vegetation is directed to a higher end, namely animal 
nutrition, so certain human beings – a slave-class, women – are naturally directed to 
a higher end, namely the ruling class of men. The city does not have a transcendent 
point of reference for its stable ordering which means that the relations between 
those who discern stability become grotesquely distorted to create a kind of pseudo-
transcendence of hoi aristoi (οἱ ἀριστοι) over hoi polloi (οἱ πολλοι). This travesty is 
then deepened by the lack of awareness within Aristotle’s tradition of alternative 
orders of value which would represent significantly different accounts of teleological 
order. One cannot blame Aristotle for not knowing, for example, the Hebrew 
Scriptures but one can observe, with the benefit of hindsight – specifically the 
eschatological hindsight afforded by the resurrection – that his conception of 
teleology is bound up with his own local community and tradition and that the 
epistemological stability of that tradition is thus significantly less sound than it 
appears. This kind of stability is really a shadow stability which we shall call 
“stubbornness”. It is a systemic refusal to allow for epistemological correction from 
external sources, especially God. For there might be a fixedness of affection which 
gains its solidity from a perception of unreality rather than through being ordered to 
the moral order as it is. The strength of a tradition may sustain such a fixedness and 
so effectively prevent true affective understanding. Stubbornness is thus essentially a 
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failure in moral understanding, a refusal to participate penitently in the world as it is. 
It stands in stark contrast to the penury of the affective for which we have argued, 
that humble poverty of initial understanding which depends for wisdom on God and 
his creation as well as looking intersubjectively to others’ understanding. 
Moral philosophy and moral theology have commonly suggested that actual 
epistemological stability for a political society requires foundations which do come 
from outside and transcend the culture and tradition of any one community. Kant 
wrote of the universal law, Eastern philosophers speak of the tao and Christian 
thinkers have described a natural law,
45
 a created moral order
46
 or a system of natural 
or ‘inherent’ rights and correlative obligations.
47
 Common to such diverse 
conceptions has been the basic question of moral obligation concerning what is owed 
to one’s neighbour, the question of justice. Whether or not natural and inherent rights 
are assumed to be basic dimensions of moral reality, the common and correct 
theological assumption is that there is a stable, objective moral reality in relation to 
which subjects have their being and perform their actions. Justice is inextricably 
linked to the created being of humans and the nature of the world they inhabit.
48
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More than that, we can say that justice itself, as the morally ordering logic within the 
good order of the cosmos, has a warmth and power of attraction by which affections 
are energised and sustained. 
Not so with Aristotle. As Nicholas Wolterstorff succinctly observes, Aristotle 
‘makes no attempt at grounding justice ontologically’.
49
 For Aristotle, justice as a 
particular virtue (as opposed to general justice which embraces all the virtues) is a 
matter of equality of recompense and proportionality of distribution.
50
 Justice is thus 
not rooted in the very structure of the world but is a matter of more-or-less in 
particular circumstances. Both Wolterstorff and Oliver O’Donovan show, in different 
ways, that this conception is not acceptable.
51
 The question then remains for 
Aristotle: ‘whence stability?’ His answer, considering his inextricable linkage of his 
social order with cosmological teleology, can only be that stability is rooted within 
his own tradition and the virtues of those who represent it. We should, therefore, be 
distrustful of claims to stability from Aristotelian quarters and, remembering the lack 
of integration of emotion in his ethics, even more wary of the idea that stability of 
affection (feeling/emotion) might proceed from his teaching.  
The approach described via O’Donovan, Ford and Lacoste suggests a 
different account of stability from Aristotle, one which takes seriously the structure 
of the moral order as defined by an objective moral order with objective obligations. 
Our proposal is that people enter moral reflection and deliberation in the ‘half-light’ 
afforded by an affective recognition of the first ethical facts and that this recognition 
becomes intersubjective through reference to a communally shared ‘ranked order’
52
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of value which leads to an ‘intersubjective verification of what affective knowledge 
finds itself presented with’
53
 and, ultimately, to a participation in the objective moral 
order as it is. This formulation of the beginnings of moral reflection and deliberation 
begins by recognising that affections are necessary at the dawning of a process of 
moral reflection and deliberation but that a particular community finds its stability 
neither in the affections nor in the self’s virtue nor in a pre-reflective, pre-
deliberative, highly defined account of the supreme good but in a shared, ranked 
order of values (ordo amoris) which is entered in affection. The ranked order is the 
way that affective recognitions may be sorted and reflected upon; by it the 
community itself is internally ordered. It is precisely as this kind of shared order that 
the stability is that of a community, whether an entire political society, characterised 
by institutions, laws and practices which embody that shared order in its totality and 
sustain the practice of judgment which conforms to that shared order, or that of 
certain communities and institutions within any political society or between political 
societies. 
The stability of this particular ranked order will itself be more or less 
correlated to the objective moral order of the world as it is, with its matrix of moral 
obligations and generic, teleological order. From a theological perspective, the moral 
order, to which the ranked order of values of a particular society is correlated, 
transcends the society in a way that Aristotle’s account stubbornly refuses to do. This 
moral order, precisely because it transcends other ranked orders, is always not 
exhaustively known by any society and so stands constantly available for deeper 
discovery and penetration by all. It has an objective stability which endures whether 
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or not it is perceived. Its stability lends stability to affections within societies. 
Enduring affections, stabilised in this way, are attracted by the moral order as it is via 
the shared order of value which the society upholds and constitute the normal ways 
of beginning moral thought within a community. The shared order of value 
participates in the natural order just as, in Aquinas, the human law may participate in 
the natural law. Moreover, from the subjective side, there is the possibility of an 
increased stability on account of becoming more ordered to the stable moral order, 
following committed, reflective, deliberative, attracted engagement in it. This 
movement represents the escape from stubbornness to which we shall return by 
another route when we come to consider memory below.  
To see further the implications of the association of stability and affection for 
the endurance of affections, consider how this account differs from Martha 
Nussbaum’s theory of emotions. In contrast to Nussbaum for whom the outwards 
emotional movement was a response to instability, the material world inasmuch as it 
is uncontrolled or not wholly controlled by the individual, a Christian account of 
affective, intentional recognition will involve affections being ultimately ordered and 
attracted towards the stability of the objective, fallen moral order vindicated in Christ 
and towards the Christ himself in whom all things hold together. On this account, 
every person’s hate, sorrow, fear and joy are signs of a deeper awareness of the 
moral order – initial, cognitive gestures towards the stability of the heavens and the 
earth from within the fallenness of this present moment in salvation history and from 
within the multiplicity of earthly cities. In that sense, affections have a revelatory 
quality, disclosing the weighty attractiveness of the created world and understanding 
the beauty of God as it is reflected in creation, that beauty named by Augustine as 
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‘pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova’ (the ‘beauty so old and so new’), drawn up 
from the depths of memory and hoped for in the deepest reaches of human 
consciousness.
54
 In Nussbaum, this movement from creation to fallen multiplicity 
and on to unified new heaven and new earth is boiled down into a monolithic, 
geological account of human experience amidst upheaval. There is no before and no 
after. There are no metaphysics. There are only events which plunge themselves like 
knives into our world.  
We may now comment further on Nussbaum’s emphasis on emotions of fear 
and grief because of her significantly agent-centred, individualistic commitment to 
eudaimonism within a liberal democratic framework. The theological account of 
moral order depends on there being a created, fallen, vindicated universe containing 
generically and teleologically related features.
55
 Such an account recognises stability 
in the created world and accounts for any hopes for blessedness within such an order 
precisely in relation to a transcendent God who became incarnate. In contrast, 
Nussbaum denies such stability and rather sees uncontrol of unstable objects as 
shaping all human emotions. This led to her emphasis on fear and grief and her 
partial and limited account of the place of joy. With no transcendent reference point, 
there is no stable place where joy could rest. Instead, emotions are conditioned solely 
by culture and child psychology. But the theological approach gives an account of 
the full range of affections by explaining their relation to the settled and attractive 
quality of the created though fallen order which calls forth both positive and negative 
affections. Moreover, rather than rooting the instability in the world – which, 
theologically speaking, though blighted by sin, is yet firmly established – our 
                                                 
54
 Augustine, Confessiones, 10.xxvii.38 
55
 O’Donovan, O., Resurrection and Moral Order, 31ff 
 
 93 
account calls people to examine themselves, their own unstable fragility and their 
failure to be fitted to the world as it is. Such a move relativises the liberal democracy 
which Nussbaum seems inevitably committed to defending by directing our gaze 
beyond such man-made shared orders of value to the created order of value itself and 
the Trinity by whom it is sustained. It is in this way that human creatures avoid 
separating themselves off from the moral order as it is and instead come in humility 
to begin to learn its ways through affective participation in its generic and 
teleological ordering. Indeed, it is in this way that we come to participate more 
truthfully in the particular orders of value that we do inhabit, including those that 
follow the patterns of liberal democracy.  
 
Stability and virtue 
 
If we hypothesise that affections gain enduring stability as beginnings of 
understanding through participation in the firmly established objective moral order 
albeit via particular, cultural orders of value, then we should next enquire further as 
to the nature of that stability within the subject. We may proceed on this line by 
drawing a contrast between virtue and memory as possible sources of subjective 
epistemological stability. John McDowell has proposed a highly epistemological 
account of virtue whereby the basis of a stable moral epistemology is and should be 
the agent’s own virtue. Thus, when an agent encounters circumstances which pose 
the question of what it is right to do, he should depend epistemologically on his own 
virtue of character to determine right action. ‘A conception of right conduct is 
grasped, as it were, from the inside out.’ A virtuous person has a ‘reliable sensitivity’ 
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about what should be done in any situation and the ‘deliverances of a reliable 
sensitivity are cases of knowledge.’ Moreover, the sensitivity is that which accounts 
for the right action and so the ‘sensitivity turns out to be what the virtue is.’
56
 He 
goes on to explain that the virtuous person is internally habituated to see a particular 
fact in a situation as the salient one to be concerned about with respect to action. This 
‘perception of saliences’ is the heart of virtue.
57
 McDowell is insistent that ‘concern’, 
the necessary emotional element of this virtuous perception, has cognitive qualities 
though he is also admirably honest in his admission that he does not have the 
resources to tackle the anti-emotional, rationalist challenge fully since he cannot 
properly account for the nature of emotion.
58
  
McDowell is interesting for us because thought-patterns similar to his have 
emerged in explicitly Christian ethics which rely on a virtue epistemology. There is a 
stream of Christian ethics which, fed by the mighty tributaries of Aristotle and 
Alasdair MacIntyre, have described moral understanding chiefly as a function of 
virtue achieved through the practices of Christian community. On this thesis, 
Christian communities of character form a virtuous people through certain common 
practices. I believe, and Brian Brock agrees, that this stream has issued in an 
‘unbiblical anthropocentrism’.
59
 A right concern for learning ethics from narrative 
has led thinkers such as Stanley Hauerwas wrongly to prioritise narrative over non-
narrative, to diminish the role of the Holy Spirit and to promote church tradition and 
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virtue to become the epistemological powerhouse of ethics.
60
 Thus the use of the 
language of moral formation has unfortunately tended to give the impression that the 
church is both potter and clay.  
In order to substantiate this critique of contemporary neo-Aristotelians, we 
begin from Oliver O’Donovan’s claim that character does not disclose how we 
should act but rather that acts disclose the character we have – there is an 
epistemological priority of action over character. The claim has a double target: first, 
it aims to cut off epistemological dependence on a consciousness of character from 
discernment of right action; second, it aims to puncture an over-confidence in the 
competence and reliability of character to discern right action – even if character is 
not consciously reflected on during the deliberation. The following four points 
enable O’Donovan to hit both targets. First, one’s own virtue of character is normally 
little known to oneself and thus granting it a part in deliberation and decision about 
action is not a promising suggestion. The endemic human tendency to overestimate, 
underestimate or misunderstand entirely one’s own moral state may be partially 
addressed by sober judgment concerning oneself but it is hardly a biblical 
expectation that such judgment is meant then to resource detailed moral thinking 
about what it is right to do in any given situation. Second, even if a third person 
evaluation of my virtue of character could be more accurate, such an estimation 
cannot itself provide information which short-circuits the moral deliberation about 
                                                 
60
 ibid. 33. Admiration of character does have a role in our account of affections, as we shall see, but, 
very importantly, ‘[w]e shall not learn to save our souls by talking about the formation of virtuous 
characters.’ (O’Donovan, O., Resurrection and Moral Order, 224) We note here John Webster’s 
criticism of Christian virtue ethicists who reduce sanctification into techniques for forming character 
and thus lead the church away from the essential response to being addressed by Scripture, namely 
repentance (Webster, J., Word and Church: Essays in Christian Dogmatics, T & T Clark, 2001, 93ff). 
For the only (somewhat brief) attempts I have found to integrate a subtle, cognitive account of 
emotion with Hauerwas, see Lauritzen, P., ‘Emotions and Religious Ethics’; cf. Wynn, M., ‘Emotions 
and Christian Ethics: A Reassessment’, Studies in Christian Ethics 2004; 17, 35-55, esp. 39ff  
 
 96 
what I owe to the neighbour in this moment since each opportunity for action, though 
set within a generically and teleologically ordered universe and therefore like other 
opportunities, is still in itself new. As such, it cannot be simply determined in 
advance that this or that virtue which the agent has is peculiarly relevant or 
necessary. What is necessary instead is a clearer view of the moral field in which the 
person is to act.  
Third, the very nature of moral deliberation implies an open narrative in 
which virtue of character is not yet disclosed and so remains unavailable as a factor 
in deliberation. If acts disclose character, then character may not yet be fully known 
and so cannot be a reliable basis for decision-making. Fourth, depending on one’s 
own virtue of character habituated by one’s own society and a highly specified 
account of eudaimonia for moral understanding of the world is a sure way to 
impenitence since it tends to foreclose the possibility of experiencing correction in 
the midst of the new situation which presents itself. In explicitly theological terms, a 
virtue epistemology will tend to block that correction which comes through repentant 
attentiveness to the created, vindicated objective moral order and God himself. This 
last point is peculiarly important for a critique of the epistemological 
anthropocentricity of McDowell and the communitarians. Thus O’Donovan observes 
that 
 
a strong self-consciousness about my own characteristic excellences, far from 
illuminating the meaning of the act which I have to deliberate, will have obscured it. It 
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To which we should add, in light of our earlier observations, that the response to the 
moral field is partly constituted by affective attraction into it. A focus on habituated 
emotion as constituting our virtuous character obstructs our view of what God 
achieves through affection, namely the possibility of being awakened to the cosmos 
as it draws out our understanding and then becoming stably ordered to that world.  
Thus an approach which begins with character and a highly specified account 
of the good life in fact offers a shadow stability to a moral agent and her community 
in their reflection, deliberation and action, a stability which is, at least potentially, 
stagnantly narcissistic and blinded by the self in such a way as to be unable to act in 
penitent response to the moral order with respect to what is owed to the neighbour in 
this or that concrete situation. This is the stubbornness which is so unhealthy since it 
diminishes, quells or eradicates the proper beginnings of reflection and deliberation 
in penurious, participatory, attracted, affective recognitions of the moral order as it 
is. The epistemological turn towards reliance on the self’s virtue and detailed account 
of eudaimonia is opposed to this discussion’s emphasis on the epistemological 
priority of affection as a participation in the world both as it appears and as it is. A 
virtue epistemology, relying on virtue to establish the right course of action, both 
walls people off from the world as it is and refuses the revelation which affection can 
bring. Epistemological stability is not in the agent’s virtue but in the order in which 
the agent participates and by which the agent is ordered towards stability. This 
insistence that stability is found in the God who sustains order over against the 
powers of disorder and sin coheres well with the evangelical disavowal of self-
reliance and self-knowledge on account of the new word which has come in Christ.  
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An Aristotelian objector may still say that virtue is affection under the control 
of reason and that to exclude virtue from an active epistemological role is to exclude 
affection too. The force of this objection is that it is only in a well-habituated 
character that affections arise at the right time, in the right way, to the right extent 
etc. and thus that moral reflection and deliberation, in which affective recognition, on 
our thesis, plays such a crucial initiatory role, actually does depend on the agent’s or 
community’s own virtue of character. However, this objection fails not only because 
it presupposes an account of reason’s mastery of emotion which we have already set 
aside, especially in the form it appears in the Nicomachean Ethics, but also because 
we hold that it is the object of affection which attracts our penurious, affective 
recognitions which then form the beginnings of moral reflection and deliberation, 
thereby overcoming stubborn and fallen understandings. It is not the goodness of the 
moral subject that gives rise to true recognition but the goodness of the moral order, 
however refracted through any particular order of value, however affected by the Fall 
and in whatever contingent circumstances, that draws out the affective recognition. 
Affections are thus not necessarily indications of or the same as virtue of character 
but rather are primarily coordinated to and drawn out by their objects mediated 
through the shared moral order within which objects finds their value. Even the 
deeply selfish man may rejoice at first sight of his child in the womb or as a new-
born baby and may wish to do all sorts of things to protect it. Even the intemperate 
woman full of vengeful bitterness over her relative’s death may be awestruck by the 
mountains near which their loved one is buried or the forgiveness which others show 
in similar situations. 
 
 99 
There remain the questions of what role, if any, virtue does play in our 
account of affective epistemology and, specifically, whether virtue has anything to 
do with enduring affections. Robert Merrihew Adams’ work on virtue shows that 
‘there is little hope for any ethical outlook that cannot accommodate the fact that 
human behavior of apparent moral significance is often quite predictable.’
62
 A 
particular person may, with reasonable consistency, feel and act in similar ways in 
similar sorts of situations and any ethics should account for this. What then is virtue? 
Adams shows that right action belongs to a different department of ethics from 
virtue. Right action is to do with voluntarily chosen action while virtue, because 
substantially affected by one’s social circumstances, articulated by the categories of 
gift and luck is not straightforwardly voluntary.
63
 To make right action a function of 
virtue or to reduce duty into virtue is to confuse these departments of ethics and to 
impoverish both right action and virtue.
64
 Adams’ most telling argument for this 
approach is that  
 
[a]ssessments of virtue have a logical pattern more typical of judgments of goodness 
than of judgments of rightness. The concepts of the good and the right differ in the 
shape of the characteristic frameworks of evaluation they offer us, that of the good 




Doing the right thing is focussed on a particular action while being good may take a 
wide number of different forms. There is a pluriformity to the good while there is a 
decisive singularity to the right such that the latter cannot simply be reduced into the 
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former. Thus, ‘virtue is best understood as a kind of goodness rather than rightness’
66
 
and so cannot explain why a particular action is right or wrong nor enable decisions 
about what to do in contingent situations.
67
  
Virtue itself is ‘persistent excellence in being for the good’ and consists in 
cognitive operations which are characteristically fragile, fragmentary and liable to 
inconsistency. He undermines classic Aristotelian conceptions of virtue as robust, 
habituated reliability in action by asking whether it is ‘really so implausible to 
suppose that almost everyone has a certain character defect? Is it a tautology that 
character must be worse than average to be defective? Has it not at least historically 
been a widely held belief that most or all of us have traits of character in some ways 
sinful?’
68
 Over against those who focus on ‘direct behavioural dispositions’ and 
robust, reliably habituated action, thereby exclusively emphasising overt behaviour, 
Adams argues that ‘motivation’, partially constituted by emotional ‘intelligence’,
69
 is 
also a large part of virtue. He does not believe that Emperor Virtue has no clothes but 
presents a more humbly attired virtue which, through accommodating its largely 
cultural and, from a theological perspective, providential source, denies the 
‘imperialistic’
70
 reduction of duty into virtue, the unity of the virtues, the robustness 
of habituated action and the primacy of overt behaviour in the definition of virtue.  
Adams’ observations point towards a more positive account of virtue’s role in 
affective epistemology. Although we have rejected reflective and deliberative 
stability through dependence on or consideration of one’s own character, virtue itself 
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may yet contribute to stability and so to the endurance of affections. We distinguish 
between one’s own virtues as a source of moral revelation concerning the right and 
the good and the virtues of others disclosed in their actions, as objects of affective 
recognition, such as a friend’s courageous action or consistent and predictable series 
of courageous actions. An agent reflecting on the pluriform good and deliberating 
about the right might call to mind and affectively participate in the virtuous 
consistency of action displayed by a man such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Such 
‘consistency’ does not entail repetitive, robust uniformity since the narrative of 
Bonhoeffer’s life, like all lives, consists in a multifaceted, fragile unity. The nature of 
any man’s virtuous consistency is conditioned by his changing circumstances and 
moral awareness. Thus consistency may entail adaptation and, crucially, change, 
some of which may be appropriately called ‘repentance’. An admirable consistency 
of life – something we might call ‘virtue’ – does not, then, entail a robust, uniform 
goodness  but rather a humble amenability to continuous change.  
As the agent reflects on Bonhoeffer’s consistency, he might be affectively 
drawn to participate in it through shame, wonder, joy, sorrow or some other 
affection. His affection is drawn by the virtue of another person who then informs his 
understanding of the relation of himself to the proposed act within the pluriform, 
good moral order. Such an affective movement is not an attempt at imitation but 
rather a receptive welcome and admiration of goodness. This account seems to fit 
well within our account of affective recognition. For by affection we welcome some 
virtue of Bonhoeffer’s character, as disclosed by his actions, and find an initial entrée 
into reflection on our own order of value and then the moral order as it is and so 
come to deliberate concerning what it is right to do in that order. 
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In being a third person observation of another’s virtue as disclosed by action, 
this movement does not pretend to an implausible self-knowledge but rather is 
content with an affective grasp of the gestalt of that virtuous appearance which is 
visible in another. In other words, what is at stake is not the formation of one’s own 
character to be like Bonhoeffer’s – a rather implausible activity bearing in mind our 
own moral ineptitude – but rather the furnishing of one’s moral awareness with a 
vision of virtue which, being indeterminate and non-exhaustive in its account of what 
is good, does not foreclose any further moral reflection and deliberation but 
nonetheless offers some grounding to both by focussing our affections on a good in 
the actual moral field. A good of this sort, especially concerning one whose life has 
often been intersubjectively recognised, in the context of a theologically defined 
moral order, as of significance for moral reflection, offers a route to a mediating 
point of stability for my own current reflection and deliberation. Bonhoeffer’s life in 
the same moral order which I now inhabit summons me to be aware of myself and to 
attend to my present condition in the moral order. The stability is thus not in self; nor 
is the stability centred in the virtues of another; the stability is provided, via the 
drawing together of myself and Bonhoeffer, in the stability of the created moral order 
which provides the context within which Bonhoeffer’s excellence is affectively 
recognised. O’Donovan comments that 
 
the virtuous are not to be imitated, but simply to be loved for what they are, and to be 
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Thus there is a place for the affective recognition of goodness in moral virtue 
disclosed in virtuous action in the beginnings of moral reflection and deliberation. 
Human moral virtue, disclosed in the fragile consistency of another agent’s acts, 
represents a special form of the normal case of affective recognition which is always 
an attracted recognition of value in particular objects and which is subject to 
intersubjective verification. Such virtue enables affections to endure as they are 
steadily drawn into its consistency vis-à-vis the moral order, and are able, on that 
basis, repeatedly to initiate moral reflection and deliberation.  
 
Stability and memory  
 
If a man’s own virtue does not bring endurance to his affective understanding and if 
others’ virtuosity, though possibly conducive to wholesome moral reflection, is 
fragile and unstable, then we must look elsewhere to discover the true source of 
affections’ endurance. Augustine tells us that ‘there exists another power’ (‘est alia 
vis’) in human life.
72
 This power is memory and we will now explore to what extent 
it explains the interrelation of the stability of the created, vindicated moral order and 
humanity’s enduring affections.  
While affections, as we have seen, are constitutionally fitted to enable 
epistemological participation in the present, stable moral order as the future becomes 
our current experience, it is also the case that affections recognise value from the 
past, by the power of memory, and so have access to a level of enduring stability 
which virtue of character, in its fragility and epistemological incompetence, can 
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never provide. We observe that memory and present stability are closely related first 
because the past has been decisively established and second because memory 
concerns acts and events in the generically and teleologically defined moral order 
which we still inhabit in the present, which has been vindicated in Christ and which 
will be fulfilled in the new heaven and the new earth. 
By way of explanation, we consider first that although, with Augustine, we 
say that it is only God’s present that has any current existence,
73
 it is true to say that 
the remembered past has a present stable quality which the present itself, experienced 
by humans as continual and fleeting novelty albeit within the regular moral order, 
lacks. In an important sense neither the past nor the future exists nor even the present 
in that it passes away even as we become aware of it. And yet the past has happened, 
cannot be changed but can be made present to us again by the power of memory. 
This is the temporal aspect of the claim that the earth is firmly established and cannot 
be moved – the established creation cannot be conceived of as abstract from time but 
has a temporality which renders its past eternally stable. The performance of human 
memory is of course variable in relation to this fixed past – the imperfection, 
partiality and deceptiveness of memory is a commonplace. Nonetheless, memory is 
sufficiently equipped to stabilise affections as the beginnings of that understanding 
which initiates reflection and deliberation. For memory gives humans an individual 
and an intersubjective way of positioning themselves in relation to the present by 
relating the affective understanding of past events to reflection and deliberation in 
the current moment. Memory has this quality with respect to all the remembered 
past, including to a limited extent an agent’s own consistency and inconsistency of 
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action, since, without diminishing the responsibility of the agent for his own actions, 
the distancing effect of the passage of time may render those actions like the acts of 
other men with respect to affective evaluation. They are as objects in relation to the 
subject who, as a ship sails across the sea yet leaves a wake, continues on into the 
present yet leaves an observable past behind. In light of memory, we see again why 
Nussbaum’s elision of eudaimonism and emotional self-understanding was unwise. 
For affection can understand the self in memory without being concerned with the 
self’s current eudaimonistic plans.  
Augustine picks up this theme when he describes how  
 
in the vast hall of my memory…I meet myself and recall what I am, what I have done, 
and when and where I was affected [affectus fuerim] when I did it. There is everything 
I remember, whether I experienced it directly or believed on the words of others…on 




One’s storehouse of memory holds a vast range of items all of which may be objects 
of affective recognition in the present in greater or lesser detail and in more or less 
deliberate and conscious ways. These may include a narrative of one’s own life, the 
history of the community or communities in which one participates and many other 
things such as events, acts, series of acts, people and mental occurrences such as 
affections. Such items may exhibit consistency of the sort which Bonhoeffer’s life 
exemplifies. By the power of memory, we are able affectively to participate in, be 
attracted by and value these past objects, rejoicing in, sorrowing over, fearing and 
hating them even though they are not present to us. Such affective recognitions do 
not enable a direct movement from the grasp of a value in the past to the pursuit of a 
right action in the present. They do not short-circuit the task of moral reflection and 
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deliberation. Rather, affective participation in the value of remembered objects gives 
entry into and throws half-light on an intersubjectively shared order of values and on 
the moral order as it is, drawing us to self-consciousness in the present moment and 
empowering sustained reflection about the nature of the good and deliberation about 
right action. This affective participation is enduring precisely in that it participates in 
that which is relatively more stable than the present, namely the remembered past. As 
such, it exists as a background, initial understanding of the world which continually 
affects the beginnings of understanding. Enduring affections would thus be these 
steady beginnings of understanding which characterise the start of moral reflection 
and deliberation. 
Second, more briefly, memory of the past is precisely memory of the past 
within the teleologically and generically organised moral order.
75
 True moral 
learning through memory would thus be through affective participation in features of 
the past reckoned within the moral order. An event such as the birth of a child, the 
conclusion of a conflict, the establishment of a trade union or a dinner under the stars 
would be remembered affectively in relation to the generic teleologies of children, 
peace, work, food and natural order which all lie within the created moral order. 
Thus memory of the past, when affectively recognised as valuable in the context of 
the stable moral order, enables enduring affections which sustain reflection and 
deliberation towards action in the present. These enduring affections are a matter of 
general revelation. Specifically Christian affective memory would recognise past 
objects as within the moral order vindicated in Christ, the basis of stability argued for 
above. Instead of skating over the surface of the world, affections and memory would 
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thus enable an agent in the present not only to remember the past in the context of 
this Christ-centred stability but also to participate in it in a committed way, gaining 
understanding of the world as it is in Christ and so gaining stability for the present 
moment from Christ in whom all things hold together. Ultimately, epistemological 
stability’s theological significance depends on the past remembered as taking place 
within the moral order vindicated in Christ. For then the past is not only remembered 
but rooted in relation to creation and salvation history.
76
  
This analysis of memory shows how affections are not only episodic and 
short-lived but also enduring since affective participation in memories of past objects 
may acquire a certain steadiness as when one continues to grieve over a lost loved 
one. It also represents an explanation for the apparent predictability of human 
behaviour of moral significance. For, though often dark and unexplored, the 
storehouse of memory is imbued with affective understanding which continues to 
shape our way of seeing the world in the present and acting in light of that outlook. 
Thus our affections may be rooted in and drawn out by the relatively stable past 
which is grasped and evaluated through our affective memory, and reasoned from 
into the future. 
Our analysis also significantly develops the concept of ‘stability’. For 
although it remains true that personal and communal virtue are neither a necessary 
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nor sufficient epistemological explanation of or guide to what it is right to do here 
and now, and that epistemological stability is only found in the moral order 
vindicated in Christ, it is also true that affective memory of past virtue or vice – such 
as Bonhoeffer’s – may draw people to a threefold attentiveness to self, world and the 
present moment. Remembering affectively thus yields a way of framing ourselves in 
the world at a moment in time in order that we might address that moment 
reflectively and deliberatively. Stability itself, the stable place from which to launch 
out in moral reflection and deliberation, thus lies partially in our memory of the past, 
as a more or less imperfect record of what took place within the created, vindicated 
but fallen moral order. Stability is not in the virtue of the man or his community but 
is found in a memory of value, remembered in relation to a community’s shared 
order of values and, by God’s grace, the moral order as it is in Christ.
77
 
So when we approach the moral field de novo, as we must, this does not mean 
that we approach it without memory of the past but rather without epistemological 
dependence on moral virtue and without our minds already made up about what the 
right thing to do will be. Thus a community may be drawn by memory and affections 
                                                 
77
 An objector might say that an accurate memory, whereby what is remembered is remembered 
truthfully, is itself an intellectual virtue. The objector might claim that, in refusing the stability of 
virtue of character, this discussion has simply shifted to another form of human self-reliance which 
can equally well obscure the moral field, namely a special form of virtue of intellect. To this form of 
the objection, one may respond in two ways, both of which are serviceable to my argument. On the 
one hand, one could simply deny that memory is a virtue and see it as an ability. We might observe 
that a memory which effectively retains facts is not a virtue because it does not engage the will. Thus, 
by the lights of this discussion, it would only be when affection, as an attracted, inclined 
understanding, evaluated items in the memory that memory took a place in moral considerations. On 
the other hand, one could admit memory is a virtue but deny that it is a moral achievement and that no 
great effort or habituation is necessary to have a good memory. In either case, memory – because of 
its characteristic activity – is not competent to decide beforehand what it is right to do but rather 
supplies a record of what has been done or thought or felt in the past. Such a record will itself be 
affectively toned in the memory while current affections may evaluate and discover value afresh. It 
should be added that some knowledge held in the memory is in general not affectively known but 
simply recalled. Plain facts such as the ten times table or the date of the Chalcedonian definition stand 
in contrast to the beauty of a friend’s courageous act. The former do not normally call forth affective 
understanding (except perhaps as an element in a certain aesthetic of mathematics); the latter may be 
thought to require it. 
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such as joy, fear or hatred into understanding aspects of its own past such as the 
successful protection of its borders against an historic foe, the systemic failure which 
allowed a culture of abuse in an institution or the demonised minority who continue 
to hold power in some areas of public life. Through the affective, attracted 
recognition of these memories of past values which reawaken the community to the 
shared order of value and, by a transcendent turn of mind, to the moral order as it is, 
they may again turn to the reflective and deliberative task. This then is the beginning 
of an account of communal self-understanding through affection and memory. 
Affections are intersubjectively shared on the basis of common memory, the 
meaning of which may itself be contested and a cause for differing affections. The 
key thing is that this self-understanding is not necessarily bound up with the 
eudaimonistic projects of the community. Rather, as the community sees itself 
marked by an order of value in relation to the moral order, the self-understanding 
enables the community to situate itself as a collection of creatures within an 
intersubjectively shared created order. As we will see in chapter three, it is the 
institutions of the community which are particularly important in enabling the 
intersubjectivity of memory and affection. 
Thus affections endure as they participate in memories. They form 
background ways of understanding the world which are relatively epistemologically 
stable. They become especially active when those memories are called to mind by 
specific recognitions at particular moments. In this way, affections, as 
epistemological operations, have both an enduring and episodic quality, neither of 
which depend on habituation into robust, reliable action but rather on the power of 
memory which may recall values in relation to the moral order of the world and so 
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draw individual subjects and communities of subjects in affection into the stability of 
the world. Via memory, enduring affections are thus held in order by the moral order 
itself and are renewed, verified, corrected and quenched on a daily basis in our 
creaturely and, perhaps, worshipful interactions. Episodic affections have a 
revelatory function which both contributes to and corrects such enduring affections 
by recognising value on an occasional basis, thus offering a way out of stubborn 
understanding. 
 Although memory grasped in affection is thus of great significance for 
coming to attentiveness in the world, the past does not determine how a man should 
act in the world in the present. The affective memory of value does not determine the 
right in a moment open before us; even the past must not be allowed to obscure the 
moral field at this present moment. However, affective participation in the past may 
enable an enhanced, committed awareness of and reengagement with the moral order 
in the present. The truthfulness of memory then becomes key to wise reflection, 
deliberation and action. For affective memory may, of course, entrench 
misperception of the moral order and intersubjective verification of affective 
memory may mislead by affirming a false affective recognition as true. Nonetheless, 
the very possibility of such wrongness suggests that the opposite is also possible and, 
moreover, is of great worth for a person and his community. The key, as Lacoste 
said, is to discuss our affective recognitions. 
One particular benefit of seeing the connection of memory and affection 




[d]espite a flurry of talk about “narrative ethics,” there has still been relatively little 
attention in ethical theory to the evaluation of life histories or processes of change; and 




It seems that a convincing account of conversion – what Adams seems to mean by 
‘processes of change’ – depends on a memory of one’s own or others’ past. Adams is 
right to emphasise that persisting cognitive traits are of the essence of a good life, 
that a good life is only ever embodied in a fragile and fragmentary way and that 
emotions (or affections) are just such cognitive traits which understand the world. 
However, by continuing to focus an agent’s epistemological stability which directs 
agency in the virtue of the agent – however minimised – there remains the problem 
of stagnant, stubborn self-coincidence whereby, as O’Donovan argues, the moral 
field is obscured on account of epistemological dependence on the enduring 
goodness of one’s own virtue, thereby handicapping attentiveness to the world and 
conversion to Christ its Maker and Redeemer. On the other hand, starting with 
affections, as participatory ways of being drawn into and understanding the world as 
it appears and the world as it is, empowers an account of conversion. Memory, by 
focussing on past events, actions, thoughts and affective recognitions, avoids the 
perils of virtue epistemology by denying epistemological dependence on enduring 
qualities or traits of the agent and instead seeks epistemological stability through the 
past affectively remembered in relation to the moral order.  
In this way, objects from the storehouse of memory, when affectively 
grasped, draw us to a world-attentiveness that forms the reasons for our affections in 
the present. These affections, based on memories, are enduring, committed ways of 
understanding the world, the persistence of which depends on remembering and 
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bringing to mind the past in all its multifaceted unity, including potentially the past 
of God’s activity in the world. If this is what may be meant by Adams’ cognitive 
traits, well and good. Persistence in excellence in being for the good is stably 
founded not in ourselves but in the moral order, remembered and brought to mind in 
the present.  
However, Adams’ account still seems to depend to a considerable extent on 
habituated stability rooted in the self as a project, the unhealthy stubbornness we 
discussed above. Instead, and according to this discussion, it is by remembering the 
past held in our memory that we are constantly enabled affectively to recognise our 
past selves in the context of the pluriform moral order of the world, to overcome 
inattentiveness to the world, to come to world-attentiveness and self-awareness in the 
open moment in which I am now called to reflect concerning the good and deliberate 
concerning what is owed to my neighbours. Thus we may know and act in the world 
rightly if we know it through affective, participative memory of past reality and in 
openness to the novel moments in which our present constantly consists. And thus 
too we may indeed act to repeat past activities, to adapt them or even repent of them 
in order that we might rightly and consistently give what is owed to the neighbour. 
This seems to be an outline description of conversion, the theme which Adams 
astutely highlighted. The predictability of action – which Adams carefully qualifies 
by recognition of human frailty and sinfulness – is explicable substantially in terms 
of our enduring affective recognitions, made possible by the power of memory, 
which repeatedly initiate moral reflection and deliberation.  
Now we may move further into memory in order to see the deepest sources of 
enduring affective understanding. Augustine argues for a much more radical form of 
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remembering whereby affections are attracted to an ultimate stability which can 
ground reflection and deliberation for all in the present. As we saw above, he argues 
that the reason that all seek the happy life is that, since we were all in Adam, we all 
knew that happy life once.
79
 On the one hand, there are person-specific provisions in 
the storehouse of memory such as Carthage or the eloquence of an acquaintance. On 
the other, there is a generic memory of the blessed life of Adam and Eve which all 
share to some extent. Such a memory lies deep within our generic humanity and 
gives rise to a longing for relationship with God and various more or less stable 
affective understandings. These longings and affections, when genuinely organised 
around the joyful worship of God, are the happy life which Augustine calls ‘joy 
based on the truth.’
80
 The ultimate enduring, affective understanding, attracted 
intentionally by the memory of such blessedness, is for this happy life and accounts 
for the restlessness of the human heart as it seeks for peace. Augustine claims that 
this primal joy has long been in the memory. Affective experiences, such as this or 
any subsequent reflection of it, initially experienced in the mind, may be held in the 
storehouse of memory to be recalled in our minds at a later time. When this happens, 
a powerful attraction of the understanding takes place, disclosing to the self the need 
of the self for an enduring experience of truthful joy found in God alone. 
Augustine argues that, when recalled and grasped again in affection, these 
memories do not necessarily make us feel as we once did. Indeed, returning to the 
ultimate case of recognising the separation of self from the pre-Fall happy life of 
Adam and Eve, Augustine comments that ‘I am sad as I remember joy of long ago’ 
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 Thus, the mind may sorrowfully recall the Adamic affective 
experience of enduring joy in the world as it was through affective recognition in the 
present moment in the world as it is. This present affective recognition of past joy – 
whether it be sorrowful, joyful, fearful, hateful, envious or something else – draws an 
individual into participation in the reality of the present, fallen moral order via 
intersubjective verification of value in a shared order of values. The stability of 
Adamic life which was known in bright primal joy is yet accessible now by the 
affective recognition of first ethical facts, features of that perfect life, which, filtered 
through the fallen world, shed half-light on our present reflection, deliberation and 
action. This is a further and most profound form of enduring stability which 
memory-empowered affections enable people to access. For it comes from another 
country, the place once shared but now lost. It stands in tension with the often 
consuming claims of national or international identity which emerge in our present 
political situation and throws our gaze forward to the transcendent horizon towards 
which human affections are designed to be attracted. 
The happy life remembered in Adam is itself inseparable from God, the 
enduring source of beatitude himself. Augustine sees that God the Trinity is in his 
memory now but believes there was a time when this was not the case. The learning, 
whereby God came to be in his memory, began both with the fact of God’s 
transcendence and with the reality of his inner presence.
82
 But God only came to be 
loved in memory and dwelt upon through God’s mercy, charity and grace. It is this 
divine initiative which finally trumps and excludes a dependence on personal virtue 
for the purpose of epistemological stability and underpins conversion and an 
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affective reorientation away from stubbornness and into enduring, truthful, affective 
understanding, the subjective experience that coincides with the objective salvation 
of the ungodly. The stability of the moral order into which this affective recognition 
draws us is itself ultimately dependent on the deeper stability of the Trinitarian 
Orderer and Redeemer by whom that moral order was vindicated, in whom it is 
sustained and into whom we are drawn in affective recognition as He takes his place 
in our memories. Affective recognition of him as the One-in-Three and the goods he 




To recognise value in God and his works is to be drawn into reflection and 
deliberation within a moral order which fulfils and transcends the past and present in 
the eschatological future of the new heaven and the new earth, the Christological 
vindication of the created order. To be drawn affectively by the Holy Spirit into 
participation in this new order is to begin the eternal life of worshipful reflection, 
deliberation and action. Thus, in this highly peculiar sense, in being called to 
remember God, creatures are called to remember their future as disclosed in the 
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Section III: Affections and the end 
 
Our discussion of how affections, as the beginnings of understanding, come to 
endure through participation in pristine, fallen and new creation has laid the 
groundwork for showing the interconnection of eschatology and affections. By 
blending elements of the Augustinian account of memory with a latter day 
Augustinian’s account of moral order vindicated in Christ, we have now enriched 
Lacoste’s thesis by stabilising affective recognition in a creational and eschatological 
conception. To elucidate this conception, we now need to return to the matters left 
unresolved at the end of the first section and answer two sets of questions which 
relate to how affections concern the ends of our understandings as well as their 
beginnings.  
(1) If affections are the beginnings of understanding, focussed on and 
attracted by particular values, then how do they relate both to the full range of values 
in which the moral order consists and to the eschatological end foreshadowed by 
God’s vindication of Christ in the resurrection which in turn vindicates the whole 
moral order and points towards its fulfilment in the new creation? Such an end has 
the quality of supremely integrating all that is good. How might affections recognise 
this end? Might the answer to these questions enable a clearer description of the 
endurance of affections at the beginnings of reflection and deliberation? (2) On the 
basis of our answers to (1), how might we account for the intuition, lurking in the 
preceding discussion, that affections not only characterise the beginnings of practical 
reasoning but also permeate and conclude such reasoning? Without retreating from 
our insistence on the initiatory role of affection we must also enquire how affections 
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seem also to have a conclusive quality, supervening on the end of trains of reasoning 
or following from some previous knowledge. Such a movement certainly accords 
with the pattern which we hypothesised at the outset, namely that affection initiates 
reflection and deliberation leading to action which in turn leads to further affection 
initiating further moral reasoning.  
 
Jonathan Edwards: excellency and affections 
 
To address these matters, we now turn to Jonathan Edwards, a move which requires 
some justification and comment. Edwards’ unique position as the most authoritative 
Protestant thinker concerning the affections makes him an important conversation 
partner in any theological discussion of the topic. His writings on affections arose 
from his historical concern with the revivalist movement known as the Great 
Awakening. In that context Edwards gave a particularly evangelical twist to the 
widespread eighteenth century interest in subjectivity. In so doing he made a leading 
Christian contribution to questions which have followed from that subjective turn 
and which still occupy us today, most notably the relationship between the interior 
life of an individual and the community of which she is a member. Nonetheless, an 
interest in Edwards will strike some as essentially irrelevant to our concerns in this 
thesis. For in Religious Affections and The Nature of True Virtue, the account of 
affections focuses almost entirely on those professing Christian faith. Affections are 
described as distinguishing signs of the Holy Spirit’s work within the lives of 
particular believers. But our discussion of affections has largely not distinguished 
sharply between Christian believers and unbelievers although it has appealed to a 
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distinction between orders of value and the created moral order vindicated in Christ. 
In contrast to these wider concerns Edwards’ interest seems purely pious and his 
account distant from the questions to which our enquiry tends, especially in their 
political form.  
This objection will not stand chiefly because the affections of Christians are 
not, from a theological perspective, irrelevant to morality in general and to the life of 
political societies at large. Rather, to consider Spirit-inspired affective recognition of 
the moral order vindicated in Jesus Christ is to focus on the heart of the human 
experience rather than on a private clique. To claim this by no means suggests that 
Edwards’ thoughts on the matter will be received uncritically. Indeed, in what 
follows, his affective epistemology will be seriously challenged while his doctrine of 
‘excellency’ – consisting in an account of the ‘association’ and ‘differentiation’ 
within God and, distinctly though dependently, within his created pluriform reality – 
will be substantially modified to explain how affections are both at the beginning and 
the end of understanding.  
We consider first the doctrine of ‘excellency’. Edwards held that everything 
that exists, including God, is fundamentally relational and can only be understood 
fully if examined in terms of the differentiation and association of its constituent 
parts. Harmony consists in the ‘consent’ of these parts which are ‘distinguished into 
a plurality some way or other.’
84
 The agreement or consent of one aspect of 
differentiated reality with another is what Edwards called ‘excellency’. God is 
relational and exists in the perfect agreement of excellency with himself in the 
Trinity. God has set this active relationality within creation itself so that all reality is 
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excellent in so far as its constituent parts are both differentiated from and 
harmoniously associated with each other. Human consciousness, when it engages 
properly in this God and this world, perceives an object’s harmonious agreement 
within itself and with other entities, and envisages appropriate action towards that 
object. A key element of that consciousness is affective, arising from ‘the sense of 
the heart’. Edwards holds that it coheres with this that the harmonious identity or 
agreement of all things is the fundamental principle and goal of divine consciousness 




The ability of man to perceive harmonious differentiation and association is 
dependent on the nature of his mind. Edwards claims that there are two faculties in 
man, understanding and inclination (or will). The exact nature of their complex 
interrelation is not entirely apparent in Edwards’ analysis but the following points are 
clear. The understanding is ‘capable of perception and speculation’ while the 
inclination (will) is the way the soul of a man ‘is inclined with respect to the things it 
views or considers.’
86
 Affections have a physiological aspect to them as changes in 
‘the motion of the blood and animal spirits’
87
 and are the more vigorous exercises of 
the inclination either approving (accepting) or disapproving (rejecting) some object. 
Crucially, the inclination does not do this apart from the understanding. Indeed 
affections – vigorous inclinations – are expressed through the understanding. This 
union of understanding and inclination in affection is what Edwards means by the 
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‘heart’. Vigorous inclinations (affections) may eventually lead out to action and thus 
Edwards considers affections the springs of action.  
Thus although two faculties are named by Edwards, his proposal is that the 
two are inseparable and that the affections are the demonstration of the manner in 
which they are united. Like LeDoux, Edwards is unwilling to carve up the mind into 
functional pieces. The affections disclose the inclined understandings which are the 
heart of a man by leading him to certain actions, the actions towards which the heart 
is inclined.
88
 In addition, the Christian has the sense of the heart, a new foundation 
(not an extra faculty) laid in the soul by the Holy Spirit, which should approve and be 
attracted towards the harmonious relation of all things. The sense of the heart is truly 
expressed in a Christian’s holy affections which, when worked out in holy practice, 
are the substance of true religion. Truly spiritual affections approve or disapprove of, 
incline or disincline towards objects, precisely in relation to whether those objects 
are interacting harmoniously by differentiation and association and are tending 
towards the excellency of agreement or consent. These affections arise as 
inclinations of the mind as it perceives and is drawn in affection towards God and 
creation in their respective differentiation and association.  
This is of the essence of Edwards’ epistemology for 
 
Unless [the beauty of holiness] is seen, nothing is seen, that is worth the seeing: for 
there is no other true excellency or beauty. Unless this be understood, nothing is 




Daniel interprets Edwards as saying that 
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To the extent that a created mind perceives something without understanding how it 
fits within the divine economy, it does not really perceive that thing at all. To the 
extent that a mind fails to appreciate the order and harmony of things – and therefore 




Thus the Christian mind is characterised by a sense of the heart which issues in holy 
affections which arise from right understanding and incline to objects in relation to 
the excellency for which they are intended by God. The affections approve or 
disapprove depending on whether they encounter agreement or disagreement, 
consent or lack of consent to excellency in the interrelation of the objects they 
consider. Affections and agency are also intertwined since, on account of the 
attractiveness of the excellency of harmony, this approval or disapproval has a 
motive quality whereby holy affections are springs of action which incline the whole 
man to holy practice, an active attraction to the good and the right and an aversion 
from evil and wrong, the sure evidences that the affections are truly holy.  
Edwards believes that this sense of the heart, by which affections arise, has 
considerable competence in moral epistemology. It is a taste ‘which relishes the 
sweetness of true moral good, tastes the bitterness of moral evil’.
91
 By the power of 
the Spirit, it ‘enables the soul to see the glory of those things which the gospel 
reveals concerning the person of Christ’ and ‘discerns the beauty of every part of the 
gospel scheme.’
92
 Thus the Christian’s affections enable high quality understanding 
which bears considerably on her actions. For the Holy Spirit’s instruction ‘consists in 
a person’s being guided by a spiritual and distinguishing taste of that which has in it 
true moral beauty’ and ‘this holy relish is a thing that discerns and distinguishes 
between good and evil, between holy and unholy, without being at the trouble of a 
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train of reasoning’ so that when ‘a holy and amiable action is suggested to the 
thoughts of a holy soul; that soul, if in the lively exercise of its spiritual taste, at once 
sees a beauty in it, and so inclines to it, and closes with it.’
93
  
On this account, immediacy of affective understanding is at one with an 
immediate affective inclination to action. For the possessor of such holy affections, 
there is no necessity for an exercise of moral reflection whereby the good is 
painstakingly penetrated and described or, indeed, for moral deliberation whereby 
right action is considered at any length prior to decision. Rather, Edwards compares 
the activity of the sense of the heart with grasping an object’s beautiful proportions 
or the balanced arrangement in a piece of music. The moral decision which accords 
with excellency is judged ‘spontaneously…without a particular deduction, by any 
other arguments than the beauty that is seen, and goodness that is tasted.’
94
 Edwards 
thus envisages a kind of perceptual immediacy about the good and the right in all 
affairs as they are rooted in the gospel: 
 
a soul may have a kind of intuitive knowledge of the divinity of the things exhibited in 
the gospel; not that he judges the doctrines of the gospel to be from God, without any 
argument or deduction at all; but it is without any long chain of arguments; the 
argument is but one, and the evidence direct; the mind ascends to the truth of the 




In this instance, Edwards does speak of argument but then defines that argument in 
terms of a single movement from evidence to conclusion. The soul thus comes easily 
and quickly to the divine excellencies of the gospel which is the central form of the 
excellencies of all things since it reveals the glory of God to man. It is from this 
glorious gospel that Edwards’ account of goodness in general and rightness of moral 
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action proceeds. The ‘view of this divine glory’ entails a moral vision of the 
interrelation of the good much like ‘when the light of the sun is cast upon’ the earth 
rather than under a ‘dim star light, or twilight.’
96
 Thus, beginning from the gospel 
itself, affections have a tremendous epistemological competence to perceive the 
excellency of all things, the good and the right included. 
There seems to be but one qualification of this extraordinary spiritual and 
practical competence which Christians are said to possess. Having compared spiritual 
taste’s facility concerning the good and the right to the force of gravity by which a 
stone falls directly downwards to its goal, Edwards qualifies this by saying that taste, 
although it does not work by a constant checking with the express and particular 
rules of the Word of God, yet is generally subject to the rules of God’s Word and so 
‘must be tried by that, and a right reasoning upon it.’
97
 He goes on to say that ‘a 
spiritual taste of soul, mightily helps the soul, in its reasonings on the Word of God, 
and in judging of the true meaning of its rules’ and does so by removing prejudices 
and ‘naturally’ taking thoughts into the ‘right channel’.
98
 Thus the moral thought of 
the Scriptures come easily and naturally to mind because there is a harmonious 
relation between the will of God and the souls of the Christians. In this way, Edwards 
gestures towards moral reflection and deliberation but does not seem to think that it 
will require any great length of time or exertion of effort. There is very little 
expectation in his mind that Christians led by the Spirit might have to go through a 
long chain of moral reasoning, reflection and deliberation concerning the right 
meaning and application of the ‘rules’ of God in relation to the goodness and 
excellency revealed in the gospel. 
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Commentary and assessment 
 
Edwards’ remarkable account brings a conceptual benefit, arising from his doctrine 
of excellency, association and differentiation, to our enquiry concerning the way that 
affections are at the end of moral understanding, though it also has a serious 
deficiency which concerns the immediateness of accurate, moral perception which he 
ascribes to the affections. Let us take the benefit first. Our thesis has so far argued 
that human affections are initial recognitions of value in the world as it appears 
which is in more or less close agreement with the world as it is in Christ and that 
these affections may endure by the power of memory. The two sets of questions we 
posed at the start of this section may now be addressed through Edwards’ account of 
how human consciousness perceives universal, creational harmony by differentiation 
and association.  
In answer to (1), we claim that affections are able to recognise values as first 
ethical facts precisely in their differentiation from and association with a multiplicity 
of other values interrelated in the totality of the moral order as it is and as it will be in 
Christ. These are the beginnings of ethical reasoning which reach out towards their 
end in the sense that they recognise the way that any particular valuable object stands 
in relation to objects of the same kind with their teleology, to objects of different 
kinds with their teleologies and, if the affection is Christian, to the goal of all kinds 
within creation, new creation and the Christ in whom all things hold together. The 
connection of the value to the wider moral order is the movement which lends to 
affection its conclusive quality. Interpreting the vindicated moral order in terms of 
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Edwards’ doctrine of excellency is a significant step for our thesis, enabling us to 
describe enduring affective participation in that order with greater clarity. The 
pattern of differentiation and association lends to the moral order an objective, 
dynamic aesthetic and a subjective, attracted relation to that aesthetic. The different 
kinds with their different teleologies are designed to be differentiated and associated 
with each other in harmony. However, the thoroughgoing nature of the Fall has 
brought disharmony into the structure of the moral order and especially into human 
creatures. Such disruption, though severe, does not prevent the possibility of human 
recognition of the way that the moral order is designed for differentiation and 
association. Thus, when we ask how humans are intended to participate mentally in 
the moral order as a whole, we answer that we participate through differentiation and 
association. 
On this thesis, affections are pre-reflective recognitions of an object, with its 
generic and teleological definition, in association with the moral order’s overall 
shape (gestalt) and goal. For example, a mother might be drawn in sorrowful 
recognition to the poor condition of another mother’s sickly child, construing the 
sickness in terms of her own similar child, the children’s common good of health; if 
Christian, the affection might also construe sickness in terms of the Kingdom of God 
where sickness is no more. Sickness is not harmoniously associated with the 
excellent beauty of all things and is not the proper condition for a member of the 
human genus. And sickness is a proper focus for a negative affective understanding 
such as sorrow or even hate. Or again, hate might grasp the injustice of sex slavery 
and trafficking both in relation to the excellency of a properly ordered society and, if 
Christian, in relation to the eschatological freedom of the children of God. Or again, 
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a father might joyfully recognise the marriage of his son both in relation to his own 
marriage and, if Christian, in relation to the marriage feast of the Lamb. Finally, a 
group of citizens might recognise in wonder, joy and sorrow their elected leader both 
in terms of the might of his office, the excellencies of his plans to do justice and, if 
Christian, in terms of the pale reflection of his rule to the coming Kingdom. 
These affective recognitions do not afford a comprehensive account of a 
complete system of differentiation and association. Rather, they are construals of one 
thing with respect to something else within the teleologically, generically and, when 
Christian, eschatologically defined moral order. In the case of sorrow or hate, they 
are initial and limited observation that things are not as good as they might be. 
Whether or not the objects of sorrow or hate are correctly recognised depends on the 
extent of correlation, in a person or social organism, between memory, an order of 
value and the moral order as it is in Christ. The negative affections of sorrow and 
hate place together some of the jigsaw pieces of reality in a way which will make 
reflection and deliberation about action possible. It attends both to the fact that the 
pieces should fit together and to the reality that, in their present arrangement, they do 
not. The positive emotions of joy and wonder see shadowy reflections of the fit 
between how things are, how things ought to be and how they will be in Christ. Joy 
might also accompany sorrow and hate, construing the object of affection in the 
hopeful terms of the perfected (eschatological) excellency to come thereby altering 
the way the negative affections are expressed. A sorrowful understanding of a 
convict’s current condition might be accompanied by joy in the man’s redeemed 
future made possible by God’s grace. This creational-eschatological approach opens 
up the possibility of a sophisticated accounting for a plurality of affections towards 
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the same object, the conceptual lacuna in modern political thought which we noted in 
chapter one.
99
 As we will see in chapter three, multiple affections may be structured 
together through forms of institutional life in political society in such a way as to 
stabilise and potentially regularise a range of affective understandings of similar 
objects over time. 
The overarching point is that whatever affective recognition or recognitions 
occur, the object of the recognition will be in some way associated with and 
differentiated from both the pluriform range of goods which constitutes the goodness 
of creation and the good Creator who authors and sustains all good. Christian 
affections recognise the concordant and discordant relations which exist between 
things in the differentiated, associated, divinely created moral order and between that 
order and its Maker. The affections of the unbeliever may also by general revelation 
be drawn in these directions as he remembers the beata vita of long ago, meditates 
on the creation now and longs for a better life. But for the unbeliever, unable to 
perceive the significance of Christ, the resources for the activity of association and 
differentiation in the moral order are found in the shared order of values offered by 
his community as an interpretation of the world as it is, in the albeit inchoate 
memory of the blessed life which all desire and in the shadowy forms of the 
vindicated moral order which she may perceive around her. But the Christian 
believer is conscious that the moral order has an explicitly creational and 
eschatological form in that the resurrection of Christ is the firstfruits of the fulfilment 
of that order which has directed attention to its ultimate fulfilment in the new heaven 
and the new earth. Christian affective recognitions perceive present values in terms 
                                                 
99
 Markell, P., ‘Making Affect Safe for Democracy?: On “Constitutional Patriotism”’, 54 
 
 128 
of this creational-eschatological shape of associated-differentiated life, the pluriform 
order of mutual relations held together in Christ.  
With these observations in mind, we may now address again the question of 
enduring affections. Stable, enduring affections depend on memory as argued above. 
Our memory of life within the world is full of patterns of differentiation and 
association which we have received, consciously and unconsciously, through our 
affections. Our memories therefore contain an affective awareness, whether accurate 
or inaccurate, of how the objects we have experienced approximated to the 
excellency for which they are intended. Our enduring affections, rooted in these 
memories, are thus stabilised through attraction into the internal structure of the 
established moral order and attraction towards the moral order’s goal. In this way, 
the beginnings of understanding, attracted into the associated-differentiated moral 
order, share in the stable steadiness of the moral order’s current harmony and future 
peace. The enduring quality of affection as a beginning of understanding depends on 
the memory of the integrated shape of the moral order.  
Two interrelated ways of answering (2) follow from our response to (1). On 
the one hand, affections have a conclusive quality to them precisely because, as 
discussed, they recognise the goodly shape of the end while yet at the beginning. 
However, although the sorrow of a mother for a sickly child may grasp in a moment 
the healthy future the child should have, there remains the task of reflection and 
deliberation, the often long and hard task of practical reason, sleepless nights and 
thoughtful action. Affection runs ahead without taking in the complexity of 
operations, nutritional decisions and ongoing therapy but seeking to grasp the end 
which is the good of health. In running ahead, affections by no means render 
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reflection and deliberation irrelevant but rather do not attempt to do that for which 
they are not fitted. This is a normal feature of creaturely life and does not require, for 
its justification, any particular appeal to special revelation. 
On the other hand, there is the case when affection truly does supervene at the 
end of a train of reasoning and practical action. The child’s complex health needs 
have been painstakingly explored, deliberated over and resolved. All that remains, it 
appears, is a joy which is not a beginning reaching forward to a conclusion but is 
itself a conclusion, which perceives aright the fitting harmony which now exists in 
the child’s body. Although this is how joy within the world may appear, according to 
Christian eschatology such joy is not a conclusion, properly speaking. For this joy – 
though in some measure right and proper – is still provisional and unstable. It is an 
understanding of the goodness of the child’s current health which will need to be 
reconsidered in light of subsequent developments and changes during the course of 
her life. Just like the applause of audience members who have mistaken a moment’s 
rest between movements for the end of a musical performance, an eschatologically 
over-realised joy in recovered health fails to perceive itself as a provisional judgment 
on value. Such joy is, in truth, both an end and a beginning, as all provisional 
judgments must be. Though our intuitions about affection may suggest otherwise, 
affections are never complete conclusions in this life (except in fairy tales). They 
remain, to a significant extent, beginnings which offer a path to further reflective and 
deliberative activities. Thus, when Lacoste described the penury of affection, he 
spoke better than philosophy alone can know – though perhaps Lacoste also knew 
this. Christian eschatology frames the penury of affection in terms of its 
provisionality as a way of understanding the world in light of the gospel of the Christ 
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who became penurious to make many rich (2 Corinthians 8:9). Jesus entered into the 
provisionality of human understanding in order that humanity might come to share in 
the riches of complete understanding, the genuine joy based on the truth which will 
characterise those who together worship God in His kingdom. 
The provisionality of joy with respect to a child’s health is but one example 
of the overall provisionality of knowledge in the world, even explicitly theological 
knowledge. When unbelievers or Christians say that they rejoice because they know 
that their spouse or God loves them, these seem clear cases of affection following 
prior understanding or knowledge rather than initiating it. The causal connection 
between the knowledge and the affection seems to indicate a chronological sequence 
whereby affection only enters in at the end and not at the beginning. These 
appearances are only partially misleading. It is the case that affection follows from 
an awareness of some value-laden reality and that the awakening to that reality is in 
an important sense the cause of the affection since the reality awakens and attracts 
the affective understanding. However, there is also a deceptive dimension to these 
appearances. For the causal link is not akin to scientific cause and effect. Instead, the 
causal link explains the reason for the affection in the sense of the attractive feature 
of reality which the affection evaluates. Understanding only genuinely begins when 
the attracted, cognitive affection receives the reality with which it is presented. Other 
forms of knowing may precede affection – the gathering of information, for example 
– but not the understanding which begins to perceive the value of that in which it 
participates and which is followed by reflection and deliberation leading on to further 
affective understanding. Affection’s quality as the beginning of understanding 
continually preserves our awareness that our knowledge is at present provisional and 
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always in need of deepening participation in the created order and in Christ in whom 




Despite the benefit which Edwards’ writings bestow, there is a serious 
deficiency in his approach. Addressing the deficiency is important both because of 
Edwards’ significant influence in the tradition of (especially Protestant) Christian 
reflection on the affective dimension of life and because it shows an unhelpful 
alternative to our own account of the relation between eschatology and affections. 
The deficiency is his belief that the perceptual understanding which is 
characteristic of the Christian sense of the heart (spiritual taste) not only provides an 
excellent view of the good, the excellent interrelation of all things, but also 
minimises or eliminates the need for moral reflection about the good and for 
deliberation about right courses of action. Affection closes ‘at once’ with right 
action, we are confidently told.
100
 No doubt there are some circumstances where 
clarity about right action rapidly follows affective understanding as when affective 
recognition of an aggressive enemy leads us quickly to flee, fight or turn the other 
cheek. However, it seems experimentally true, following Edwards’ own method of 
observation of Christian practice,
101
 not only that Christians generally do not have 
Edwards’ perceptual immediacy about the excellent mutual relations of all things but 
also that deliberation about what it is right to do is normally very necessary for 
Christians. Although, in the aftermath of the Fall and God’s work of redemption, the 
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presence of the Holy Spirit in the believer certainly raises the capacity for inclined 
understanding towards excellency, yet the Scriptures furnish us with clear 
demonstrations about the continuing obscurity which clouds the minds of believers.  
Concerning the good end of man, Christians know from Paul that ‘now we 
see in a mirror dimly’ (1 Corinthians 13:12) and from John that ‘what we will be has 
not yet appeared’ (1 John 3:2). What Christians will see is God, the author of 
goodness who alone is Good, but this is not yet; when Christians do appear, they will 
be like Christ, their supreme good, but this is yet to come. Concerning the right, we 
see that the early church in Acts and as depicted in the epistles is replete with 
confusion over what followers of Christ ought to be doing, whether it be the 
controversy between Paul and Peter at Antioch (Galatians 2:11ff) or the continual 
disagreements between Paul and his churches over their way of life (e.g. 1 
Corinthians). Christians are not represented as immediately grasping the good and 
the right as Edwards seems to think possible. As opposed to our penurious account, 
Edwards offers an over-realised eschatology of the affections. 
It seems that the reason behind Edwards’ tendency in this direction lies in his 
description of the interrelation of understanding, inclination and affections. 
Although, as we have seen, Edwards often seems to equate affection with a certain 
spiritual taste or understanding, at other times, he holds that affections ‘arise from’, 
‘flow from’ or ‘proceed’ from instruction, knowledge, understanding or conviction. 
For example, affections ‘arise from those influences and operations of the heart, 
which are spiritual, supernatural and divine’.
102
 Elsewhere he explains that holy 
affections ‘arise from some information of the understanding, some spiritual 
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instruction which the mind receives, some light or actual knowledge’,
103
 that they 
‘arise from some instruction or light in the understanding’;
104
 or again, that they 
‘arise from a strong persuasion of the truth of the Christian religion’
105
 and that 
‘[t]ruly spiritual and gracious affections…arise from the enlightening of the 
understanding [which understands] the things that are taught of God and Christ’.
106
 
Moreover, unholy affections ‘arise from ignorance’.
107
 Alternatively Edwards 
sometimes uses the language of flowing or proceeding: ‘[b]ut yet such convictions 
are sometimes mistaken, for saving convictions, and the affections flowing from ’em, 
for saving affections’;
108
 affections may ‘flow from’ a false conviction;
109
 or again, 
this ‘sort of understanding or knowledge is that knowledge of divine things from 




These descriptions indicate an ambivalence in Edwards’ account of affections 
which coheres with his self-confessed lack of linguistic and conceptual clarity about 
the relation of understanding and inclination.
111
 Affections are, according to 
Edwards, matters of the inclination which involve heart, mind and will. The 
inclination is informed through the understanding and, inasmuch as the affections 
approve or disapprove of what the understanding discovers, the inclination is 
inseparable from the understanding. This seems to indicate that affections themselves 
should definitely be classed as “understandings”. However, Edwards does not seem 
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wholly committed to this as shown by the fact that he does not reflect at any length 
on what kind or quality of understandings they might be. As sensations of the mind 
they relish or disrelish, they approve or disapprove; this seems to indicate that they 
are some form of understanding. However, the language of ‘arising from’, ‘flowing 
from’ or ‘proceeding from’ seems to indicate that affection is a secondary feature of 
morality which follows from understanding and does not constitute it. 
Edwards’ claim that the sense of the heart itself has a direct sensible 
perception of the beauty of the moral excellence of all things is intended to clarify 
the matter.
112
 In describing the sense of the heart in this way, Edwards was rightly 
seeking to overcome the tiresome, confusing and unscriptural opposition between 
“head” and “heart”. In doing so he redefines spiritual understanding ‘as a sensible 
light involving direct sensible perception and the inclination of the heart.’
113
 What is 
surprising is that Edwards does not go on to argue that affections are themselves a 
certain kind of understanding which inclines the agent in some active direction. 
There remains a vagueness in the connection between affection and understanding. 
Edwards humbly recognises this vagueness in his closing comment that ‘we can see 
but a little way into the nature of the soul, and the depths of men’s hearts.’
114
 Indeed, 
one wants to agree heartily that much must remain a mystery in this area of study. 
However, there seems to be a connection between the lack of emphasis on 
reflection and deliberation and Edwards’ failure definitively to class affections as 
forms of understanding and explore critically what kind of understanding they might 
be. The issue is strikingly illustrated in Edwards’ interpretation and use of Romans 
12:2 which he renders as ‘ye may prove what is that good, and perfect, and 
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acceptable will of God’.
115
 The translation ‘prove’, indicating certainty and 
definition, is significant in the context since the verse stands at the head of Edwards’ 
systematic account of spiritual taste which precisely does not involve extensive 
moral reasoning but is accurate in proving natural and spiritual excellence. However, 
this translation and meaning is by no means uncontroversial. Bauer equivocates 
uncertainly between two possible meanings for dokimazo (δοκιµάζω) in Romans 
12:2: either it means ‘approve’,
116
 in the sense of immediate acceptance (i.e. in 
accord with Edwards), or it means ‘put to the test’, ‘examine’, ‘discover’ or ‘try to 
learn’.
117
 The latter meaning invites us to understand the renewing of the mind as 
essentially reflective and deliberative and is paralleled well at Ephesians 5:10, in the 
context of another section of Pauline paranesis, where a good translation seems to be 
‘try to learn what is pleasing to the Lord’.
118
  
The overall emphasis of this second translation option is on discovery rather 
than direct, non-reflective, non-deliberative approval.
119
 If the sense of ‘reflective, 
deliberative discovery’ is preferred, then this throws into question the account of 
taste which Edwards has been advancing. The context of Romans 12:2 suggests an 
emphasis on discovery since Romans 12:3, continuing the same line of thought from 
the first two verses, calls us to phronein eis to sophronein (φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ 
σωφρονεῖν) or, to think towards right thinking. In O’Donovan’s words:  
 
This practical thinking is not immediate and intuitive; it is extended and leads to a 
conclusion, as is indicated by two parallel phrases constructed with the preposition 
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“to” or “towards”. The mind is renewed “towards” the discernment of God’s will; they 




Reflection and deliberation seem to be at the centre of Paul’s injunction here rather 
than an immediacy of total moral perception. But in Edwards’ account holy 
affections, as expressions of ‘divine taste’, go straight to the ‘true spiritual and holy 
beauty of actions’.
121
 This move, short-circuiting reflection and deliberation, renders 
superfluous any discussion of whether one’s own or others’ affections have rightly 




An objector might point to the twelfth sign of truly gracious affections to suggest 
that intersubjective discussion of affections is possible and important for Edwards. 
For in that discussion, one form of the Christian profession by which others may 
judge the honesty of the profession is said to be the professor’s report of his inner 
state which includes reference to his ‘misery’, ‘full conviction and sense of 
[Christ’s] sufficiency and perfect excellency as a savior’ and ‘general benevolence to 
mankind’, all of which seem to be affective.
122
 Moreover professors might report 
that ‘they do joyfully entertain the gospel of Christ’, ‘that they rejoice in [Jesus] as 
their only righteousness and portion’ and that they ‘have a willingness of heart to 
embrace religion with all its difficulties.’
123
 This might seem to indicate that 
Edwards thought that discussing affections was worthwhile and practicable.  
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However, this is not so since the uses to which these reports are put are 
highly limited and are stated in somewhat circumspect language. Edwards says that 
such communications ‘may give advantage in forming a judgment’ and function to 
rule out certain possibilities such as that the profession is made ‘from mere 
customary compliance’.
124
 The reason why the communicability of affections as 
reports to others of one’s spiritual experiences is downplayed is that Edwards 
believes that, in deciding whether or not to accept someone in charity as a brother, 
we should consider not affections but the fruit of affections in good works.
125
 The 
counterpoint to this is that one’s own affections may be a great comfort and 
assurance to oneself in one’s conscience but are not of great practical significance to 
others.
126
 Thus the communicability of affections in Edwards has very minimal 
significance in the active, common life of the community. He has minimised the 
value of public communication of affection in favour of private experience.
127
 My 
argument has been that, were Edwards to have conceived affections as a certain kind 
of cognition which does not necessarily have an immediate and clear perception both 
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of the good in general and specific right courses of action, he might have thought 
differently about the significance of the communicability of affections. 
 
The deepest problem with Edwards’ epistemology seems to be a latent quasi-
Aristotelian sub-structure which guides key passages. One such is his elaboration of 
spiritual taste, a thing ‘given and maintained by the Spirit of God, in the hearts of the 
saints, whereby they are…led and guided in discerning and distinguishing the true 
spiritual and holy beauty of actions’.
128
 In order to illustrate the nature of spiritual 
taste, Edwards describes a natural (i.e. not experiencing saving grace) but virtuous 
man in terms which would be instantly recognisable by many Aristotelians. The 
man’s ‘good nature’ teaches him how to act on every occasion; there is a ‘habit of 
mind’ which directs him which is then exercised by a taste of what it is right to do 
and which distinguishes ‘in a moment, more precisely, than the most accurate 
reasonings can find out in many hours.’
129
  
This natural virtuous man’s understanding is compared to a stone dropping by 
the force of gravity directly downwards to its goal, without the need or even the 
possibility of delay or deviation.
130
 The suggestion is that it is the good nature or 
virtue of this virtuous man which enables knowledge of the precise course of action 
which conforms with excellency. Reverting again to the specifically Christian 
virtuous man we learn from The Nature of True Virtue that ‘[t]rue virtue most 
essentially consists in benevolence to Being in general. Or perhaps to speak more 
accurately, it is that consent, propensity and union of heart to Being in general, that is 
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immediately exercised in a general good will.’
131
 Edwards thus defines benevolence 
as the union of the heart between the subject and this object with affections arising 
directly or ‘immediately’ from this general benevolence.  
Moreover, unlike Aristotle, whose disjointed account of virtue and feeling 
was discussed above, Edwards thoroughly integrates virtue and affection and argues 
that all holy affections flow directly out of the prior virtuous benevolence. Affections 
are given no way to arise except through the virtuous mind of the agent, albeit made 
virtuous by the Spirit of God. Edwards’ latent Aristotelianism seems then to be the 
root cause of the combined difficulties of epistemological immediacy and vague 
conceptualisation concerning the affections. For holy, epistemologically accurate 
affection seems to be the natural overflow of the virtuous man. We have said enough 
already about the dangers of virtue epistemology to see the problems with this 
approach. An epistemology whereby reflection and deliberation are as unnecessary to 
a man as multiple options for downwards movement are to a stone falling to the earth 
without obstruction will quell the revelatory power of affection, make reflection and 
deliberation irrelevant and invite a stagnant self-coincidence. 
Moreover, as Martha Nussbaum has pointed out, such Aristotelian-type 
thinking might even be taken in a more sinister direction. Nussbaum develops a 
forceful criticism of Aristotle’s ethics by showing how it promotes a continuous, 
merciless surveillance of agency whereby every motive and passion must be 
interrogated to see if it conduces to eudaimonia. Though Edwards is alert to the risks 
attendant on judging holiness by overt affections, his epistemology relies on a certain 
moral perfectionism that would fuel a self-reflexive surveillance culture. Nussbaum, 
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drawing on the importance of the experience of infancy when a merciful holding by 
primary care-givers is of the essence of development into mature emotional 
interdependence, argues that only an ethic which has explicit room for a ‘merciful 
willingness to cease interrogating oneself about the appropriateness of one’s motives 
and passions’ will enable healthy personal, social and political emotions. The 
criticism is focussed against an ethics of perfection which, like a relentlessly 
demanding father, tyrannically ignores human neediness, fragility and emotional 
ambivalence.
132
 Though we will have occasion to challenge some of Nussbaum’s 
own insights, her criticism of Aristotle certainly hits the mark.  
While it is right to make these critical observations about Edwards’ well-
intentioned and aesthetically pleasing affective epistemology, we should also observe 
the significant convergence of Edwards’ account with the more modest and merciful 
approach to affections developed here. It comes through Edwards’ appeal to 
Christian eschatology:  
 
The love and joy of the saints on earth, is the beginning and dawning of the light, life, 
and blessedness of heaven, and is like their love and joy there; or rather, the same in 




Lacoste’s description of affections as the half-light of ethics parallels Edwards’ 
distinction between the dawn in this present era and the full light of heaven to come. 
The difference in light between earthly and heavenly affections is one of degree. 
However, as has been shown, Edwards has ascribed such a high degree of 
epistemological competence to earthly affections as to make earthly reflection and 
deliberation considerably less necessary than is actually the case. In light of his 
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thoroughgoing doctrine of sin, this over-realisation concerning the affections is all 
the more surprising.  
Our task to this point has been to describe a moral concept. An account of 
affections as the attracted beginnings of understanding which endure through 
memory and construe particular values in terms of the moral order recommends itself 
as both sufficiently subtle and intuitively appealing. Having given this account of the 
nature of affections and their role in human morality, we now need to enquire about 
their role in political relations, the task to which we now turn. 
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Chapter 3: Affections in political relations 
 
We have now developed a theological account of the nature of affections and their 
role in human morality. In the next three chapters, our enquiry will focus on the place 
of affections in a particular aspect of human morality, namely the political relations 
which subsist in human societies. We begin this task here by enquiring specifically 
about how the affections play a role in the internal workings of certain institutions of 
political society, specifically the institutions of representation and law. 
These are not new themes. Arguing against the cast of mind which led to the 
social upheavals of the French Revolution, Edmund Burke wrote that 
 
[according to] this barbarous philosophy, which is the offspring of cold hearts and 
muddy understandings, and which is as void of solid wisdom as it is destitute of all 
taste and elegance, laws are to be supported only by their own terrors and by the 
concern which each individual may find in them from his own private speculations or 
can spare to them from his own private interests. In the groves of their academy, at the 
end of every vista, you see nothing but the gallows. Nothing is left which engages the 
affections on the part of the commonwealth. On the principles of this mechanic 
philosophy, our institutions can never be embodied, if I may use the expression, in 
persons, so as to create in us love, veneration, admiration, or attachment. But that sort 
of reason which banishes the affections is incapable of filling their place. These public 
affections, combined with manners, are required sometimes as supplements, 




Burke here refers to the importance of ‘affections’ and especially ‘public affections’ 
in the personal, representative embodiment of institutions and in the workings of law. 
However, in the style of many conservative political thinkers then and now, he leaves 
undefined and imprecise the way that affections do play their part in political 
relations. This is unfortunate because the affective dimension of political life and the 
challenges to it which Burke highlights are too important to be left underdetermined. 
                                                 
1
 Burke, E., Reflections on the Revolution in France, 77-78 
 
 143 
The descendants of the philosophy he opposed operate at a high level of technical 
definition and thus appear to know more about the inner workings of political 
relations than those who gesture inchoately towards affections. While bearing in 
mind Aristotle’s well-worn and wise dictum that we should not seek more precision 
than the subject matter allows, this discussion will yet seek more precision than 
Burke thought it wise to give.  
 
Section I:  Martha Nussbaum’s political eschatology 
 
We approach this question from a theological direction, an approach with which 
Burke had much sympathy though not so much in the way of systematic engagement. 
We saw in chapter two that if one adopts an eschatological outlook, it affects one’s 
account of affections. Edwards’ doctrine of excellency was adopted as an 
interpretation of the moral order as it is and as it has been vindicated in Christ. In this 
connection, we turn again to Martha Nussbaum. Her political thought also has a 
surprisingly eschatological character. We advance such a claim cautiously since she 
does not use the theological language of “eschatology” itself. However, her account 
of political emotions is closely organised around an ambitious way of dealing with 
ultimate questions of human existence with which Christian eschatology has been 
traditionally associated.  
For example, Nussbaum defines the ultimate human state as ‘mature 
interdependence’. In that condition, as we saw in chapter one, a human has left 
behind childish self-obsession and joined together with others in compassionate 
recognition of her own and others’ frail neediness thereby creating a political 
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community which accords with that recognition. Her eschatology is thus essentially 
interior to the development of each human life towards maturity but may be 
increasingly realised in a maturing political culture. This strong emphasis on 
temporal progression from childishness to adulthood sets Nussbaum at odds with 
accounts such as existence behind the Rawlsian veil where the timely quality of 
human life is not recognised. It is just this emphasis on temporality which suggests 
the ascription of “eschatology” since it offers an account of a universal human future 
to which all are summoned. For Nussbaum, death, one of the traditional four last 
things of Christian eschatology, is the limit of this future. Death’s inevitability 
should prevent humanity from attempting to transcend the mature interdependence 
which represents their ultimate purpose. The fragility which characterises all life 
before death is the ultimate condition of humanity to which all should be reconciled. 
In this sense, the end has always already been here but is infinitely repeatable in 
successive generations as they live out their fragile lives to greater or lesser degrees 
of mature interdependence. 
This peculiar eschatology becomes clearer in light of the political emotions 
which Nussbaum discusses. We have already considered compassion as the 
eschatologically appropriate, positive emotion which sustains a political society 
defined by interdependent fragility. By contrast, disgust and shame are the 
eschatologically inappropriate negative emotions. Nussbaum uses child psychology 
and sociology to explain why these latter two emotions are almost always unwise 
aspects of political society. In her view, they undermine political society’s common 
life because, through them, the established ‘normals’ subordinate and oppress a range 
of out-groups. On Nussbaum’s account, disgust is never conducive to determinations 
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of wrong or right since its genealogy stems from a (largely male) unwillingness to 
countenance the self’s vulnerability and eventual death.
2
 It is an evaluation of that 
which is sticky, oozy or otherwise threatening to people’s sense of self-sufficiency 
and bodily permanence. Members of an out-group are disgusting because they 
embody such a threat or because their characteristic actions are disgusting. The 
obvious example for Nussbaum is the male, heterosexual American’s attitude to 
homosexual males. Shame, because of its origin in the narcissistic failures of infants 
as they encounter their lack of omnipotence, is reckoned similarly dubious as a 
political emotion. Such childishness is a failure to understand the eschatologically 
limited human condition in a world of upheaval. To make an independent existence 
one’s goal is to return to an ashamed, infantile immaturity. Although a more 
generalised shame may occasionally be appropriate – the shame of middle-class 
America to care for poor America
3
 – this other ‘primitive shame’
4
 is never 
appropriate for political society.  
Shame’s relationship to the law illustrates Nussbaum’s concern over both 
shame and disgust. One of her chief interlocutors, Dan Kahan, suggests that some 
offenders might perform ‘some clearly humiliating ritual before the public gaze’ as 
part of their punishment. Nussbaum denounces this as ‘bringing back the brand on 
the face’,
5
 a way of degrading other members of the community. She is particularly 
concerned about the possibility of the permanent shame and degradation which 
accompanies the irrevocable loss of the vote following conviction for felony under 
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US law and which would accompany castration for sexual offences were that 
sanction permitted and utilised.
6
 Each of these exclude people on a permanent basis 
from appearing in society without being made to feel the shame from which they 
should, as maturing human beings, be increasingly emancipated. These illustrations 
from judicial punishment are institutional signs that shame is an unhealthy political 
emotion. Its dark genealogy, linked to shattered narcissistic dreams, oppresses those 
who feel shame and actually dehumanises those who use shame to humiliate others. 
It ‘involves the realization that one is weak and inadequate in some way in which one 
expects oneself to be adequate’.
7
 Such expectation is normally based on a deluded 
view of humanity which falsely prizes independence and fails to recognise the 
ongoing weakness, fragility and mortality which characterises the “eschatological” 
human condition. To institutionalise shame and force people into relationships 
defined by shame is to oppose the development of mature interdependence both in 
individuals and in a political culture. To make shame permanent through loss of the 
vote or castration is to exclude people from the eschatological future to which they 
are called. 
We may elaborate Nussbaum, with respect to representative institutions, to 
say that, by her lights, shame and disgust normally encourage a political self-
consciousness which is stagnantly self-coincident and narcissistic, “re-presenting” 
the self back to the self without the ability to learn or be summoned by those who are 
differentiated from some social norm upheld by the ‘normals’. These emotions 
reassert ‘normalcy’ thereby shutting down criticism of the very notion of normalcy 
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and any particular representation of it.
8
 This social pattern fails to understand the 
ultimate, eschatological reality of mature interdependence amidst diversely fragile 
humans. Nussbaum especially criticises social contract theory which hides our true, 
interdependent humanity from us and presents to us only ‘the image of the citizen as 
a productive worker, able to pay for the benefits he receives by the contributions he 
makes.’
9
 The concept of representation offered in such theory is that of a community 
of ‘competent, independent adult[s]’ who re-present similar selves to similar selves,
10
 
a myth which hides from view the diversity and dependence of society. It especially 
conceals the disabled or, to speak more truly, it normalises some disabilities and 
renders abnormal other disabilities. The political representation which accompanies 
such an account, whether conceptualised as Rousseau’s delegate or Hobbes’ 
Leviathan, will similarly fail to represent the wide, interdependent diversity of a 
community for it will treat that community as a group of similar, independent 
persons who have each contracted in such a way as to constitute the representative 
institution. Such a contract does not offer a plausible interpretation of the diverse 
many not deemed competent to “sign up”. 
Nussbaum’s alternative to the contractarian concealment of our 
interdependent humanity explores the mode of our public appearance and especially 
‘the minimum needed to appear in public without shame, as a citizen whose worth is 
equal to that of others.’
11
 Political representation should be built around protecting 
and promoting ‘capabilities’
12
 rather than contractarian rights which hide our fragile 
interdependency. Nussbaum’s political representation is thus an interpersonal 
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recognition of equality amidst permanent, diverse disability. Sustaining this ongoing 
recognition requires a facilitating environment characterised by 
  
a political conception of the person that makes sense of the fact that we all have mortal 





That environment is the political liberalism characteristic of the best, as Nussbaum 
sees it, of modern Western nation-states. In a powerful passage she argues that: 
 
Liberalism is frightening…we know where we are if some of us are “normal”, 
independent, productive citizens, and others have their eyes downcast in shame. What 
liberalism requires of us, however, is something more chancy and fearful, some 





Nussbaum’s “eschatology” is thus founded on the psychological claim that mature 
human existence in the twenty-first century is only practicable when people’s 
political representation is not built around the idea of perfection but is rather a 
constant re-presentation of weakness and need to weakness and need in all its 
diversity but without shame or disgust. Such emotions, unlike compassion, cannot 
recognise one’s own bodily vulnerability or others’ vulnerability and so do not 
involve thought about supporting human capabilities. The institutions of law and 
representation should, therefore, be adapted to promote communal compassion and 
to prevent the presence of shame and disgust.
15
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 Nussbaum’s political eschatology is seen climactically in her account of 
disgust and death. She accepts that there is a limited role for disgust at the prospect 
of death and decay, recognising that it 
 
seems unlikely that we could ever be at ease with our own death and the decay that 
surrounds it; insofar as disgust grows out of our uneasy relationship with decay and 





However, she is uncertain as to whether we should be totally at ease with these 
inevitable features of human existence, arguing that political society should 
 
embrace with neither fear nor loathing the decay and brevity of our lives. But to ask of 
humans that they not have any shrinking from decay or any loathing of death is to ask 
them to be other than, possibly even less than, human. Human life is a strange 




Nussbaum’s strength is her willingness to explore the mystery and fragility of 
human existence. However, her commitment both to a liberalism which does not 
adjudicate between comprehensive accounts of the good and to an eschatology 
which, while highly focussed on decay and death, does not give conceptual space to 
the concept of a continuing life after death, leads to a political philosophy which 
removes vital wisdom from a political society’s institutions. While rightly promoting 
a political sensibility to vulnerability and interdependence, she has also smuggled an 
eschatological, comprehensive account of human existence into the heart of politics 
which does not sit easily with various religious conceptions. Christianity, for 
example, describes death as an enemy and the resurrection of Christ as the way that 
fragility, death and decay can be defeated without the loss of but rather as the 
                                                                                                                                          
discourage, and can shape in various ways, the emotions that impede appropriate compassion: shame, 
envy and disgust.’ 
16
 Nussbaum, M., Hiding from Humanity, 95 
17
 ibid. 121 
 
 150 
fulfilment of a particular version of mature interdependence, namely the body of 
Christ. This gives a very different account of temporal progression from Nussbaum’s 
extrapolations based on child psychology.  
Her smuggling would be serious enough if unrecognised. However, 
Nussbaum follows Rawls by commending the idea of a liberal ‘module’, in the form 
of an endorsement of political liberalism, inseparable from her account of death, 
decay, vulnerability and emotion, which can be attached to all particular religious or 
comprehensive conceptions in a political society. Thus she believes  
 
that [her] psychological conceptions…are broadly acceptable to those who hold 
diverse religious doctrines, and that they can be accepted as part of a core of doctrines 




This belief seems unjustified. The absence of a systematic recognition of the 
transcendent in Nussbaum’s eschatological, political psychology undermines the 
possibility of those energising analogies which characterise much of religiously 
inspired affection and action in political society today. The equality she proposes is 
an equality whose central insight is that we are all decaying and dying but must 
neither project our disgust about this onto others, thereby denying them the equal 
treatment they deserve, nor shame others into forgetting their own fragility, thereby 
concealing our own and undermining compassion.  
For their own reasons, many religious conceptions value liberty, opportunity 
and equality and recognise the truth of fragility and interdependence. But equally, 
those same religious conceptions could not adopt Nussbaum’s conviction that decay 
and death should define our political consciousness, a conviction which seems 
inextricable from the liberal module she proposes. Although she recognises that 
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religions may hold that ‘in some ultimate metaphysical sense human life is not very 
dignified’,
19
 she does not allow for their eschatological accounts of human life to 
have political weight. In the end her eschatology is, like all thoroughgoing 
eschatologies, exclusive. For example, the Christian gospel, as we shall see, offers a 
very different account of death and the future which leads to a way of 
conceptualising political affections. This account can accommodate many of 
Nussbaum’s insights but also goes beyond them to penetrate more deeply into the 
nature of human existence.  
 
Section II: Political affections in Deuteronomy and Luke-Acts 
 
To respond to Nussbaum and address the place of affections in political institutions, 
we will need to elaborate our discussion in chapter two. The account of 
intersubjective affection developed there can now be given political application 
through attention to the role of institutions.  
Oliver O’Donovan defines a political institution as 
 
a series of common practices in which the exercise of political authority has a regular 
position. Institutionalized authority…provides a framework within which…moments 




On this plausible view, a political institution provides organisational structure to a 
community so that it can carry out a series of practices concerning common goods 
which require the exercise of political authority. A political institution’s practices, 
such as discussion, consultation, ceremonial ritual, law-making, voting and law 
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enforcement, require a certain stability so that the community at large can easily 
recognise moments of genuine authority which can give reasons for action 
concerning the goods they hold in common. The community’s recognition thus 
attends both to the institutional authority itself and to the common goods with which 
the political practices are concerned. 
The stability of an institution’s practices is provided by the traditions which 
guide their conduct. The traditions of political institutions are communal storehouses 
of memory in a politically active form. Although tradition in itself is the handing on 
and developing of remembered practices and patterns, it is actually indistinguishable 
from memory since its content and activity is always defined by memory. Through 
such traditions, the laws which govern institutional practices are brought to bear in 
the present and thus a community stably engages in their common practices, 
developing them and passing them on as appropriate. It is this pattern which leads 
O’Donovan to comment that ‘[l]aw is the only safe form of cultural memory’.
21
 An 
obvious political illustration is a legal tradition based on precedent which evolves 
over time and in which contemporary judgments are constantly referred back to the 
past opinions of members of the tradition, though the tradition does not absolutely 
bind the present to the past for there remains the important idea that law is 
discovered by the members of the institution as they carry out their practices in 
accord with the tradition. The practice of judgment in legal institutions will be 
developed further later in this chapter.  
 Discussion of institutions, traditions and practices is intimately linked in the 
minds of many to virtue, habituation and training. It is often held that the purpose of 
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traditions, practices and institutions is to form virtuous people who will then be able, 
precisely as virtuous people, to carry forward the traditions and practices of the 
institution effectively. In the wake of Alasdair MacIntyre’s highly influential works 
in this area, it might seem that to speak of these things sensibly requires just such a 
commitment.
22
 But this assumption is not as securely founded as it seems. Moreover, 
the assumption is significant because of the contemporary tendency for virtue theory 
to permeate and even dominate theological discussions of institutions, practices and 
traditions. We have already seen this to some extent in our discussion of Christian 
neo-Aristotelians in chapter two and we will see it again with respect to Stanley 
Hauerwas in chapter five. 
By way of a political elaboration, we claim that the traditions of political 
institutions sustain not only the laws which govern practices but also those affections 
which accompany and aid laws. These remembered affections are the beginnings of 
understanding which participate in the goods with which the practices of a 
community’s institutions are concerned, recognise the authority of those who 
promote the proper ends of those goods and initiate the task of political reflection 
and deliberation which is shared by the community and its authorities. If this is so, 
then the endurance of the political affections which aid law depends not on the 
community’s virtue but on the community’s memory of its tradition of reflection on 
the good and deliberation concerning the right, stored up in the practices of its 
institutions.  
 The tradition of a particular community which shares in institutional 
practices is thus the primary lens through which a community’s affections ‘see’ the 
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world. Often this ‘seeing’ happens on the unconscious level. This is a subtlety of 
memory not developed in Augustine’s Confessions but hinted at in his storehouse 
metaphor and supported by neuroscientific researchers such as Joseph LeDoux, 
namely that the unconscious memory draws out affective recognitions which do not 
seem fully explicable to ourselves and others and yet seem somehow reasonable and 
fitting to the moment. Affections may be cognitively attracted from the storehouse 
into our present experience by some object which has gained its significance through 
some past experience which we cannot or will not remember. This phenomenon is 
familiar in psychoanalysis but less commonly discussed with respect to political 
affairs. Just as an individual may have had past experiences which recur in the 
unconscious memory and bring about affections which are not fully explicable, so 
too may a community or members of a community, through collective though 
unconscious memory, be to some extent unaccountably awakened in affective 
recognition by particular objects (symbols, events, words, songs etc). The 
community may not even know immediately which objects have attracted their 
affective understanding, let alone articulate their significance. Nonetheless they feel 
sure that something of significant value has appeared to them. In that half-light, and 
if they understand the intentional-evaluative content of affections, they may engage 
in intersubjective verification to discover what of significance has occurred. In this 
way our affections may be truer guides than we think to what is actually of value to a 
society since they may be attentive to and sustained by memory in a way that cool 
calculation of consequences is not. Thus political memory can explain both 
apparently inexplicable or objectless political affections, a set which any theory of 
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affections should be able to explain to some degree,
23
 and the way that affections are 
intersubjectively attracted by people, symbols, objects or activities that are able to 
draw on a community’s memory. 
A political institution which has the authority to attract a community’s 
affective attention thus gives that community the opportunity to experience political 
affections together and respond together, perhaps in agreement and perhaps 
diversely, to common objects in a regularised way. Political affections thus evoked 
are the beginnings of communal, cognitive discernment which should be followed by 
intersubjective verification, moral reflection and deliberation. They endure on the 
basis of the strength of tradition and memory which the institution supports. They 
render humble service by drawing a political community into internal reflection 
about the value of common objects and deliberation concerning the courses of 
political action which ought or ought not to be followed in relation to those objects. 
In contrast to a political society built around formation of virtuous character among 
its living members, a political institution with a healthy tradition will be 
characterised by an openness to discovery, newness and surprise which undermines 
the hazards of stagnant self-coincidence. For it will look to be awakened to the 
identity of the community through affective participation in the past, a process which 
should alert the community to the present’s contingent quality and the possibility that 
change to realign with or even correct the tradition and its laws is often necessary. 
This seems to be a plausible elaboration of what Burke is gesturing towards when he 
says that affections may be correctives or aids to laws. 
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 Political institutions will have a variety of ways of drawing together their 
history with their present moment and of construing the present in terms of the past 
to enable self-understanding and change. Political institutions may utilise symbols, 
songs or images (for example) which act as focal points for memory and affections. 
In the British tradition, one might consider footage of the poll tax riots, a Scottish 
Saltire or the often reproduced image of Myra Hindley. The recurrent presence of 
such common objects of affection ensures that memories of old political conflicts, 
wars of resistance and crimes are brought to mind in an affective way which initiates 
reflection and deliberation. Thus memory enables the enduring power of affective 
recognitions to contribute to political discourse. Inasmuch as the memory and 
affections are intersubjective, this process provides a way to gather and sustain 
common political thought and action.  
Institutional memory may of course operate in such a way as to prevent 
discovery and change by bringing the past uncritically to mind, by failing to 
encourage intersubjective verification, by maintaining a triumphalist posture that the 
present situation is better than the past or through sustaining a belief that the 
excellent virtues of the people now are such as to make attention to the past or 
external standards unnecessary, the political form of what we called “stubbornness” 
in chapter two. The guard against this is precisely some sort of eschatological cast of 
mind which transcends the particular human community, relativises claims to 
virtuous excellence and calls for humble reflection and deliberation. An eschatology, 
whether Nussbaum’s or some religious conception, perhaps mediated through the 
form of an established religion, enables a community or particular members of the 
community to judge against or to praise their own tradition, present conduct and 
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future plans. Our thesis is that a particular religious eschatology, the Christian one, 
has uniquely sufficient resources to enable healthy political affections in the service 
of the common good. From that theological perspective, the extent to which an 
institution’s tradition is actually correlated to the present condition and future state of 
the objective moral order in Christ will vary. For the tradition holds within it a 
remembered order of value which guides practices concerning common goods which 
are carried out by the community. Political affections which are guided by Christian 
eschatology may offer considerable service to the order of value of a particular 
community by understanding the objects valued by a community in relation to the 
actual moral order disclosed in the gospel. In this way, the combination of political 
memory and affections attuned to Christian eschatology may enable a political 
community to live its common life in a more truthful way. 
 
Wisdom from Deuteronomy and Luke-Acts 
 
Our task, therefore, is to explore the political affections which arise from Christian 
eschatology and to see what role they might have in political institutions. David 
Ford’s account of wisdom’s attentiveness to the ‘cries’ of the world will assist us. He 
describes how wisdom is ‘immersed in the agonies, conflicts and joys of life, whose 
intensities are often articulated in cries’
24
 and how ‘[d]iscernment of cries and crying 
out with discernment are near to the heart of the meaning of a prophetic wisdom that 
is involved in history and oriented to God and God’s future.’
25
 This language 
colourfully translates what we have described in terms of affective participation and 
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intersubjective verification of affection. Affections are basic not only to cries 
themselves but also the intersubjective initiations of wise moral discernment in 
response to cries. Affective wisdom names the way that a man’s affections may be 
immersed or participate in others’ affective cries in such a way as to understand 
them. Christian, affective wisdom entails such intersubjective understanding in light 
of the eschatological future which God is opening up.  
Affective wisdom may have a political dimension. O’Donovan writes that 
 
Wisdom is our appropriation of the good afforded to humankind, inexhaustible, 
limitlessly open to participation, defining the relations of the other goods that we 




Political wisdom grasps the differentiated and associated interrelation of goods 
within the common good which humans seek in various ways. Political, affective 
wisdom is the way this appropriative work is begun, participating in the cries of joy 
and pain which permeate the history, present and future of a political society. When 
Christian, this wisdom understands that society in relation to God and the 
eschatological future of the moral order which God has opened up in Christ. 
We will first consider how the political, affective wisdom of Deuteronomy, 
emerging from the complexity of Israelite life, offers further conceptual clarity to our 
account of political affections. Deuteronomy, a text which combines legal code and 
national narrative, is rich in ‘emotional reasoning’
27
 and presents the institutional life 
of the people of Israel in a way which is deeply concerned with affectivity. The 
festive institutions of Israel, with which we shall be particularly concerned, are a 
series of practices that ensure that people live within ‘earshot’ of the cries of people  
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that arise from the intensities of life – in joy, suffering, recognition, wonder, 
bewilderment, gratitude, expectation or acclamation; and cries of people for what they 
most desire – love, justice, truth, goodness, compassion, children, health, food and 




We will shortly be considering the gospel of Luke and the book of Acts inasmuch as 
they contribute to our eschatology of political affections. Luke-Acts, considered as a 
single continuous narrative, presents a highly subtle account of affections in relation 
to institutions of law and representation. Through engagement in these texts, we will 
see how affective, political wisdom arises through an involvement in history – 
instantiated in traditions, institutions and practices – which is attentively awakened to 
God’s eschatological purposes for the moral order vindicated in Christ. While it is 
true to say that the concerns of the modern theory of emotions and this discussion’s 
concept of affection are in some ways distant from the social, cultural and 
intellectual settings of Deuteronomy and Luke-Acts, fruitful connections between 
them will become apparent. This fructification will in due course be specifically 
channelled into an exploration of illuminating analogies between the institutions and 
affections of the people of God and the institutions and affections of political 
societies today. 
We begin with Deuteronomy whose affective wisdom is multifaceted and 
contains legal, institutional and eschatological dimensions. The historical-critical 
concerns which have occupied many students of Deuteronomy have yielded insights 
important for our purpose, most notably an awareness of the social structure of Israel. 
However, the historical-critical questions themselves will not be a major emphasis 
here and we will instead attempt to discern how the final text presents the people’s 
                                                 
28
 Ford, D., Christian Wisdom, 5 
 
 160 
affective life. A range of authors have recently taken this approach especially in 
relation to the moral theology of the Pentateuch. For example, Gordon Wenham 
observes that, although it is hard or even impossible to discern the moral stance of 
any putative sources of the Pentateuch since we cannot know what elements of the 
source have been omitted, it is nonetheless possible to perceive the commitments of 




This discussion will adopt Wenham’s rhetorical approach and seek out what 
the implied reader of Deuteronomy – the reader for whom the canonical (implied) 
authors were writing – might reasonably have been expected to understand, with 
respect to human affections, on the basis of the final form of the text. It should be 
emphasised that such an implied reader will be marked by a reverence for the text 
and the tradition which produced it. The implications of this approach for a search 
for affective wisdom are important. For if the final form of the text has been arranged 
with the intention of influencing reverent readers and unless there is very strong 
evidence to the contrary, it will be assumed that there is a more-or-less coherent 
vision of the place of affections in Israel’s life within the book of Deuteronomy and 
that this vision was what the implied readers were supposed to receive. From the 
overall affective richness of Deuteronomy, it seems clear that imparting this vision 
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was one of the objectives of the implied author(s). Although Wenham’s rhetorical 
approach is here accepted, we are more doubtful about his ethical agenda which is ‘to 
identify patterns of behaviour in the narratives which the authors seem to be 
implicitly commending and so draw out what they consider to be virtues.’
30
 He 
argues that Old Testament writers were commending these virtuous habits and 
practices so that they would become habitual in the lives of their readers.
31
 Joy, fear 
and anger (among others) are simply construed as vices or virtues.
32
 We will see in 
due course that this is neither a necessary nor promising interpretation. 
 The festivals of Israel offer insight into the wisdom of affections’ institutional 
role in Deuteronomy. The design of the festivals as institutions, a series of common 
practices which operate in coordination with the social, cultic and political 
institutions of Israelite life such as family, temple, priesthood, law and town, not only 
assumes that affections are aspects of cognition but also provides sophisticated 
opportunities for affections to focus intentionally on objects which are of common 
concern to the whole community. Joy is the central affection whereby these common 
objects are cognised by the community during their common practice of the festivals. 
Festive joy only occurs explicitly in six pericopes, all of which are accounts of 
communal, celebratory, institutional practices (12:1-28, 14:22-29, 16:9-12, 16:13-15, 
26:1-15, 27:1-8). Joy forms the climax in each of these pericopes which describe the 
great gatherings of the people. The first and last pericopes stand at the initiation and 
completion of the great work of legal explanation which dominates the centre of 
Deuteronomy (chapters 12-27) and precedes the covenant curses and blessings. 
These two pericopes climax in joy at the prospect of establishing places to worship 
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YHWH in the land which the Lord God is giving Israel. The central four are highly 
organised accounts of the gathering of the people, in various institutional settings, for 
joyful worship. The festivals taken as a whole are shaped so that YHWH may appear 
to be the true ruler of the people and so that the people may appear to themselves as 
under his authority. Thus the festivals are “political” in the peculiar sense that they 
recognise the supreme authority of YHWH over the land and over the people to 
whom the land was given. Through the festivals the people come, through joyful 
affection, to a communal, intersubjective understanding of self, nation, YHWH and 
the world they inhabit. They discover themselves as the chosen nation from 
humanity, the central genus in the created moral order, and understand their common 
life as the God-ordained order of value which appropriately reflects the values of the 
moral order as a whole.   
Instead of surveying each of the festive pericopes in turn, the discussion will 
focus on one which most clearly illumines our theme, the feast of tithes at 14:22-29. 
In this pericope, we see a design for regular periods of highly affective focussing on 
common objects, specifically, the fruit of the land which will be given to Israel. Here 
Israel are commanded regularly to conduct intersubjective affective participation 
which verifies the goodness of the land and its fruit as aspects of the created order in 
a way that empowers moral reflection, moral deliberation and action towards those 
who may, if neglected, cry out for justice.  
The location of this passage in a legal code makes clear that the affective 
recognitions of Israel can be drawn out in response to God’s commands – the law 
says ‘you shall rejoice’! Such a notion accords with our overall account of affections 
as cognitive, attracted participations and contradicts those theories of emotion which 
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designate them as essentially irrational. Matthew Elliott, among others, has argued 
that the New Testament Scriptures consistently hold that affections are ‘frequently 
commanded’.
33
 The same is true of the writings of the Hebrew Scriptures in the Old 
Testament. Elliott makes this point more briefly when he observes that a ‘way to 
differentiate the righteous from the wicked in the Old Testament is by how they 
feel.’
34
 The righteous are commanded to have certain emotions towards God, each 
other and their enemies. Although Elliott does explore the cognitive nature of 
emotion and recognises that the festivals are a ‘time of emotional renewal, both in 
rejoicing and solemn reflection and repentance’,
35
 he does not develop the nature of 
the responsibility which the Israelites have for their affections nor the way that 
affections enable such reflection and repentance. His commentary, though valuable, 
thorough and much needed, only shows that emotions may be praised or blamed but 
does not uncover the depth of their contribution to Christian ethics.
36
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We find conceptual assistance to meet this challenge in one of the central 
curses against Israel at 28:47-48. Israel is cursed because they ‘did not serve the Lord 
[their] God with joyfulness and gladness of heart, because of the abundance of all 
things’. The condemnation of joylessness seems puzzling unless one sees that the 
reason for the severity of the curse is that a chief reason for the ‘joyfulness and 
gladness of heart’ which recognises ‘the abundance of all things’ is to initiate the 
people’s moral reflection and deliberation in such a way as to ensure that they do not 
disobey the commandments and statutes of the Lord with respect to the goods they 
share in common. The absence of joy and gladness debilitates the agency of the 
people because they are unable to participate affectively in the land and so 
understand it as the place of abundance given by the Lord. Thus the reason for 
cursing is not simply the affective failure but rather all that the affective failure 
entailed for the loss of the capacity for genuine moral reasoning. The curse is not 
simply a forensic judgment on failure – though it is no less than that. Rather, it is an 
explanation of what will ensue if the people are no longer communally, affectively 
and wisely attracted to and participating in the goodness of YHWH himself and the 
goodness of the moral order. But with that participative beginning, the penetration 
and exploration of the moral order, in its generic and teleological design, may be 
undertaken rightly so that its differentiation and association is wisely known by 
Israel and justly acted upon.  
The feasts are given as institutions which prevent a loss of such political, 
affective wisdom. At the feast of tithes we see there are different situations in which 
rejoicing is to take place and that these are adapted to awaken the people of Israel to 
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self-consciousness concerning their place in the moral order and YHWH’s purposes 
for them. The practices of the festival involve not only diverse locations for joy but 
also diverse participants in joy. The joy is first focussed on the central place of 
worship (14:24) while the focus in 14:28-29 is on the towns. The Levite is present in 
both settings and the same reason for not neglecting the Levite is repeated, namely 
that he has no portion or inheritance with the people. This itself is a vital reminder to 
the people of the ultimate direction of joy since the Levite’s portion is not the land of 
the Lord but the Lord of the land. As Gordon McConville says, to forget the Levite 
in the midst of celebration would be to forget the LORD.
37
 However, when the 
location changes, some of the participants change. 14:28-29 describes a triennial 
variation on the regular, institutional practice of 14:22-27 which is explicitly 
inclusive of the diverse needy in the towns (cf. 16:9-12 and 16:13-15 esp. 16:11-12, 
14; also 26:1-15, esp. 26:12). Joy in the land and its fruits is to be expressed by the 
full range of the Israelite community. Indeed, the very existence of the triennial 
variation suggests that the celebration of tithes cannot be characterised by properly 
joyful recognition unless the subjects of the intersubjective expression of joy include 
all these people. 
There seems to be a twofold rationale for the affective design of this feast and 
the festivals at large. First, the organisation of the feast of tithes enables the people to 
focus affectively on the land God has given in such a way as to see its relationship to 
the needy and to God himself. Joy in the land’s goodness initiates reflection and 
deliberation concerning the moral order. This joy has the semblance of a conclusion 
but actually retains that provisional quality which chapter two described. The reason 
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for this is threefold. To begin with, (a) the joy seems conclusive because of the sheer 
physical satisfaction which the goodness of the land brings. Joy in the land is 
embedded in the embodied practices of the festive institutions. The sheer physicality 
of the feast’s fruits binds together 14:22-27 and 14:28-29 in one overarching 
affection of joyful participation. The provision for long-distance travellers (v24-26) 
emphasises afresh that this affection is bound up with the practices of shared eating 
and drinking. With this in mind, there might appear to be little content to joy beyond 
satisfying what one’s heart desires, a conclusive joy if ever there was one.  
But (b), the festive joy is actually arranged in such a way as to awaken the 
people to the neediness of the poor in light of the goodness of the land and the 
goodness of the One who gave it. Far from being a conclusion, festive joy initiates 
moral thought and action. Everyone ought to benefit from the land because, at the 
Exodus, everyone was equally saved from Egyptian slavery and the land was 
graciously given to all. Thus when the fearful fatherless, the (potentially) hated 
sojourner and the sorrowful widow share in the people’s joy and so intersubjectively 
verify the land’s goodness, the joy which permeates this moment of recognition 
enables the people to construe themselves afresh in unity without ignoring their 
differences. The range of possible social conditions is not elided at the triennial feast 
but rather gathered and recognised. The experience of communal joy precisely 
represents a quickened attentiveness to the variegated need for common goods 
among the poor and needy. 
Joy is thus the people’s participation in the blessing of the land which 
initiates moral reflection on the land and its diverse inhabitants and deliberative 
action on the basis of those reflections. The people travel, in Lacoste’s terms, from 
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value to norm as they joyfully recognise the value of the land and then reflect on the 
norms which define deliberations concerning how they are to treat the good land, one 
another and especially the needy. The deep joy of the festival is thus essential to aid 
just obedience to laws such as the law of the Sabbatical year and is accordingly 
entered into on a yearly basis. Thus, in relation to the moral imperatives of the 
Sabbatical year (15:1ff), Christopher Wright describes ‘Israel so rejoicing in God’s 
blessing that they fully obey God’s law.’
38
 Regular feasting epitomises YHWH’s 
design for Israel’s life which takes seriously the ongoing presence of those who are 
in danger of being forgotten if joy does not constantly awaken the people at large to 
their responsibilities. The renewal of joy year on year is the renewal of Israel’s 
capacity for moral reflection and deliberation in accord with the goodness of God 
and the created moral order. Joy is reenergised, in the context of the ongoing needs 
of the community, in order to open up the possibility of righteous action for the 
common good.  
Finally, (c) the presence of the Levite, as already discussed, demonstrates that 
the joy in the land is always pointing beyond itself to a joy in the Lord of the land. 
The Levite has no portion of his own because his portion is the Lord himself. Joy in 
the land is not conclusive because this would be to mistake the gift for the Giver. Joy 
is thus provisionally mediated through the land and directed on to the Lord of the 
land. In the place the Lord shall choose, the elect people’s joy initiates the deeper 
reflection on the goodness of YHWH.  
In light of these observations, we may question Wenham’s adoption of virtue 
theory to interpret Old Testament ethics. The necessity for yearly renewal of 
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affective understanding and the risk of forgetfulness of the needy does not suggest 
that there is any expectation of moral progress among the people of God. Indeed, the 
legal provisions of Deuteronomy generally expect the people not to make moral 
progress. Soon after the law concerning the feast of tithes, we find the command that 
‘you shall not harden your heart or shut your hand against your poor brother’ (15:7) 
but rather that you ‘shall open wide your hand to your brother, to the needy and to 
the poor, in your land.’ (15:11) There is an expectation that the hardening of the heart 
will happen. Such hardening walls an Israelite off from the beginnings of 
understanding which might arise at the feasts, neither rejoicing in God’s open handed 
gift of the land nor recognising the cry of the needy for its fruits.   
Thus while agreeing with Wenham that there are some traits of action held up 
as admirable and while bearing in mind Wenham’s recognition that obedience-to-law 
is a theme of the Old Testament,
39
 it still seems strange that he should underplay the 
expectation that stubbornness and hardness of heart will be primary marks of the 
people of God. The stubborn sinfulness of the people is known from the start and is 
worked out through the narrative. To be sure, there are moments of great hope when 
Moses emphasises the possibility of the people actually doing the law (30:11-14). 
Yet, soon afterwards, Moses’ experience of leading this people for so many years 
begets a bleak assessment of their future obedience (31:27-29). This is not to say that 
the law does not leave open the invitation and, indeed, the command to live 
righteously; such obedience remains a possibility. It is rather to affirm that the 
legislators expect Israel stubbornly to disobey and that this expectation is vindicated 
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by the narrative. Thus it seems that, contra Wenham, the rhetoric surely does not 
invite people to become virtuous but rather to behold their own stubbornness.  
For these reasons, it seems to me that Wenham’s appeal to virtue and virtue 
theory in reading the Old Testament and especially Deuteronomy is conceptually 
unpromising. There is special danger in assuming that terms which relate to 
affections should be subsumed into a larger or more comprehensive account under 
the heading of virtues. Elliott also goes in this direction with his barely explained 
claim that ‘[e]motions are among the most important Christian virtues’.
40
 As shown 
above, affections themselves are not virtues but are the awakened beginnings of 
reflection and deliberation concerning the particular obligations to act justly towards 
one’s neighbours. Their endurance should be traced not to habituated virtue but to 
their dependence on memory. In seeking to subsume affections into habituated 
virtue, we risk obscuring God’s design for Israel, namely the way that affections are 
intended to bring epistemological renewal to a community’s political relations. 
Wenham’s approach, far from overcoming stubbornness, actually encourages people 
to adopt a virtue ethics which will deepen that impenitent posture. Although he lays 
out the biblical material carefully and winsomely, virtue language is adopted with 
little justification when he makes a move to moral systematisation. Our account of 
affections should make such unfortunate slippage less tempting. 
That account is clarified through the second, complementary aspect of the 
affective design of the feasts of Israel, namely Deuteronomy’s reliance on the power 
of memory to stabilise the affections of the people through the institutions ordained 
by God. Two festivals are prescribed at 16:9-15: the Feast of Weeks, in which the 
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people recognise the goodness of the harvest and remember that they were slaves in 
Egypt; and the feast of Booths whereby the people, including the needy, rejoice in 
the gathered produce while living in the booths which remind them of the journey 
from Egypt to the Promised Land. During this latter feast in the Sabbatical year 
(15:1ff), the great reading of the Law takes place (31:9-13). At this time of intense, 
joyful recognition of the good present, fuelled by the memory of salvation from 
slavery, the people are reminded of the laws and statutes for their common life. In 
these structured, institutional practices, the affections of the people are guided from 
value to norm, from an initial recognition of the goodness of God and his gifts to 
reflection on that goodness and deliberative engagement in the laws which order 
their lives in relation to God and the goods they share in common. Thus affection 
precedes the people’s engagement with and obedience to the laws which protect and 
promote the common goods which they celebrate in joy.  
Memory of God’s activity in leading them out of Egypt stabilises, sustains 
and refreshes the affective recognitions of the people. Joy in the goodness of the land 
endures through memories of the sovereignty, faithfulness and power of YHWH. 
This interrelation of memory and affection is the heartbeat of Deuteronomy and is 
beautifully expressed at 26:5-11, a lyrical narrative relating the deep reasons for joy, 
amidst the offering of the firstfruits and tithes, which climaxes in another call to 
comprehensive joyfulness. They remember that a ‘wandering Aramean was our 
father [and that] he went down into Egypt and sojourned there, few in number, and 
there he became a nation, great, mighty, and populous’, that they went into slavery 
but that then they ‘cried to the LORD, the God of our fathers, and the LORD heard our 
voice and saw our affliction, our toil, and our oppression.’ (26:5, 7) Of the fifty-two 
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times when Egypt or Egyptians are mentioned in Deuteronomy, only one can be seen 
in any kind of positive light (23:7). The rest are either highly negative due to the 
experience of slavery (e.g. 5:6, 5:16, 6:12, 6:21, 7:8, 9:14, 13:5, 13:10) and other 
evils (11:10) or geographical references which are tinged with these negative 
connotations (e.g. 25:17).  
In this light, consider 25:6: ‘the Egyptians treated us harshly and humiliated 
us and laid on us hard labour.’ The implied reader will be deeply aware of how 
God’s people suffered and ‘cried to the Lord’ (25:7). The frequent calls to remember 
Israel’s slavery in Egypt, evocatively referred to as an ‘iron furnace’ (4:20), are not 
simply invitations to remember that Israel were slaves. It is no less than such a 
factual remembrance but it is also much more. For it is a call for the people actually 
to remember or – for later generations – to remember in imagination the deeply 
affective experience of being slaves, the cries of suffering and hope. In accord with 
the pattern of differentiation and association, the past distortions are construed in 
terms of the present salvation so that the excellency of God’s work is admired. The 
people remember their past sorrows and poverty in Egypt as they joyfully participate 
in present abundance in Israel and this joy then empowers moral reflection and 
deliberation concerning right action towards poor neighbours in the present. 
In various ways, the practices of the festive institutions sustain this 
eschatological movement between the affective memory of Egyptian affliction to the 
experience of the promised land of plenty in the presence of the Lord. It is a 
movement of eschatological differentiation and association since the community 
experiences the Lord’s moral order by contrasting the slavery of Egypt with the 
peaceful corporate life in the land. The interrelation of past Israel, Egypt, the Lord 
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and present Israel provides the deep logic that structures the joy of the people and the 
institutions which give organised form to the community. This joy permeates the 
narrative, frequently repeated in Deuteronomy, that their very existence as a nation is 
dependent on and structured by the Exodus from Egypt, the house of slavery, through 
the merciful and mighty works of YHWH. Ultimately, rejoicing has this profound, 
all-permeating significance for Israel precisely because of the comprehensive One 
who ordains the institutions of community and who has supplied the reasons for 
rejoicing. Joy, focussed in highly physical forms of celebration such as feasting, 
brings to mind the One who is the source of their joy, YHWH himself. And as joy 
penetrates all the life of the people of God, so all the people are bound together in 
common understanding. Just as ultimate Augustinian joy based on the truth is rooted 
in a memory of God himself, so ultimate Israelite joy springs from the memory of 
YHWH and his works. Returning once more to the feast of tithes, we see that the 
basic reason for the inclusion of the needy in the triennial celebration of the feast of 
tithes is founded in the connection between memory, joy and right action. The 
various institutions in which the community participates provides the structured 
social context for this cognitive joy to draw people into participation in YHWH, his 
works, his laws and his created moral order that the people might engage in moral 




Our enquiry into affections in political relations now turns from Deuteronomy to 
Luke and Acts. For a Christian eschatology of political affections could not stop with 
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the Hebrew Scriptures but must proceed to the Scriptures which specifically describe 
the significance of Jesus of Nazareth. Two brief, preliminary points should be made 
concerning these New Testament texts. First, it will be assumed that Luke and Acts 
should be considered as the two parts of a single corpus as suggested by their 
respective introductions (Luke 1:1-4; Acts 1:1-3). Moreover, although single 
authorship of this single corpus is not absolutely essential to our account, the 
overwhelming weight of the early church tradition is behind one named author, 
Luke. This discussion’s terminology will follow that tradition.
41
 Second, single 
authorship does not imply a singularity of source for the material of Luke-Acts. 
Indeed, the introductions explicitly state that Luke is compiling multiple sources. 
However, Luke’s commentary on the narrative, both directly and through his 
arrangement of sources, has created a coherent line of thought.
42
 This coherence 
makes investigation of one aspect of that thought – the place of affections – a 
plausible task.  
So we turn to our account of Luke-Acts, the climax of which will be an 
analysis of Acts 13-15 whereby evangelical joy initiates the moral reflection and 
deliberation which leads to action of crucial importance to Christian eschatology. To 
understand this climax, we need to see that affections permeate Luke’s account of the 
institutions which give organised form to the people of Israel. As the gospel opens, 
Zechariah is depicted performing his representative duty at the temple, Israel’s 
central, religious institution. Surrounded by the gathered, attentive and prayerful 
people, leading their praise of the Lord God, Zechariah receives a message of joy 
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concerning the child to be born: joy for himself, joy for Elizabeth, his barren wife, 
and joy for the people. The angel announces that ‘you will have joy and gladness and 
many will rejoice at his birth’ and explains that the child John ‘will be great before 
the Lord.’ (Luke 1:14-15) A striking feature of these events and much of Luke 1-2 is 
that, in contrast to the rest of the gospel and much of Acts, the established leaders of 
the institutions of Israel – the chief priests, Pharisees, Sadducees, scribes, elders and 
others – are absent. They have nothing to do with the message of joy. While the 
gospel of Matthew describes Herod and the chief priests violently opposing Jesus 
from birth, Luke focuses on the people of Israel, allowing their teachers to appear 
only briefly to demonstrate Jesus’ wisdom and allegiance to God his Father (2:41-
51). The effect is to connect the people, through the mediation of a single priest, with 
the joy coming in Christ. 
Luke continues this focus by depicting joy as a wise way for the community 
to begin a participative understanding of what is happening in Israel and Israel’s 
institutions. The ultimate object of joy is introduced at the foretelling of Jesus’ birth. 
Joy is experienced first by the yet unborn but jumping John (1:44) and then as 
Mary’s exultant joy in the Magnificat (1:47). John’s own conception is patterned 
after ancient conceptions out of barrenness, such as the gift of a son to Abraham and 
Sarah. What seemed impossible becomes possible and that which could not happen 
comes to pass by the power and goodness of YHWH: for ‘nothing will be impossible 
with God.’ (1:37) Though his parents’ joy is great, it is a prelude to that unique joy 
which attends the virginal conception and birth of Jesus. The difference from John’s 
birth is obvious immediately. In John’s case, there is a natural though certainly 
surprising conception. In Jesus’ case, the conception is depicted as the direct, 
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unmediated work of God. While Zechariah enquires, ‘How shall I know this? For I 
am an old man, and my wife is advanced in years.’ (1:18), Mary asks, ‘How will this 
be, since I am a virgin?’ (1:34)  
Thus the joy concerning Jesus’ birth is “unprecedented” joy for the identity of 
the second in the Trinity as man is totally unprecedented, a new thing under the sun. 
Though unprecedented, it is not unrelated to the promises of God and expectation of 
Israel; rather the joy is a fulfilment of the joy of Deuteronomy in a way which 
surpassed the expectation of the people. The goodness of God’s gift of the land is 
now fulfilled in the goodness of the long expected Christ, anticipated even in Moses’ 
day (Deuteronomy 18:15). Unprecedented joy is a previously unknown affective 
recognition of this new gift of God in Christ. It is the eschatological joy by which 
everything, past, present and future, is now construed in terms of Jesus Christ.  
Thus John and Mary rejoice in a ruler who will fulfil the promise concerning 
the institution of the Davidic throne and reign perpetually over the house of Jacob, 
the son of Isaac, Abraham and Sarah’s laughing offspring (Luke 1:32-33). Mary’s 
joy in this news initiates the Magnificat which reflects on her God’s mighty 
leadership of Israel (esp. 1:51-55). Mary rejoices in how God has helped his people 
by reordering the institutional structure which organises their life. Proud men’s 
hearts have been confused, leadership has been changed and the hungry have been 
provided for. Similarly, Zechariah’s now obedient and loosened tongue gives poetic 
and political form to the joy of the people (1:67-79). In his song of praise, Zechariah 
celebrates the Messianic horn of salvation raised up for the people, a symbol of 
strength which will be exercised against the enemies of Israel, whom Luke seemingly 
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construes as the Roman authorities (7:18-23),
43
 the demonic forces (11:14-23) and 
the corrupted leaders of Israel (13:10-17). Jesus is thus presented as the 
representative leader who will satisfy Mary and Zechariah’s expectation through 
eschatological fulfilment of institutional types and practices, thereby inaugurating a 
new institutional representation in accord with the law of God. The long-dormant 
practices of Israel which constitute the institution of Davidic kingship are not 
overturned but rather reinvigorated. 
Mary and Zechariah’s joy in Jesus models how the people are to engage in 
this renewed institutional life. Affective participation is seen as essential for 
obtaining Israelite identity. Without affection, there could be no awakening to the 
moral self-understanding, reflection and deliberation which constitute life in the 
Kingdom of God. Accordingly, Luke repeatedly explores the identity of the people 
(laos; λαός) through their affective attraction to Jesus as he fulfils their institutions, 
especially through a contrast with the affections of their official leaders. While the 
people discover their identity in joyfully welcoming their Messiah, their 
representative who carries forward their future, those representatives who currently 
fill the institutional structures of the people of Israel, the Pharisees, chief priests, 
Sadducees, scribes and Herod, angrily resist the new King. A parting of the ways is 
depicted, an affective division between the people who joyfully recognise their 
identity in Jesus and their rulers who furiously and fearfully reject it. Luke draws the 
contrast repeatedly to make the point. As the adversarial leaders are shamed, the 
people rejoice in Jesus’ teaching and power (13:17); as the disciples rejoice at the 
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triumphal entry of their king into Jerusalem, the Pharisees are rebuked for their 
attempt to quench the people’s joy (19:36-40).  
Other affections are very important in the gospel. For example, while Jesus is 
vehemently accused by the chief priests and rulers and mocked by Herod and his 
soldiers (22:6-11), the people, especially the daughters of Jerusalem, mourn and 
lament over him on the road to the cross (22:26-31) and then return home beating 
their breasts (23:48). Nonetheless, joy seems to be Luke’s overriding theme. He very 
deliberately provides joyous “bookends” to the ministry of Jesus. The good news is 
announced in the beginning as charan megalen (χαρὰν µεγάλην; 2:10) and this great 
joy is the disciples’ experience at the end (24:62), thus validating Augustine’s 
contention that ‘grande gaudium’ (great joy) is the heart of worship. The people 
throughout Luke’s gospel experience this joy as the beginning of their understanding 
that Jesus’ representative leadership is for their common good. The structure of their 
joy is disclosed as they witness Jesus performing a healing, his practice which 
fulfilled the purpose of the Sabbatical institution: the ‘people rejoiced at all the 
glorious things that were done by him.’ (13:17) The people’s joy is attracted to Jesus’ 
deeds which were placing sickness in its proper eschatological context, namely the 
Kingdom of God. 
Thus Jesus fulfils the institutions of Israel, such as the Sabbath feast, thereby 
structuring the way in which affections are attracted and focussed. For he draws the 
people into the tradition of Deuteronomy reenergising them to remember the moral 
thought and life which Moses put forward, most notably the concern for those who, 
like the sick, were not sharing fully in the goodness of God’s gifts. The people, by 
following Jesus and participating in this fulfilled structure, form intersubjective 
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bonds of affection as they recognise together the dawning of the great King of the 
kingdom who vindicates both the Deuteronomic concern for the poor and the 
generically and teleologically defined moral order within which Deuteronomy and 
Luke are situated. The people are attracted to this man, not from any outward 
appearance, but because he genuinely fulfils both their Israelite identity and their 
human creatureliness. 
By contrast, the leadership’s fearful, angry, furious failure to recognise the 
goodness of Jesus is typified in the indignant synagogue leader (aganakton; 
ἀγανακτῶν 13:14). Instead of an attraction to Christ, he walls his heart off from 
joyful participative understanding. Joy is the way into Christ but the faithless fury of 
the leaders is a bar to epistemological entry. The leaders’ affections do bind them 
together in common action but only in order to kill and destroy Jesus. For they do not 
share in the eschatological, affective understanding which Christ brought to the 
institutions of Israel. Luke and Acts depicts the corrupt Jewish leaders’ affections as 
so out of step with the past and future of their institutions that they are shut out from 
participative understanding of the kingdom of God. Their attempts to destroy Jesus 
and put an end to joy are overcome in the resurrection which vindicates Israel and the 
moral order thus reinvigorating and renewing the joyful understanding which then 
characterises not only the temple worship at the climax of the gospel but also, more 
deeply still, the narrative of Acts.  
For by the Holy Spirit given in Acts 2, the people of God experience affection 
whereby they awaken to self-conscious identity in the Christ who has fulfilled all the 
institutions of the people of God. Their joy in the resurrection of Jesus draws them 
into reflection and deliberation concerning what life and conduct will accord with the 
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Kingdom. Acts’ primary example of this concerns the status of the Gentiles in the 
plan of God. On this issue hangs the legitimacy of the claim that Christ’s Lordship is 
universal in its scope, a matter at the heart of the institutional life of ethnic Israel and 
the church. Peter’s vision (Acts 10) and report to the council are followed by the 
birth of the Gentile church in Antioch. The Jerusalem church sends Barnabas to 
investigate. Barnabas goes to Antioch and, ‘seeing the grace of God, he rejoiced’ 
(11:23). At this momentous event in the history of the plan of God, Luke, who has 
depicted the good news as charan megalen (χαρὰν µεγάλην; Luke 2:10) for all 
people, returns to his major theme again: Barnabas saw and rejoiced (echare, ἐχάρη)! 
On our reading, his joy is a wise, epistemological, attracted experience, a moment of 
awakening by the Holy Spirit, which is succeeded by continuing moral thought. 
Barnabas’ joy perceives how the differentiation of the human genus into Jew and 
Gentile was now being eschatologically fulfilled in their association together in the 
harmonious excellency of the church.  
This joy, though drawn towards the eschatological, teleological end of 
humanity, is yet the beginning of Barnabas’ and the church’s understanding. It is 
followed by Barnabas’ year-long stay with Saul (Paul) in Antioch before their joint 
missionary journey. There they witness the Gentiles rejoicing as they too understand 
that the good news is for them as well as the Jews (13:46-48), thereby perceiving 
exactly the same pattern of differentiated, associated excellency. Thus the affective 
recognition of what was happening is intersubjectively shared and verified. What 
was the source of the new affective, intersubjective recognition which energised the 
tradition so that its institutions could be reconfigured in light of Christ? It seems 
plausible, in light of Luke’s emphasis on the presence of the Holy Spirit in the 
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church, to say that it was the Holy Spirit who enabled this intersubjectivity. After this 
intersubjective recognition, they are appointed to go to Jerusalem to discuss 
developments with the church; and so they go, bringing the wisdom of charan 
megalen (χαρὰν µεγάλην; 15:3) to the church as they travel.  
But this affective half-light did not lead immediately to the carefully worded 
and considered letter to the Gentile believers (Acts 15:22-29). Instead there were two 
further stages. For the intersubjective sharing had to give way to the reflective 
admiration of what God was doing among the Gentiles and the process of communal 
deliberation yielding a norm as a basis of action in the form of the letter to the 
Gentiles. Thus, after their arrival, the Jerusalem church council of Acts 15, a ‘model 
for the political process’,
44
 hears two decisive pieces of evidence: Peter’s testimony 
concerning God’s gracious gift of the Holy Spirit to the Gentiles (15:7-11) is 
followed by Paul and Barnabas’ account of the miracles God has done among the 
Gentiles (15:12). There ensue reflection on God and his promises and deliberation 
concerning the right course of action which conclude in the letter prescribing norms 
for the different churches’ common life. Thus the joy of Barnabas, in recognition of 
the work of God, was the eschatological, participatory half-light of recognition which 
preceded this process, not giving the final word but offering the first. Through 
Lacoste, we maintained that the inseparability of cognition and affection is basic to a 
rich account of prudence in a healthy political society. In Acts we read that Barnabas 
recognised God’s grace and rejoiced and that the churches benefitted greatly. By the 
power of the Holy Spirit, the churches’ affections achieved a recognition of God’s 
representative work, an awakening to what God was doing in the world. This 
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awakening then opened up the possibility for the exercise of a healthy, united social 
prudence which was both wisely attentive to the troubled cries of the Gentiles, 
imperilled by the threat of an intolerable ‘yoke’ (Acts 15:10, 19), and focussed on the 
common good of all the people under Christ’s authority in one harmonious group. 
The affections themselves, as cognitive though inexhaustive reports of God’s work, 
were not that prudence but were essential for initiating and directing its proper 
exercise. This account of the place of affection in political relations importantly 
preserves affection as a cognitively rich resource for the moral life without 
overburdening it with responsibility for all moral thought.  
We have now spoken of the Holy Spirit. The affections, reflection and 
deliberation of the church, the true society of the people of God, are distinct from the 
world in that they are specially led by the Spirit of God. Accordingly, the quality of 
the intersubjective sharing of affective recognition and the enduring nature of that 
sharing does not depend solely on the godliness or ungodliness of the people in 
question but depends fundamentally on the sovereign presence of the Holy Spirit in 
and between all believers as he resources their memory and stabilises their life in 
Christ. This is the fulfilment of the pattern which was indicated in the discussion of 
Augustine in chapter two whereby deep stability was found partially in the memory 
of Edenic joy based on the truth but mainly in the worship of the God revealed in 
Jesus Christ. In the gospel, joy is brought close in the person of Jesus Christ. 
Through him, the Holy Spirit enriches the affective penury bound up with our fallen 
condition. 
In conclusion, we observe that biblical representation and law effectively 
support political society when a people are initially bound together in intersubjective 
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affective recognition. Just as joy in the land constituted the participative 
understanding whereby Israel might recognise YHWH, reflect on his goodness and 
deliberatively obey his law concerning the poor and needy, so joy in the gospel and 
in Jesus constituted the participative understanding whereby the church might 
recognise their leader, Jesus Christ, and, by Spirit-led reflection and deliberation, 
establish and obey norms on the basis of which their common life might proceed. 
Understanding the role of affection in the institutions of the people of God enables 
closer conceptualisation of the nature of political societies in general. For the 
Scriptural presentation of affection interprets what Burke meant by ‘public 
affections’, showing how affections are essential if people are to live lawful lives 
under the authority of their representatives. Affections precisely constitute the 
engagement of the community in the matters for the sake of which representation and 
law are instituted. In this sense they are aids to law, correctives to our practice of it 
and the way that we recognise those authorities who give us reasons for obeying it. 
The eschatological account of affections in Scripture also claims to provide a critical 
standpoint whereby affections in all institutions may be described and assessed. The 
joyful fulfilment which Christ brought to the institutions of Israel through the church 
by the Spirit stands as an analogical consideration for affections in the institutions of 
every political society. The nature of Christ’s representation of the Israelite tradition 
should shape all our practices of institutional representation. Moreover, through 
Christ, given to unite the nations in harmonious wisdom, not least in their affections, 
the Holy Spirit quickens memories and guides affections that the stubborn and hard 




Section III. Theological affections in the institutions of representation and law 
  
Now that we have specified a Christian eschatology of political affections as 
depicted in the Old and New Testaments, we may proceed to consider two 
interrelated aspects of institutional life in political society, namely representation and 
law. Within ‘earshot’
45
 of the cries and wisdom of Deuteronomy and Luke-Acts, we 
will establish a dialogue between Oliver O’Donovan and Martha Nussbaum. Neither 
of these scholars has written about each other but both their political conceptions are 
attentive to the emotional or affective dimension of institutions albeit in intriguingly 
different ways. The argument will be that our concept of affection enables an 
interpretation of O’Donovan which yields a more convincing view of political 
affections than Nussbaum’s insightful account offers.  
We have seen in chapter one and in this chapter how Nussbaum’s corrective 
development of Millian liberalism aims to demonstrate the significance of emotions, 
especially compassion, disgust and shame, for political institutions. There is much 
which O’Donovan and Nussbaum agree on, especially a scepticism of the potency of 
social contract theory to sustain healthy political societies and a conviction that 
affections (or emotions) have a cognitive aptitude which is relevant to political 
society. However, O’Donovan’s conception, interpreted through Christian 
eschatology, is seriously at odds with Nussbaum’s eschatology of mature 
interdependence which relies, as we saw, on child psychology and a certain view of 
human mortality. This axis of disagreement substantially constitutes the different 
roles which affection or emotion plays in their accounts. It should also be noted that 
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Nussbaum’s focus is on emotions and so she has a more detailed account than 
O’Donovan. O’Donovan’s writing, on the other hand, though imbued with 
theological acumen, marks out the affective dimension of human morality and 
political society without thoroughly exploring it, thereby highlighting an important 




We have seen O’Donovan’s account of how political institutions provide the 
structure within which political authority can be recognised. He goes on to claim 
that: 
 
God raises up those who will bear authority. The mysterious alchemy of the affections 
elicits recognition, a people see itself in the face of an individual thrown forward for 




Recognition of a representative is a ‘complex balance of the cognitive and 
affective’,
47
 ‘like the recognition we accord to a face or form, the recognition of 
Gestalt, grasped at once in a moment of acknowledgement and welcome.’
48
 Affective 
understanding is both immediate and yet, contra Edwards, inchoate, grasping objects 
in outline but to a degree of detailed specification which enables clear moral 
knowledge. It is O’Donovan’s view that this ‘affective dimension is entirely absent 
from official theories of representation in the modern West’,
49
 such as social 
contractarianism. This twenty-first century insight echoes Burke’s criticism, noted 
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above, of ‘that sort of reason which banishes the affections [and] is incapable of 
filling their place’.
50
 We also see parallels between Burke’s interest in the 
embodiment of institutions in persons and O’Donovan’s account of the affective 
welcome of God-appointed, personal political representatives.  
In order to explore this affective dimension which Burke and O’Donovan 
point towards, we consider again the nature of institutions. As argued above, 
institutions are the organised form of community life which embody a tradition of 
practices. Affections within institutions participate intersubjectively in the memory 
held in the tradition in order to make connections between the past and the present 
life of the community. The role of a representative is to provide a personal place of 
focus in order that these bonds of affection between representative and represented 
might be renewed or, in Burke’s terms, that there might be the creation of ‘love, 
veneration, admiration, or attachment’.
51
 This is what we normally call ‘leadership’ 
whereby a representative person or group enables those represented to discover both 
their political identity and the forms of life which maintain and develop that 
identity.
52
 Leadership presupposes hierarchically differentiated vantage points on 
common objects of affective recognition. The common affections – common, 
cognitive participations in common objects – occur amidst diverse societal roles. 
Political representatives, through the attractive power of their position, strength, 
beauty, knowledge or skill may summon the affective recognitions of the people to a 
common intersubjective verification. The power of attraction of political affections 
depends, to an important extent, on the levels of authority which permeate human 
societies.  
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Intersubjectivity is thus not an essentially non-hierarchical notion. Indeed, for 
many practical political purposes within certain institutions, it is essentially 
hierarchical since in all societies there are both representatives and represented who 
share in affective recognition of common objects but who are differentiated as to 
their authority. Here we find further and illuminating agreement with Jonathan 
Edwards who extended his doctrine of excellency in a political direction. In The 
Nature of True Virtue, Edwards argues that ‘it pleases God to observe analogy in his 
works…and especially to establish inferior things in an analogy to superior.’
53
 He 
envisages an analogy from Being in general – the excellency of divine things, 
disclosed to mankind definitively in the gospel – to some discrete (or private) aspect 
of Being considered on its own. The agreement of the latter within itself is beautiful 
inasmuch as it resembles the complete harmony of the former to some shadowy 
extent. Just as a man may give cordial agreement to Being in general so he also may 
give natural agreement, a secondary sort of virtue, to reflections of Being in general. 
Edwards sees such secondary beauty in political institutions as they approximate the 
harmony of Being in general: ‘[t]here is a beauty of order in society…As when the 
different members of society have all their appointed office, place and station’.
54
 
Therefore, in terms now familiar, we may say that the differentiation of the parts of a 
political society is the premise for their associative harmony. Not all can be 
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For political representatives within a hierarchy to perform their task 
effectively – as distinct from performing it well – they must have the authority of the 
tradition. All political representatives have political authority, given to them by God 
in his providence. They personally fill certain community institutions in roles such as 
king, member of parliament, councillor or judge with respect to a tradition of 
practices held in cultural memory. If the representative adequately discovers and 
embodies the tradition then the represented will recognise the representative as 
someone who holds authority for them. The significance of this for the affections of 
the representative and the represented is that such a representative has the authority, 
mediated through the familiar institutions, to draw the affections of the people in 
specific ways towards understanding, reflection and deliberation concerning common 
objects. When a community follows its representative with intersubjectively affective 
recognitions among themselves, this is what we will call “loyalty”, a form of 
affective affinity from the led towards the leader and amongst those who are led. 
Loyalty is thus the common form of all affective intersubjective unity between 
representative and represented, whether the affection itself is joy, sorrow, hatred or 
some other affection. As such it does not essentially consist in blind allegiance to a 
person but is rather a committed, communal way of beginning to understand the 
world in relation to a leader who is directing that understanding. As before, whatever 
affective form loyalty takes – whether hatred of enemies or joy in just judgments – it 
should be understood as preliminary to moral reflection and moral deliberation. True 
                                                 
55
 Note that this account of representation certainly does not in itself overturn the equality of 
representative and represented under human and natural law. For these terms, see Aquinas, T., Summa 
Theologiae 1a2ae 94-95. 
 
 188 
loyalty is thus not blind but allows itself to be led into further moral investigation. 
Loyalty fails where it does not lead into consideration of whether the leader’s 
account of the good and the right reflects the community’s own order of value and, 
beyond that, the moral order created by God.  
Thus for representatives to perform their tasks well, they must not only be 
effective in attracting loyalty but must also be drawing out appropriate affections 
concerning objects as a prelude to moral reflection and moral deliberation. For 
example, people might disagree about whether a representative should seek to attract 
sorrow, compassion or anger towards a particular group such as women who become 
pregnant substantially for the sake of state benefits. The disagreement shows that 
affection itself is both describable and reasonable but also important because of the 
policy discussions and decisions which might be opened up by such initial affection.  
To this we add that a good political representative distinguishes matters 
which require affective political attention from those which are not political but are 
of ‘public’ or private concern where ‘public’ designates that region of political 
society which, in most Western nation-states, is beyond the familial but not 
essentially to do with coercive authority and legislation. We have in mind voluntary 
societies, social organisms such as credit unions and, especially, churches. The logic 
of our distinction depends on an insight particularly associated with Augustine that 
political authority was added after the Fall in order to preserve society’s common life 
rather than to have control over every aspect of it. Martin Luther argued specifically 
that the institutions of family and church existed before the Fall.
56
 Wise political 
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representatives perceive the provisional nature of political authority in relation to 
such non-political institutions, discern where their responsibilities end and are 
governed by those limits. The representative’s distinctively political task is to 
awaken a people affectively to some particular aspect of the moral order which 
requires their common judgment, a judgment which may, in some circumstances, be 
effected by coercion. This task may, of course, engage with the life of a family or a 
church when events occur which require political intervention, such as the abuse of 
children. But the guiding conceptual framework is not that the political authority 
gives rise to other institutions but rather that the other institutions came first and then 
required the assistance of political authority. A political representative is thus an 
‘authority…I depend on to show me the reasons for acting’
57
 concerning these 
distinctly political affairs. He may draw my political affections in order to make 
these reasons clear to me.  
The mediated loyalty concerning particular objects into which we are drawn 
affectively by the leader is accompanied by a more direct sort of loyalty which is 
between the representative in his representative office and the represented. We 
recognise such a representative with ‘awe, a wonder that is both delight and terror’.
58
 
This wondrous awe is an affective awakening, evoked by the ‘peremptory’ appearing 
of representative authority among a people.
59
 Those who find themselves represented 
begin to understand their representative in delight concerning the representative’s 
limited, political vocation for the common good and in terror at what may befall the 
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community individually and corporately – whether by way of coercive punishment or 
sheer social deterioration – if they fail to live rightly in pursuing that common good. 
Wondrous awe is thus the basic affective form of loyalty between representative and 
represented. It is the participative beginning of political wisdom in the world as it 
appears to a political community and, God willing, as it is in Christ. As with 
affective recognition in general, wondrous awe does not entail easy or immediate 
agreement on practical, political questions but rather initiates and sustains moral 
reflection, deliberation and action.  
Since it is God who raises up authority, this initial awe which forms loyalty is 
ultimately rooted in divine providential activity. God’s providence, in giving 
representation to people in their traditions, awakens people by summoning their 
affections to the works prepared for them within hierarchically differentiated 
intersubjectivity. Some providentially attracted affections have a revelatory quality 
and may result in a continuation, renunciation or embrace of a tradition or its 
representatives, in whole or in part. Providence operates through reminding the 
people of their tradition through the representative for the sake of action in the 
present. The people’s affections, focussed through the institutional representative, 
recognise aspects of their past life by the power of memory, thereby initiating 
reflection and deliberation in the present. An affective admiration for the spirit of 
those who fought in the Battle of Britain, focussed through the representative laying 
of a wreath, resources reflection on the continuing excellence of the British Armed 
Forces and deliberation concerning how this significant common object ought to be 
maintained.
60
 Effective representatives make use of such possibilities in a people’s 
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life in order to develop the loyal intersubjectivity which sustains effective action. If 
they fail in their task of eliciting wondrous awe – perhaps through the incongruence 
of their laying the wreath with their military or political policies – then a measure of 
their authority to attract loyalty may ebb away. God’s providence, normally 
inscrutable but occasionally more transparent, oversees the ebb and flow of loyalties 
and the rise and fall of political authorities.  
 In order to see in more detail the inner workings of differentiated, political, 
eschatological, affective intersubjectivity, it will be helpful to consider two 
conceptual threats which have opposed it. The first is Kant’s ‘good will’, described 
by O’Donovan as ‘affective independence’, 
 
an affective disposition wholly free of self-reference, beyond the reach of reflection 




O’Donovan proceeds to a political and eschatological examination of the 
development of the affectively independent subject whose 
 
service to society was at the cost of undermining society’s institutions. Affective 
independence made all authorities irrelevant, as though the final redundancy of 
politics had come about already. [Such an] individual has also been cut off from the 
worldliness of moral order; and since the order of creation is the only point of 





Perpetually oriented to the elusive moment of immediacy, the modern subject stands 
aloof from his own kind, reflecting objectively upon it, subordinating it to the logic of 
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The modern subject’s psychological abstraction from the created order, other orders 
of value, others of his genus and even the self, seeks to anticipate the day when all 
crowns are laid at the feet of the One to whom all power and authority has been 
given, Jesus Christ, and so has rendered recognition of one who bears the authority 
of a tradition nigh on impossible. Such abstraction is a withdrawal from what we 
have called ‘participation’. It is a refusal of the ‘worldliness of the moral order’ 
which denies the generic, teleological nature of reality and has terminated in practical 
unreasonableness ad infinitum. Affective independence is an unwillingness to be 
awake to the world as it is and is thus not a “good will” but rather a stubborn and 
hard heart, unable to participate wisely in reality, a grotesque reflection of Jesus’ 
judgment on his own people that ‘seeing they may not see and hearing they may not 
understand’ (Luke 8:10) mirrored in Paul’s words to the Jewish elders in fulfilment 
of the Isaianic judgment (Acts 28:26-27). 
The affections of this subject are thus walled off from their proper role which 
is to initiate the subject’s committed engagement in the world. The loss of this 
engagement undermines recognition of common goods and so severely diminishes 
the possibility of a genuine ‘we’ of intersubjective verification, thereby eviscerating 
affective, epistemological power from political society’s institutions. The 
representative is effective when he overcomes stubborn, affective independence by 
providing a meaningful continuation of the tradition which summons the affections 
of the people into intersubjective participation in the traditional order of value and 
the created moral order. Through the construal of the present in terms of the past and 
through projecting a vision for the future, the representative draws on deep reserves 
of affective wisdom stored in the memory to invite people to engage afresh in the old 
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and new challenges which a political society may face. Representation thus saves 
people from lingering on the edge of reality and calls them into the difficult business 
of participatory living. Just as kings of old stirred their troops before leading them 
onto the field of battle, so social and political representatives today may, in word, 
deed and symbol, call peoples into affectively engaged, right action to defend the 
wronged, punish the wrongdoer and promote the good.  
The second threat is proceduralism. The particular focus here, in the context 
of political representation, concerns electoral procedure. O’Donovan observes that as 
 
the electoral system expands, organs of consultation ossify and fall away. The more 
the political classes are set to the task of fighting elections, the less they will be free to 
attend to what they hear. The roar of the heavy machinery of legitimation drowns out 
the very possibility of listening to voices that reason, plead, celebrate or lament in 
public. The price of legitimist purity is a high one, paid in practical and moral 
impotence…So the state becomes cut off from the realm of public communications, 




In Ford’s terms, attentiveness to the public, reasonable ‘cries’ of the people is the 
beginning of successful representation while a primary political allegiance to 
electoral procedure produces a deadening effect on that affective epistemology which 
hears cries and stimulates the search for the common good. O’Donovan’s 
observation is not only that the political elite cannot perceive people’s reasonable, 
affectively toned cries but also that an inattentiveness to such affection disempowers 
common moral thought and agency and so leaves representatives and represented cut 
off from each other, bereft of loyal intersubjectivity. Elsewhere he comments that 
 
[b]ehind the legalities of the electoral mechanism there must be the social event of 
representation, the cohering of a more complex network of relations – institutions, 
sectors, traditions, loyalties – to forge an identification between a people and its 
government. Election can only be the lynchpin that holds the wheel of tradition in 
place. So we must ask…of regulative electoral rules…whether they express the 
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identity and concerns of the people and their enduring loyalties; whether in other 




His point is not that electoral rules cannot be just and, indeed, an aid to 
representation but rather that their ultimate purpose is to serve that which is 
conceptually prior, namely the common good of the community. The community’s 
‘enduring loyalties’ are their shared, repeated, regular ways of participating 
affectively, through representative institutions and traditions, in the world as it 
appears to them and, God willing, the world as it is. The threat of proceduralism 
consists in that which is conceptually and eschatologically subservient to the 
common good undermining that good by becoming the all-consuming fascination of 
politicians, electorate and media alike. 
The Scriptures provide exemplary instances of representation which suggest 
ways of overcoming the threats to the common good which affective independence 
and proceduralism represent. Moses is depicted as the representative who can attract 
and stabilise the nation’s affections within their institutions. As the people stand on 
the edge of the promised land, Moses, the survivor from the Exodus, remembers the 
sorrow of slavery in Egypt, the joy, mixed with fear, of the liberation, the popular 
self-consciousness at Sinai and all the affections on the journey. As such he is 
qualified to summon the people both to obey the law by eating the bread of affliction 
at the Passover and by rejoicing at the Feast of Booths and to obey the Lord by going 
up to take participative possession of the good land which the Lord has given. 
Moses’ memory of the nation’s narrative and God’s part in it is the storehouse 
wherein resources are found to lead the people to enduring affective recognition of 
God and the land.  
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Similarly in Luke-Acts, the people rejoice in the way that Jesus’ 
representative activities on their behalf bring righteousness to their institutions and 
cause them to appear as a publicly defined group over against those Jewish and 
Roman rulers who were misdirecting the development of their tradition away from 
the common good. Their joyful recognitions lead them, in the suitably named book 
of Acts, to be able to do and say what they previously could not do and say by 
themselves,
66
 namely to live as a joyful people characterised by their bold preaching, 
experiencing the authoritative wisdom of the reign of God. This becomes possible 
through the work of the Holy Spirit who enables the people joyfully and subjectively 
to recognise the resurrected Leadership of Jesus and defines the way that the 
objective, unprecedented joy in Jesus’ birth is deepened into an unprecedented joy in 
his resurrection as the people of God are ‘filled with joy and with the Holy Spirit’ 
(Acts 13:52). This joy is that initial, enduring, participative way of understanding the 
world as it is in Christ which, rooted in the memory of YHWH and full of hope of 
the new heaven and the new earth, stabilises reflection, deliberation and actions 
according to norms such as the Jerusalem church’s letter to the Gentile believers. 
 This analysis of representation gives shape to a Christian eschatology of the 
affections. The significance of the affections is hard to imagine without temporal 
extension. One cannot place significant conceptual weight on joy, hatred or even fear 
behind Rawls’ timeless veil of ignorance. From the subjective side, affections are 
focussed on values which are perceived by agents in their diverse social roles and 
situations according to their traditions which are temporally extended and stored in 
memory. From the objective side, affections concern engaged participation in the 
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world as it is. Things of this world persist and change over time and so, if affections 
are to be engaged in something real then they must be timely. Furthermore, following 
the doctrine of excellency through differentiation and association, it seems that 
affections are forms of construal whereby one time is seen in terms of another time 
so that harmony results. Specifically, in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, the time 
of the Old Testament is construed in terms of the time of the New Testament. Spirit-
led affections are ways of construing the life of Israel, including its institutions, and 
all creation in terms of Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ. The angel says, 
 
“Fear not, for behold I bring you good news of great joy that will be for all the people. 
For unto you is born this day in the city of David a Saviour, who is Christ the Lord.” 
(Luke 2:10-11) 
 
We are invited joyfully to construe Israel’s institutions, such as the Davidic kingship, 
in terms of a baby boy. To receive these glad tidings with joy is the way to initiate a 
life of moral reflection, deliberation and action within the terms set by the gospel 
itself. Affective independence constantly reserves itself from such initiation and so 
perverts Scriptural common agency; but wisdom hears the angel’s cry of 
announcement and so becomes attentive to the revelation of Christ and the moral 
order he vindicates.  
Eschatologically attuned affections will construe political society now in 
terms of Christ. In this way, the eschatological-analogical relation between 
institutions of contemporary political society and the institutions of Israel fulfilled in 
Christ may be recognised. Just as Christ’s fulfilment of the traditional institutions of 
Israel opens up an affectively rich, infinite future, so an earthly representative’s 
fulfilment of his or her own traditional institutions, while respecting the infinite and 
transcendent future, may open up an affectively rich though limited future for the 
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community who find their organised forms in those institutions. Conversation 
between this Christian eschatology and Martha Nussbaum’s account of mature 
interdependence reveals three fruitful lines of thought with respect to political 
affections.  
First, the resurrection of Jesus shows that political representatives and their 
communities should not minimise the awfulness of fragility, decay and death by 
accepting it as the ultimate condition of human life nor eradicate fear and hope from 
the affective repertoire which surrounds human decline. Representatives who seek to 
promote ‘mature interdependence’ would be more or less committed to such a 
posture. In such a society, the environment for affective understanding would be 
such that affective recognition of the infinite significance and eschatological 
perfectibility of human life would be inadmissible in public reasoning. But the 
resurrection precisely trumpets the news that God did not let his Holy One see 
corruption (Acts 2:27) and thus calls political representation neither to settle for a 
truce with death nor attempt to overcome it by its own means. A political 
environment where such ultimate questions were self-consciously left open would 
allow for a subtler range of affective understanding concerning the sickness, death 
and decay which are an ever-present feature of the current human condition.  
This is by no means a fringe concern since our affective attitude to death and 
sickness affects major political institutions especially, in the UK, the National Health 
Service. Nussbaum’s critique of illusory aspirations towards bodily perfection and 
disgust concerning death is neither the only nor the best way of understanding our 
contemporary consciousness. Explicitly religious analysis, especially from the 
perspective of Christian eschatology, both explains the aspiration with respect to 
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creation and resurrection and attends to the reality of imperfection which Nussbaum 
has highlighted. Christ’s resurrection vindicates our joy in the goodness of this world 
and our aspiration for joyful experiences in the world to come but also, by 
demonstrating that death and decay are not the goal of humanity, vindicates our 
sadness, compassion, hope and fear concerning sickness and death. But Nussbaum’s 
approach does not allow for these redemptive notes to be sounded in political 
discourse, preferring the choruses of Greek tragedies to the songs of lament and joy 
which fill the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. If decay and death in a fragile world 
do have the last word in human affairs, then Nussbaum’s approach is right. But, in 
light of the human aspiration for permanence, this does not seem a sound basis for 
building the mature interdependence she desires. Instead of discounting that 
aspiration, a political conception attentive to Christian eschatology will affirm it in a 
qualified way by explaining its source and goal in Jesus Christ.  
With respect to the NHS in particular, the affective attitude we have towards 
death will frame our reflections and deliberations concerning the development of 
palliative care and the availability of assisted suicide in a state health service. The 
key issue is control. Palliative care seeks to manage the dying process in such a way 
as to limit pain and provide a dignified way of dying which stops short of intentional 
medical killing. Even high levels of palliative sedation which may hasten death are 
not intended to bring about death but rather to control pain. The patient’s decline 
may be controlled but not the actual timing and manner of death. Medically assisted 
suicide is an alternative way of controlling the dying process whereby pain is 
overcome through a death intentionally and jointly brought about by medical 
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practitioner and patient upon the request of the patient. Thus the patient is given very 
considerable control over the manner and timing of her death.  
The affective attitude we have towards death will shape the way we approach 
these questions. For Nussbaum, compassion will be appropriate in both cases but 
much less so, strangely, for the patient opting for assisted suicide since the timing 
and manner of death is a largely controlled factor. Indeed, on her account, the more 
control of any sort a patient has over her dying, even through palliative care, the less 
appropriate compassion will be. Nussbaum’s compassion, her paradigm political 
emotion, is oriented to the uncontrollable quality of decay and death itself. 
Moreover, death is something to be embraced, without fear and loathing, because it 
is the permanent and final form of the human condition.  
Nussbaum’s compassion is thus very largely untouched by joy and hope. But 
Christian compassion will follow a different logic since it is oriented not only to 
decay and death but also to the transcendent dimension in which all humans 
participate. Palliative care, by refusing to collude intentionally with death, coheres 
better with Christian eschatology’s account of compassion which, though focussed 
on human fragility, construes it in terms of the resurrection of Christ. Affections are 
oriented not only to the patient’s control of her situation but also to the sovereign rule 
exercised by God as demonstrated in the resurrection. Compassion for those 
contemplating assisted suicide is thus not implausibly measured by the extent of the 
agent’s control of her circumstances. Nor does a patient’s choice of palliative care 
diminish our compassion. Above all, compassion for the dying is very reasonably 
accompanied by fear, joy and hope – perhaps separately or perhaps together – since 
the desire for transcendence and permanence beyond death runs deep in the human 
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consciousness, as Augustine’s account of memory indicated. Fear of death is entirely 
understandable and worthy itself of compassion – seeking to minimise it is highly 
implausible and even unhealthy in itself since a political pact with death may obviate 
the development of life-extending, palliative care. Moreover, hopeful joy in what 
remains of earthly life and in a life beyond death have permeated the Christian 
palliative and hospice care movement which has preserved a recognition of God’s 
sovereignty over the end of life thereby recognising the complexities of control and 
affections which surround death.  
If a political compassion organised according to Nussbaum’s eschatology 
were thoroughly to permeate the NHS, this institution would be providing an 
environment of understanding which shapes our reflection and deliberation in an 
unwarrantably anti-transcendent manner. As such it will fit people less well both for 
this life and for the eternal life for which they are intended. For if compassion is for 
things which are uncontrollably bad, if death is not bad and is thus not to be feared 
and if assisted suicide controls death, then not only is compassion much less 
appropriate for those contemplating assisted suicide but also assisted suicide as an 
embrace of death without fear and less worthy of compassion emerges as the more 
preferable option. Indeed, Nussbaum is on record as supporting a limited right to 
assisted suicide and holds that the ‘danger of abuse is the only good reason…to 
refuse to make assisted suicide illegal.’
67
 From a theological perspective, political 
representatives have a responsibility not to promote Nussbaum’s account of death 
and decay lest we slip into an arguably sub-human (and certainly sub-Christian) way 
of viewing our neighbours, especially the most vulnerable who are sick, dying and in 
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despair. Instead, they should leave open the question of transcendence and so allow a 
wider range of affective experience to accompany the dying process. The extension 
of institutions of hospice and palliative care, preferably open to the transcendent 
dimension, promises far more for the health of society. 
Second, the ascension of Jesus promises a kingdom of perfect and permanent 
peace which makes shame a reasonable political affection. For the political 
judgments of earthly authority involve a ‘confession of shame in the face of 
necessity, a sense of tragedy about the cutting-short of reasonable interaction. So for 
Augustine the just man wages even just wars in tears.’
68
 Christian eschatology makes 
shame in the face of tragedy a sensible form of self-understanding for it rightly 
recognises our limitations, especially in our failures to govern ourselves with 
wisdom.  
Nussbaum is unimpressed with Augustine and his line of reasoning. Though 
she applauds his attention to emotion in moral psychology and his concurrence with 
her that vulnerability and uncertainty are significant in human emotions, especially 
with respect to what she obliquely calls ‘the uncertainty of grace’,
69
 she criticises 
him for undermining mature interdependence by being so heavenly minded that this-
worldly, political concerns are merely provisional and so of no great importance.
70
 In 
his ‘politics of Eden’, she believes, humans were 
 
in a deep way nonerotic: they had no passionate attachment to pieces of the world; so 
long as they were good, they were not curious or striving. We might say that in our 
sense they were without emotion. It is thus a very basic fact about humanity – our 
need for objects, our keen hunger to know and to control the sources of good – that is 
original sin. And thus a basic aspect of our humanity becomes a fitting object of 
boundless shame; it is this very condition that renders us hopelessly alike so far as 
merit is concerned. The politics of Eden is this: be ashamed of your longing for 
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objects, your curiosity to know them, and your very wish to originate independent 
actions. Be so ashamed that you see this as radical evil, and yield your will before the 
authority of the church. But also: be consoled, for this is merely a provisional world, 
and the actions you would like to undertake here do not matter greatly; all of your 





Nussbaum’s critique displays nothing so much as a lack of insight into 
Christian eschatology and a lack of awareness of her own. To begin with, her belief 
that Augustine’s account of salvation history makes our active, moral life in this 
world irrelevant is simply mistaken. Augustine’s writing is hardly without moral 
recommendations for the life of the church and the world nor is he embarrassed 
about framing their significance in light of the judgment to come. For example, 
Nussbaum holds that it is Augustine’s view that people are to be loved individually, 
‘not only the good parts but also the flaws and faults’ and, as such imperfect people, 
they are to be loved ‘in themselves’.
72
 But then she doubts whether Augustine really 
believes that we are to love individual people since ‘what one loves above all in them 
is the presence of God and the hope of salvation.’
73
 Consider too her claim that 
‘Augustinian love is committed to denying the importance of the worldly losses and 
injustices to which my neighbour may attach importance, in order to assert the 
primacy of the need for God and the potential for grace.’
74
 The basic Augustinian 
tenet she overlooks is that, just as you love the sick person that he might be well in 
this life, so you love the flawed and faulty person that he might be righteous in this 
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life. Augustine’s moral thought is hardly restricted to otherworldly concerns, whether 
he is addressing righteous action, political justice or personal health.
75
 
This misrepresentation of Augustine’s ethics and eschatology stems from her 
rejection of the doctrine of the Fall which has ‘too much abjectness…too much 
unwillingness to grant that a human being may in fact become, and be, good’.
76
 She 
believes that all that is left to the Augustinian is to be ashamed of what we are and to 
‘cover ourselves, mourn, and wait.’
77
 In light of this doctrinal rejection, she rather 
oddly criticises Augustine for not ascribing to Edenic humanity characteristics which 
are obviously, precisely on Augustine’s view of the Fall, features of fallen humanity! 
Augustine’s Adam and Eve indeed are ‘without emotion’ on her account of the 
nature of emotions – they are content rather than striving, dependent on God rather 
than seeking to be independent arbiters of good and evil and under the sovereignty of 
God rather than desiring to control the sources of good. Like LeDoux, a 
neuroscientist she favours, Nussbaum unfortunately ends up believing that a large 
part of the Christian tradition believes emotions to be essentially inextricable from 
sin.  
By normalising the instability of the fallen world, Nussbaum dismisses the 
enduring stability of creation, new creation and creation’s God. Nussbaum’s 
eschatology has no room for heaven and hell, two of the traditional last four things, 
although the goal of mature interdependence is characterised by elements of both – 
social solidarity amidst permanent death. Moreover, God drops entirely out of 
Nussbaum’s analysis of Augustine’s moral thought to be replaced, somewhat 
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strangely, by the church, a sociological oversight if ever there was one and entirely in 
line with her suggestion of the anti-transcendent liberal democratic module we 
discussed earlier.
78
 Nussbaum’s account of shame springs directly from her rejection 
of the Fall. She ascribes shame to disappointed, infantile, narcissistic desires for 
omnipotence which are endlessly destructive of self and others. When Christian and 
political, this shame apparently even energises violence against unbelievers and 
‘God’s enemies’.
79
 This is an understandable interpretation in light of Nussbaum’s 
overall philosophy but quite unrepresentative of the mature Christian position. 
Therefore, in light of her misinterpretation of Christian eschatology, we must 
undertake the task of giving a brief, Christian account of the place of shame in 
politics on her behalf. 
Political shame concerns both the embarrassing necessity of the resort to 
public force and the essentially limited nature of the judgment such force effects. If 
we reckon that the world is fallen, shame becomes a highly important public 
affection, whereby people may understand the limitations of earthly powers and act 
accordingly. As we have seen, Christ’s leadership involved the shaming of those who 
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held authority inadequately (Luke 13:17). The inadequacy of our reflective and 
deliberative powers to the task of just judgment, whether in peacetime or in war 
tearfully waged, is a permanent feature of fallen humanity. Inasmuch as that desire is 
a desire to be God, then a Christian, political eschatology agrees with Nussbaum’s 
scepticism about omnipotence since the tendency of political authority to overreach 
itself is a bid for a certain sort of omnipotence. But, unlike in Nussbaum’s account, 
shame has a positive and helpful place in Christian eschatology for it precisely 
initiates our understanding of the true nature of humanity which is neither equal to 
God, nor always striving nor destined to decay but rather ‘a little lower than the 
heavenly beings’ (Psalm 8:5) and able to participate in the kingdom of the ascended 
Christ. Wise shame discloses to ourselves that we are not failed gods but rather failed 
human creatures graciously called to an eternal kingdom. From the perspective of 
punishment, shame is a basic affection which accompanies modern society’s 
preferred form of sanction, namely incarceration. To inform someone that he is not 
fit to live in wider society, even for a short time, is to bring shame on that person. 
One wonders what emotions Nussbaum expects prisoners who have committed 
serious crimes to experience. She certainly offers no real alternative to incarceration 
per se but rather seeks so to humanise prisons that shame is no part of the prisoner’s 
experience.
80
 But the worthy desire to make prisons more liveable by, for example, 
improving sanitary conditions, cannot obscure both the declaration of guilt against a 
convict and the fact of the loss of freedom which he experiences, both of which are 
closely associated with a feeling of shame. Nussbaum’s dislike of shame seems to be 
connected more to her lack of a doctrine of redemption from shame than from the 
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structure of the affection itself which seems an accurate affective understanding of 
the condition of being excluded from mainstream society because of a definite 
offence. In sum, human inability to do right is worthy of shame not only with respect 
to those who judge guilt but also those who are judged guilty. 
Third, most briefly, the differentiated life of the kingdom of God, inaugurated 
by Jesus the representative leader, shows that there is hierarchy which is affectively 
beneficial while neither trivial nor unjust. In a political institution, while all may be 
equal under the law of an institution, some have authority and others are under 
authority; some are representatives and others are represented. It is not quite clear 
whether Nussbaum believes all hierarchy in political society is ‘pernicious’
81
 or only 
certain forms of it. She is determined not to support political theories which 
systematically fail to take the disabled into account but seems to equate such theories 
with ‘unequal and hierarchical social relations.’
82
 Our thesis is that good social 
hierarchy is desirable if people are to experience the wonder, fear and awe of 
representative leadership and so be quickened, affirmed or challenged in their 
loyalties and enduring, intersubjective affections. Good representation will entail the 
compassionate inclusion of the out-groups for whom Nussbaum fights but will not 
settle for an account of the members of those out-groups which either undermines the 
representative leadership they need nor falls short of the promise of Christ’s 
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Burke claimed that ‘public affections…are required sometimes as supplements, 
sometimes as correctives, always as aids to law.’
83
 We turn to consider how 
affections operate in those legislative and judicial institutions through which 
communities make pronouncements concerning the goods they share in common. 
Those institutions we shall group under the single name of ‘law’ and their central 
common practice, following O’Donovan, is ‘judgment’, an ‘act of moral 
discrimination that pronounces upon a preceding act or existing state of affairs to 
establish a new public context.’
84
 Within the law, we distinguish between generic 
judgments given by legislatures as laws which have force for all relevant cases 
within a jurisdiction and particular judgments given by courts as discriminations 
concerning particular cases.  
With respect to both types of judgment, the process will often start with cries 
of pleading which alert us to the possibility of a need for judgment. For example, the 
‘English parliament began life as a “court of common pleas,” a means by which the 
governed spoke to government [read: represented spoke to their political 
representatives] about their frustrations.’
85
 We may add that, in the modern era at 
least, the governed also speak to their government about causes for celebration and 
joy, perhaps petitioning representatives to celebrate, safeguard and promote some 
sporting or cultural endeavour. Whether in frustration or celebration, the initiation of 
reflection and deliberation for the common good thus arises from the affective cries 
of the people. Although the people’s judgment, partially expressed in affection, is not 
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a political judgment, it initiates a process towards political judgment. An “emotional 
reaction” (or, better, an “affective attraction”) and ‘the reactive principle’ of 
government
86
 are thus closely related. Affective responses to societal ills and societal 
flourishing are often dismissed from rational discourse as knee-jerk reactions. But 
such reactions may be reasonable in the way that affections are reasonable, namely 
as initial, participative understandings of the world.  
A community may react (be attracted) intersubjectively to the wrong and the 
bad with fear, anger or grief and to the right and the good with joy. They fear 
because of the threat that wrong poses to the common good; they are angry and 
grieve because it is a wrong which has or appears to have been done; they rejoice as 
they are drawn into some action or state of affairs which serves the common good. 
Through the court of common pleas, their representative attends to their affections 
and may or may not come to share in them. For example, a group of constituents may 
be indignant about the inadequate statutory provision for young men leaving prison. 
Their representative recognises and understands this affection thereby bringing 
‘grievance out of the sphere of private action into the field of public judgment’. In so 
doing, she participates in their cries but makes possible public reflection and 
deliberation to verify whether their indignation is appropriate. For, ‘the decisive test 
is not the residual existence of a grievance, but its capacity to arouse general 
sympathy’. Such sympathy may well signal the presence of actual injustice, thereby 
drawing the representative’s attention to an injurious wrong. But equally it may 
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become a ‘great fomenter of public discord’ when justice is not done or does not 
appear to have been done.
87
 A good representative will deal with this potential 
discord by taking the people’s affections seriously without granting them the last 
word. She will understand how they feel or, in colloquial terms, “feel their pain” but 
then allow that initial understanding to open up reflection and deliberation rather 
than foreclose them. Thus intersubjectively shared affections are a basic form of 
communication available to represented and representatives. But what ought the 
good representative to do in light of this communication? At this point it makes a 
difference whether we are talking about the generic judgments of legislators or the 
particular judgments of the judiciary. 
On a generic level, affection, as a humble, penurious way of beginning the 
movement from values to norms, is well-suited to the representative’s task of 
discovering law since it is non-exhaustive in its moral deliverances, encouraging 
further enquiry while offering an initial judgment. When a people’s anger or grief is 
drawn to some particular wrong, parliamentary legislators (as contrasted with court 
judges) are initially focussed on that particular case. However, they are not mandated 
to judge directly on that matter because that task is reserved for the judiciary in 
criminal and civil suits and because of the general rule that legislators do not make 
generic laws based on one particular case. Rather they are to make normative 
judgments in the form of laws which, in part at least, rightly recognise the popular 
affective recognitions which have become apparent through particular cases. Thus 
there is a movement from popular recognition of value at the level of particularity or 
a repeated pattern of particulars, via political reflection and deliberation, to a 
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representative action of norm-giving which itself establishes ‘a new public context.’
88
 
If institutions successfully enable this process over time, the public context will be 
marked by an “affective wisdom”, that ability to understand affective recognitions as 
key aspects of political discourse and reasoning. Such a context will encourage 
processes of intersubjective verification of affective recognition thereby promoting 
reflective, deliberative law-making towards the common good. In this way, good 
laws take account of the affections of the people over time. As noted previously, this 
makes law ‘the only safe form of cultural memory’,
89
 since it remembers what a 
tradition has learnt about the appropriateness of certain affective recognitions in 
certain situations. 
Contrast this approach to the place of affections in law with that of Jonathan 
Edwards. A key feature of harmonious, political association, according to Edwards, 
is symmetry. Human consciousness of such symmetry is by the affections of the 
‘natural conscience’,
90
 guided by the common illuminations of the Spirit ‘as 
operating on the self’ as distinct from special and saving illuminations of the Spirit 
‘as dwelling in the self’.
91
 Having considered geometrical symmetry, he develops a 
metaphysics which situates excellency largely in symmetrical relations between 
entities.
92
 Edwards especially applies symmetry to the justice enacted by the laws of 
society, the proper proportioning of duties and obligations amongst relatives, friends 
and neighbours. When justice is done it is an example of secondary beauty and 
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secondary virtue by analogy from the beauty and virtue of Being in general. The 
governing principle of this secondary form of moral virtue – which is very distant 
from true virtue – is ‘desert’, a principle which Edwards develops in the context of 
the discussion of self-love, which in turn is expressed in gratitude towards those who 
love us and anger for those who hate us. In short, ‘all the moral sense that is essential 
to those affections [of gratitude and anger] is a sense of desert’.
93
 Desert is thus 
essentially what the political affections of gratitude and anger perceive. It is a strictly 
symmetrical principle, ‘that we should desire they themselves should suffer in like 
manner as we have suffered’,
94




He also argues that ‘conscience naturally gives men an apprehension of right 
and wrong, and suggests a relation between right and wrong, and a retribution’.
96
 
Conscience, ‘that sense the mind has of…consent’,
97
 has to do with ‘that excellency 
which most strongly affects’.
98
 The combination of his epistemological confidence 
about anger and gratitude and his principle of natural justice are not promising 
resources for a political society which requires any kind of subtlety in its legal 
arrangements. For Edwards’ advocacy of the principle of symmetry in political 
affairs in the form of ‘desert’ is a recipe for unwise and even ugly judicial 
enactments. Justice in society does not mean that punishment is symmetrical to 
crime, that the offender should suffer what the offended has suffered, that the rapist 
should be raped. Rather, as Oliver O’Donovan has pointed out, society does not echo 
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crime with punishment but rather, in punishing crime, provides an answer to the 
offender’s act.
99
 A principle of symmetry guided by gratitude and anger, the 
affections explicitly connected with desert by Edwards, will make for judgments 
which are not fitted to crimes but which are made with an incommunicable, 
passionate, incontrovertible certainty. Conceptually, at least, this is a recipe for 
public judgments which cannot be discussed but which will be followed through with 
all the ‘beauty’ of a fine piece of geometry but none of the wisdom of a legal 
tradition.  
Consider, instead of Edwards’ account, a specific instance of a wise tradition 
of institutional law, namely the English-speaking common law tradition, a tradition 
to which Nussbaum has applied her account of shame and disgust. In a co-authored 
article, she and Dan Kahan show how the common law has, for good and ill, taken a 
cognitive-evaluative view of emotions in the prosecution of particular cases while 
much modern legal theory has taken a mechanistic view which reckons emotions as 
destructive of the legal responsibility of the accused. If we do hold that ‘emotions 
involve evaluative thought we naturally begin to ask questions about the sort of 
evaluations reasonable people ought to make.’
100
 These “emotions of the reasonable 
person” feature prominently in Hiding from Humanity. For example, Nussbaum 
holds that any 
 
good account of why offenses against person and property are universally subject to 
legal regulation is likely to invoke the reasonable fear that citizens have of these 
offenses, the anger with which a reasonable person views them, and/or the sympathy 
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We also see that in jury service reasonable people are called on to give a verdict on 
their peers which will, to some extent, take account of the affections of the accused. 
When a son becomes angry and kills those who assaulted his aged, housebound 
father, is his affection reasonable and so some sort of mitigating factor? In a classic 
set of cases, to which Nussbaum often returns, is the anger of the cuckold, which led 
him to kill both adulterous wife and illegitimate lover, reasonable? The jury are 
called on, in the terms of this discussion, to verify intersubjectively the affections of 
the accused and to enquire both whether these were reasonable ways of 
understanding the situation and whether, if reasonable, they are mitigating factors. In 
this way, the jurors share in the affections both of the victim (indignation against the 
accused) and of the defendant (indignation against an alleged wrongdoer), allowing 
both affections to bring understanding and thereby influence the jury’s reflection and 
deliberation. As we have seen, contra Kahan, Nussbaum holds that shame and 
disgust are never helpful in judging particular cases or general laws. Instead, 
‘indignation’ or ‘outrage’, ‘expressing a reasoned judgment that can be publicly 
shared’,
102




So what role, if any at all, does anger have in the law and in judgment, its 
central practice? Nussbaum distinguishes anger from disgust and shame on the 
grounds that ‘the notion of harm or damage lies at the core of anger’s cognitive 
content’ and therefore the reasoning from which anger stems ‘can be publicly 
articulated and publicly shaped.’
104
 Anger must be proportionate to the finite wrong 
of particular offences. Where it is not, anger can lead to the desire to humiliate and to 
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shame, which, because it is directed at the person as a whole, is looser in its 
connection to a particular offence and so has greater capacity to mark someone and 
destroy them for an extended period or even permanently. Anger should take the 
person seriously as a responsible creature. Shame, in its pernicious form, can reckon 
or designate the person sub-creaturely and sub-human.  
Though shame may play more of a role in our political affairs than Nussbaum 
allows, as discussed above, Christian moralists may agree with the analysis of anger 
(which might also be called ‘indignation’), adding only that private anger is 
subordinated to the public exercise of just wrath (Romans 13:1ff) and to the final 
promise of publicity that ‘Vengeance is mine and I will repay’ (12:19). As we learn 
from the incident of the enraged devotees of Artemis (and Mammon!) (Acts 19:21-
40), wrong civil anger was well-known to the early church since it was often directed 
against them. But Paul calls the church at Ephesus to ‘be angry and sin not’ 
(Ephesians 4:26). The Ephesians were free to be angry at wrong, thereby recognising 
injustice, and yet they were not to sin. Instead, in the context of the church, they were 
to entrust ultimate judgment to the higher Judge, recognising the provisionality of 
their own indignation. Their Representative would take their private grievances 
against one another and make them a matter of public, eschatological, wrathful 
judgment, to be resolved at the throne of the crucified Lord.  
By analogy from the eschatological relativisation of anger in the church, what 
is needed in political societies is precisely a way of enabling people to be angry at 
injustice and yet not to sin, especially through extrajudicial violence. The over-
realised epistemological certainty in Edwards’ account does not allow for such a 
transition from private to political anger by resolving both into a single dictate of 
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natural conscience. What we require is an institution whereby the affective 
recognition of private anger may initiate reflection and deliberation and thereby 
contribute towards a public judgment which may be effectively acted upon for the 
common good. Representative, political authority is that institution which makes 
affection communally beneficial while limiting its capacity to lead people into 
wrongdoing. Through representation the affections of the people may be understood, 
provided with appropriate political expression and judged worthy or unworthy of 
general sympathy.  
This then is the meeting point of representation and law, our two ways of 
examining affections in political institutions. The representative is called to know 
and understand humanity as mediated through the legal tradition of the polity. This 
will mean understanding the affective wisdom of the laws which are established and 
connecting them through the exercise of authority with the particular circumstances 
of the people. When this happens through the common practices of political 
institutions, the moment of authority may easily occur and be recognised.  
 
Joy and awe 
 
The curses of Deuteronomy warned Israel that joylessness, among other sins, would 
result in the loss of their common life in the land. The Hebrew Scriptures trace the 
people’s narrative from the entry into the land after Moses’ death all the way through 
to their stubborn domestic injustice, disastrous foreign policy, repeated defeats and 
final exile to Babylon. The joyful participation in the land is lost and the 
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Deuteronomic festivities are no longer undertaken. Instead, the people sit down by 
the rivers of Babylon and weep.  
 The narrative eventually proceeds to the advent of the Lord’s anointed, Cyrus 
king of Persia, who enables the people to return to the land. In the time of his 
successors, that return reaches its climax in the ministry of Nehemiah, the 
representative of the people who leads them in the rebuilding of their common life. 
While yet in Babylon, he weeps and fasts as he shares in the troubles of the exiles 
who have already returned (1:3ff). On his arrival at Jerusalem, he organises the 
people in civic renewal and attends to the practice of judgment. For when some of 
the people allege ill-treatment at the hands of fellow Israelites who are exploiting the 
poor through usury in a time of famine, Nehemiah says ‘I was very angry when I 
heard their outcry and these words. I took counsel with myself, and I brought charges 
against the nobles and officials.’ (5:6-7) Here we see the renewal of the pattern of 
wisdom we discovered in Deuteronomy. Nehemiah hears cries concerning the good 
land which is meant to be shared by all the people, reflects on the cries, deliberates 
upon action and acts in judgment according to the law of God.  
Following this renewal of judgment with respect to a particular case and the 
completion of the city wall, Nehemiah renews the institution of the law as a whole. 
When the people weep because of the words of the law (8:9) in the context of the 
feast of booths, Nehemiah redirects their affective understanding to the goodness of 
the land and their God, teaching them that the ‘joy of the Lord is your strength’ 
(8:10) and commanding them to feast and celebrate. Their reception of Nehemiah’s 
wisdom is accompanied by the ‘great joy’ (8:12; cf. Luke 2:10) which constitutes 
their understanding of his words and leads to obedient action in the form of proper 
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celebration. After that joyful recognition of God’s goodness they sorrowfully 
recognise their own and their forefathers’ sin by which they enter deeply into 
reflection on the wrongdoing which has characterised the nation’s life (chapter 9) 
and so proceed to a commitment to repentance sealed with a covenant (9:38). 
Joy is the strength of the people. Their joy in the Lord is an enduring 
understanding which stabilises them in moral wisdom for the sake of political 
renewal. It endures through their renewed memory of God’s faithful goodness, the 
source of stable understanding in their common life of reflection, deliberation and 
action. Following this festive occasion, the institutions of representative leadership 
(priestly and tribal) and legal judgment are renewed as the variegated life of urban 
and rural Israel is decisively displayed, climaxing in the dedication of the wall, the 
sign of their reinstitution as the city of God. On this festive occasion, the affective 
recognitions of the people are carefully orchestrated through the summoning of 
priests, Levites and leaders, the preparation of choirs and the walk of witness around 
the walls. The result is a powerful display of Yahwistic understanding: 
 
…they offered great sacrifices that day and rejoiced, for God had made them rejoice 
with great joy; the women and children also rejoiced. And the joy of Jerusalem was 
heard far away. (12:43) 
 
YHWH is the reason for their ‘great joy’, drawing out their attracted understanding 
to perceive the reality of his rule in the land He had promised. That understanding, 
given expression in loud celebration, is then announced to the nations who hear it 
from afar.  
The people’s cries of joy as they return to the laws of Deuteronomy recall 




Oh that they had such a mind as this always, to fear me and to keep all my 
commandments, that it might go well with them and with their descendants forever. 
(Deuteronomy 5:29) 
 
So we see that the ‘fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.’ (Proverbs 1:8) 
Specifically, the intersubjective fear of the Lord in loyal, wondrous awe is the 
beginning of eschatological, political, affective wisdom, framing all the affective 
understanding, reflection, deliberation and obedient action which follow from it. The 
joy of the Lord, intentionally attracted to the land of the Lord and the Lord of the 
land, is the basic affective form which that loyalty takes in Israel’s life. In this way, 
affective understanding is rooted both in locality and in the transcendent God of the 
whole earth who dwells among the people of his choice. 
Joy and awe are thus the expansive affective understandings which are 
appropriate to the Kingdom of God. Within these affections, the more narrowly 
defined affections of indignation and shame which accompany the law become 
intelligible as they relate to wrongs we do and the judgments we make within the 
moral order which God has created and vindicated in Israel and in Christ. This 
interrelation of joy, fear, anger and shame seems to be the affective meaning of 
O’Donovan’s claim that the ‘ways of judgment are more specified than the ways of 
life’.
105
 Fear of Almighty God, joy in his Son Jesus Christ, in whom the ways of 
judgment and the ways of life are held together, and joy in the created order, now 
vindicated and held together in Christ, are the proper beginnings of wisdom for those 
awaiting consummation in the new heaven and the new earth where unprecedented, 
unimaginable joy based on the truth will be the understanding of the people of the 
awesome God. And yet this consummation has not yet been achieved and so the 
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people of God live among the nations of the world. For this reason we now proceed 
to consider further implications of our findings for the life of nations (chapter four) 




Chapter 4: Affections and locality 
 
We have considered affections’ role in certain institutions of political society, 
namely representation and law. We turn now to enquire concerning how our political 
conceptions as a whole may foster or undermine institutional affective wisdom. 
Many areas of today’s political societies provide routes into this question. One might 
begin by reflecting on the current strength of those mediating forms of life which we 
know as professional guilds such as medicine. The ability of these guilds to function 
as collective forces for the common good of political societies has been dependent to 
a great extent on intersubjectively shared affective understandings of the common 
tasks in hand. With respect to medicine in the UK, medical professionals’ 
intersubjective affections of compassion for those in need, joy in restoration of health 
and indignation at the social conditions which keep so many of the poorest in British 
society in transgenerationally ill health, seem to be systematically quelled by the 
bureaucratisation of healthcare and the ever-increasing demands of a culture with 
few resources to deal with decay and death. In the place of compassion, joy and 
righteous indignation we now often find depression and apathy. The steady loss over 
the years of those affective understandings with which many medical professionals 
embark on a career not only lowers the quality of the care given to patients but also 
diminishes our attentiveness to the need to care for our doctors, nurses and other 
health professionals. Although these observations would lead on to an important 
analysis of the workings of medical institutions, such a study would not provide a 
sufficiently broad basis for answering the question we are posing in this chapter. 
Instead, it will be better to engage with a discussion which, though focussed in the 
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Western nation-states, is arguably relevant to all peoples in the twenty-first century 
since the influence of Western patterns of thought are present in many non-Western 
settings especially among the ruling elites who are often trained in institutions of 
higher education in the United States and in the nation-states which form the 
European Union. 
 
Constitutional patriotism: an initial assessment  
 
The social and political context which followed the second world war was the 
intellectual incubator for the now wide-ranging discussion of the place of affection or 
“affect” in the life of nation-states in today’s Europe. The aftermath of the Holocaust 
and the long-lasting impacts of diverse forms of nationalism have stimulated various 
thinkers to articulate theories which are intended to protect the peoples of Europe 
from any repeat of the massive disasters of the twentieth century and, in more recent 
versions, to purify a European democratic consciousness.
1
 Extensive debate has 
surrounded the possible role of various sorts of “patriotism” in sustaining liberal 
democracies and international organisations such as the European Union. The debate 
itself has only gained momentum because of the massive uncertainty which exists in 
mainland Europe and, arguably, in the United Kingdom, about what does, will and 
should hold a nation-state together as a community of collective agency and, 




                                                 
1
 Muller, J., Constitutional Patriotism, Princeton University Press, 2007, 30 
2
 We will largely be addressing the European situation here but similar questions may be asked with 
respect to ASEAN, the African Union and other international organisations.  
 
 222 
The term ‘collective agency’ obviously does not entail a naïve account of all 
the people in a territory actually carrying out the same activities all the time. Instead, 
collectivity is always refracted through some sort of representation. On the one hand, 
more associated with the term “liberal”, ‘collective agency’ may refer to a common 
practice of upholding the rights of others sharing in the same political society 
through the deliberations and decisions of elected representatives and through 
judicial process. On the other hand, more associated with the terms “conservative” or 
“communitarian”, ‘collective agency’ may refer to the shared, traditional practices of 
a culture, including practices of particularly political representation, by which people 
experience themselves as represented. Such descriptions never entirely capture the 
actual reality of any particular political society. Rather, they are differing 
explanations of how people see their identity represented in society’s actions without 
necessarily participating in those actions themselves. In this way, a diverse society is 
sustained in collective action. 
However, it is not the case that people currently experience this identification 
and representation. The breakdown of older patterns of life and the lack of popular 
confidence in elected officials and even the electoral process itself combine to raise 
serious questions about the realisation of moral community in any particular polity or 
in larger political entities such as the European Union. It is in this context of 
uncertainty about what holds communities together that terms such as “constitutional 
patriotism” and “liberal nationalism” have entered academic discourse. The German 
context and specifically the work of Jürgen Habermas have provided a focus for 
these new approaches. Analysis of his ideas and the responses he has elicited will 
provide a fertile starting point for exploring the contribution of our theologically 
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informed concept of affection towards a political environment which fosters healthy 
representative and legal institutions. Indeed, Habermas’ openness to religious 
thought invites such an attempt
3
 and, although he does not take up the language of 
‘affect’ (or the German ‘affekt’) as a specific term of art, it is clear that the 
phenomena of affections (emotions) are key to his account of constitutional 
patriotism. More commonly we see the language (in English translations) of 
‘attitudes’,
4




 Nonetheless, as we shall see through 
the commentary of Patchen Markell, Cécile Laborde and Jan Muller, Habermas’ eye 
is definitely on that which we have been investigating as the affective dimension of 
political relations. 
 
Habermas’ constitutional patriotism 
 
In his important essay on the past and future of the nation-state, Habermas 
summarises the conceptual framework within which his doctrine of constitutional 
patriotism operates by describing how the 
 
tension between the universalism of an egalitarian legal community and the 
particularism of a community united by historical destiny is built into the very concept 
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He argues that the universal principles which are expressed in the procedures of 
liberal democracy are currently both dependent for their enactment on the particular 
legal constitutions of particular nation-states and in tension with those constitutions. 
Habermas believes that this tension should be held in such a way that the 
cosmopolitan or universalist emphasis governs and, where appropriate, undermines 
the tendency of particular cultures towards an ‘ethnocentric’
8
 self-interpretation. This 
position entails a conceptual separation or uncoupling of ‘norms’ and ‘facts’. For the 
sheer facticity of traditional, localised identity, defined by territoriality, taking 
ideological form in nationalisms, is, in Habermas’ view, ‘intrinsically susceptible to 
misuse by political elites’,
9
 resulting in the neglect of universal norms. 
 Habermas’ analysis of political existence in terms of facts and norms makes 
particular assumptions. He is convinced that ‘norms for a reasonable conduct of life 
cannot be drawn from the natural constitution of the human species any more than 
they can from history’.
10
 On Habermas’ view, theories which gain anything from 
philosophical anthropologies such as that of Max Scheler
11
 or from the ‘ambivalent 
bonding force of archaic institutions’ are indebted to ‘metasocial guarantees of the 
sacred’ which are now thoroughly discredited.
12
 No longer is positive law to be 
related to natural law which Habermas claims is ‘administered by the Church’.
13
 
Instead, a new account of facticity has emerged whereby  
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In contrast to convention and custom, enacted law does not rely on the organic 
facticity of inherited forms of life, but on the artificially produced facticity found in 





Habermas holds that such facticity is a legal form which allows coercion only 
because of autonomous self-legislation and only for the sake of preserving 
autonomous freedom. Moreover, this legal form is by no means arbitrary since ‘the 
facticity of law expresses the legitimate will that stems from a presumptively rational 
self-legislation of politically autonomous citizens.’
15
 The facticity of the 
conventional, local community which lay behind older legal structures is now to be 
set aside in light of the only factical resources which matter, a modern legal structure 
which is built around the rights and freedoms of citizens. For such citizens, there is 
now only ‘validity and facticity – that is, the binding force of rationally motivated 
beliefs and the imposed force of external sanctions’.
16
 The two are necessarily 
uncoupled since universal norms are never to be absolutely identified with any 
particular factical legal form embedded in a particular, factical, territorially defined 
political society.  
In framing matters in this way, Habermas makes room to argue that the old 
concept of a Volksnation is untenably unsafe for post-war, modern Europe in light of 
the undeniable, twin realities of radical, social pluralism in European nation-states 
and the influence of economic, military and political globalisation. These are leading, 
Habermas believes, towards the decline of the nation-state and the development of 
post-national forms of representative identification and consciousness.
17
 All 
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 moral unity will not motivate collective popular 
agency towards the common good and will instead distract people from appropriate 
routes towards affective attachment to universal principles and the growth of post-
national consciousness. His positive proposal is that 
 
constitutional rights and principles…form the fixed point of reference for any 
constitutional patriotism that situates the system of rights within the historical context 
of a legal community. These must be enduringly linked with the motivations and 
convictions of the citizens, for without such a motivational anchoring they could not 
become the driving force behind the dynamically conceived project of producing an 




Thus in constitutional patriotism, the ‘allegiance’ or ‘affect’
20
 of citizens is primarily 
directed to universal, constitutional rights and norms rather than to a pre-political 




Such a move has, however, proved highly open to misinterpretation. For it 
has been thought that Habermas has been advocating a thin or ‘bloodless’
22
 concept 
of citizenship which effectively bypasses all historical and local particularity by 
redirecting affect solely and directly to universalist principles. For example, Thomas 
Mertens, commenting on Habermas’ position, argues that 
 
[p]atriotism in such a democracy does not…entail loyalty to a specific substantial 
community, but has the sole meaning of being loyal to the democratic procedures of 
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However, such an interpretation is not adequate to the subtlety of Habermas’ 
account. Laborde has helpfully isolated an interpretation of Habermas called 
“neutralist” constitutional patriotism. These interpreters, like Mertens, have misread 
Habermas and 
 
neglected the deliberative, critical dimension of constitutional patriotism 
and…underestimated the role of political culture in underpinning political loyalty and 
social solidarity. This is because the neutralist version of constitutional patriotism 




Habermas’ claim is that it is only in the context of a definite legal community in a 
particular locality that the deliberative process of communication about constitutional 
principles and rights can be carried on. Thus he holds that what ‘unites a nation of 
citizens, as opposed to a Volksnation, is not some primordial substrate but rather an 
intersubjectively shared context of possible mutual understanding.’
25
 This ‘mutual 
understanding’, ‘loyalty’ or ‘solidarity’ is Habermas’ attempt to name the affective 
dimension which we have been exploring. 
Setting Mertens’ assessment aside, we see that constitutional patriotism is not 
a plan for the total purge of the particularities of tradition, religion, place and family 
from political consciousness – an obviously impractical option. Instead, according to 
one sympathetic interpreter of Habermas, ‘citizens are asked to reflect critically upon 
particular traditions and group identities in the name of shared universal principles.’ 
Tradition, with its ‘attachments and loyalties’ should not be absolutely excised but 
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should be constantly revised through a ‘critical, highly self-conscious back-and-forth 
between actually existing traditions and institutions, on the one hand, and the best 
universal norms and ideas that can be worked out, on the other.’ Thus, in order to 
realise Habermas’ vision of the ‘rationalization of collective identities’, what is 




Indeed, Habermas’ thesis – at least in its later form – is not that constitutional 
rights and principles should necessarily float free of particular, territorially defined, 
legal jurisdictions such as nation-states, but rather that the facts of a particular legal 
structure of rights, in a defined community and with suitable, enforceable sanctions, 
are a logically necessary ‘supplement’ if the universal norms are to have any 
motivational grounding in people’s lives. Habermas’ ‘philosophical modesty’ which 
refuses the position of transcendent theorist
27
 thus tends towards an uneasy 
interdependence of facts and norms in which modern ‘law can stabilize behavioural 
expectations’
28
 since coercive ‘law overlays normative law with threats of sanctions 
in such a way that addressees may restrict themselves to the prudential calculation of 
consequences.’
29
 The relationship is uneasy since calculation of consequences is, by 
Kantian standards, an amoral form of self-interest which is hardly aligned with the 
high-minded universalism of post-national rights-based norms. Nonetheless, 
Habermas clearly argues for the importance of such an historically, institutionally 
and territorially situated legal supplement which engages motivation ‘in a manner 
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 In Laborde’s terms, this linkage between facts and norms is a 
‘motivational anchorage’.
31
 ‘Affect’ is thus the way that citizens are themselves 
linked to universal norms via their particular, localised, factical situation. 
Since then, according to Habermas, the relationship between a nation-state’s 
facticity and universal norms should be viewed as the necessary compromise which 
draws the people of that nation-state towards those norms, it comes as no surprise 
that he does not consider the nation-state itself as the final disclosure of the arena in 
which the democratic consciousness can and will develop. Indeed, he believes that 
there is a growing post-national consciousness which should be allowed to shape the 
constitutional patriotism which is peculiar to any particular nation-state and which, in 
time, will lead to the decline of the nation-state as larger, probably continental, forms 
of government are able to achieve legitimacy and attract sufficient allegiance to 
sustain their authority. Constitutional patriotism is thus the affective ‘attitude’ 
whereby the process of critical engagement of tradition leading to post-conventional 
and post-national consciousness can be sustained.  
In the German context, for example, an episode of this process was carried 
out in the so-called Historikerstreit (“Historians’ debate”) of the 1980’s in which 
Habermas argued strongly for Germans not to dissociate themselves from the Nazi 
past but rather to engage seriously in critical remembrance of what occurred in the 
1930’s and 1940’s. In Muller’s interpretation,  
 
[m]emory would thus unfold a motivational power and supplement the universalist 
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Habermas is thus arguing precisely not for citizens to attempt to transcend and 
abstract from their own heritages but rather that they should enter into ‘a continuous 
civic self-interrogation and open argument about the past’.
33
 To balance this, it 
should also be emphasised that Habermas is genuinely committed to an emancipation 
of consciousness from conventional identities which were given by tradition to 
individuals in order that they might enter into the freedom of post-national and post-
conventional communicative action.
34
 This does not contradict his recognition of the 
importance of particular legal jurisdictions to stabilise democratic consciousness but 
rather describes the tension which he sees at the heart of modern European life. 
Remembering the past does not mean that the future may not develop in a quite 
different direction, namely towards a post-national consciousness which is armed 
against ethnocentricity and sustained by a properly affective constitutional 
patriotism.  
 
A view from Dover beach 
 
Habermas’ constitutional patriotism, along with the debate which it has fuelled, is 
one highly nuanced attempt to address the thinness of many liberal descriptions of 
political identity and legitimation in the modern Europe. Such anaemic accounts 
have been heavily criticised by other authors with an interest in the significance of 
affections for political relations. Roger Scruton, for example, has denounced 
contractarian theories which are defined by an obsession with autonomy that makes 
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‘rational choice, rather than irrational sentiment, into the primary social fact.’
35
 
Drawing on the Burkean tradition of barely disguised disdain for those who base 
their political doctrines in the implausible fiction of an historical contract with no 
real signatories and no thick web of tradition, he laments the loss of a deep emotional 
connection with the land of England and mocks the social contractarian ‘we’. He 
proceeds to look beyond even the ‘we’ of a nation in time of crisis by appealing to  
 
ways of forming a first-person plural [that] are [not] so conscious. There are other, 
more instinctive and more immediate, forms of membership which serve the purpose 
just as well or better, and which have the desired result of making it possible for 




He has in mind here the corporate instincts which arise through kinship and religion. 
Those instincts, he recognises, have been dangerous in continental Europe, but took a 
gentler form in England, under the influence of ‘home’, that localised ‘focus of 
loyalty’
37
 which guided these instinctive emotions more moderately.  
Scruton’s moving and poetic account of the death of this England has much 
to recommend it. His account of corporate personality catches the outline of the 
connection between affection and personal representation which we encountered in 
chapter three
38
 while his repeated appeal to social trust, loyalty and homely locality 
highlights themes to which we shall return. However, it is not clear from Scruton’s 
writing that he has quite escaped the Enlightenment paradigm which opposed 
emotion (as non-cognitive) to reason (as cognitive). We may observe some 
resonance between Scruton’s description of the ‘we’ of instinctive membership and 
the account given by Jean-Yves Lacoste of the intersubjective sharing of affective 
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recognitions which was discussed in chapter two and developed in chapter three. 
Both accounts appeal to socially formed ways of coming together which are not 
acceptable to or even explicable by rationalist or contractarian paradigms. However, 
Lacoste’s account gives more philosophical satisfaction and is more politically 
fruitful precisely because of the penurious cognitive aptitude which Lacoste 
recognises as the necessary content of affection. Scruton’s lack of attention to the 
cognitive quality of affection is once again a matter of the self-consciously imprecise 
conservative style of writing, after the fashion of Burke, a style which is captured in 
Scruton’s characteristically British observation that ‘the deeper emotions could only 
be debased by their expression.’
39
  
Scruton’s underdetermined approach has not been persuasive to those who 
fail to appreciate how ‘in all relations of love and loyalty, the face of the other 
remains the focus of emotion – the sign and incarnation of the spiritual essence’
40
 
and who, sadly for Scruton, hold the whip-hand in the destruction of the old England 
upon whose face he loves to gaze in the deep caverns of his memory. Scruton’s 
critique has quite obviously failed to impress the serried ranks of political 
philosophers who ignore, misunderstand and mock him. His instincts are in tune with 
the overall direction of this thesis and his attention to land and locality highly 
perceptive but his argumentation has not been persuasive to the mainstream. Thus a 
different tack is required and the expression of emotion as ‘affection’ in the 
descriptive analysis undertaken to this point, seems to be a central way of addressing 
the shortcomings of liberalism which Scruton rightly observes. 
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Despite these conceptual shortcomings, Scruton’s lyrical critique of a certain 
form of liberalism which is inimical to this account’s concept of intersubjective 
affective recognition is worth quoting at length since it unveils what is at stake in the 
ongoing debate between liberalism and conservatism. He believes that the defenders 
of liberalism secretly and without acknowledgment desire that which conservatives 
naturally inhabit, namely 
 
an experience of membership that will open the heart, and also close the mind. At a 
certain point the strain of living without an ‘us’ and a ‘them’ becomes intolerable. On 
the lonely heights of abstract choice nothing comforts and nothing consoles. The 
Kantian imperatives seem to blow more freezingly, and the unfed soul eventually flees 
from them, down into the fertile valleys of attachment. But where shall he rest? To 
whom will his loyalty be owed? What flock or herd or army can he join, who looks on 
all of them with the merely vicarious loyalty of the envious anthropologist? The 
answer is this: to find an enemy, to create a new kind of membership in the spirit of 
battle. The enemy is the one who believes what the liberal so tragically fails to believe 
– the one who feels the loyalties to which the liberal ought in conscience to attach 
himself but which his own thinking has destroyed. To turn on the conservative is, in a 
peculiar way, to partake of his conviction, just as the Huron Indian absorbs the 




Habermas and Scruton 
 
The contrast between this essentially English, conservative critique and Habermas’ 
more obviously continental response to contemporary threats to the cohesion of 
moral communities opens up a fruitful line of thought. While Scruton laments, at 
great and lyrical length, the disenchanting and death of a land mysticism which now 
lies vanquished, slain by the cultural dragons of Tony Blair, ‘a Labour party 
committed to “globalisation”’ and the BBC,
42
 Habermas describes the patriotic affect 
which citizens of Europe should feel for the universal procedures of liberal 
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democracy when suitably instantiated in their own legal traditions and historically 
conditioned constitutions. However, despite Habermas’ European liberal credentials, 
he escapes Scruton’s general condemnation since he sees the necessity of some sort 
of loyalty. In this sense, Habermas distances himself from the deep freeze of a 
certain kind of abstract Kantianism by arguing for a constant movement between the 
valleys and the heights, the local and the universal, a life between facts and norms. 
Indeed, surprisingly, both Habermas and Scruton share a number of basic concerns 
which are also concerns which this discussion has been at pains to emphasise, 
namely the importance of affection, memory, institutions, ‘stability’ and some kind 
of distinction between the strictly political dimension of political society and its 
cultural or factical dimension. Thus, although they are offering divergent responses, 
they seem to be observing the same cultural malaise and addressing similar moral 
and political themes.  
However, lest we think them to be agreeing on a fundamental level, we 
should note their most substantial, philosophical difference which emerges in 
Scruton’s insistence that every 
 
political order depends, and ought to depend, upon a non-political idea of membership. 
And to the extent that it emancipates itself from that idea, I claim, to that extent does it 
lose its motivating force, just as individuals lose their moral identity and will, to the 
extent that their prejudices, pieties and moral instincts are cancelled by the abstract 




Habermas’ attempt to purify citizenship from the myth of a pre-political Volksnation 
aims at rendering null and void the motivation which Scruton proclaims as essential 
to collective agency. Thus while Habermas looks hopefully for the possibility of a 
post-national consciousness whose affection is drawn to constitutional principles 
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embodied in supra-national, continental institutions, Scruton is highly sceptical about 
the demise of the nation-state and argues instead that a consciousness of being at 
home in one’s locality is essential to collective agency. In contrast to Habermas’ 
account of constitutional principles becoming enduringly linked with the motivations 
of citizens, Scruton states that ‘[p]olitical institutions exist in order to mediate and 
adjudicate, not in order to mobilize and conscript’
44
 and holds that the heart of 
agency should not be thought accessible to the machinery of government but rather 
flows from the depths of rootedness in land, religion and kinship group.  
Thus his challenge to writers like Habermas who deny the pre-political its 
proper place is that ‘the political sphere cannot stand so serenely above the loyalties 
which feed it.’
45
 His point is that the pre-political is the basic way that shared 
affective connections which foster moral community are established and that the 
political which is called into service to act in judgment in society cannot be 
conceived as standing apart from a particular people as if it were the creator of the 
social organism it governs. For all his laudable attention to memory, institutions and 
affect, Habermas’ account of the uneasy interdependence of facts and norms is, from 
Scruton’s perspective at least, undone by the basic denial of the significance of pre-
political unity. From an explicitly theological perspective, Scruton’s observations 
reflect the Augustinian distinction between political authority and the society which 
gives political authority its rationale.
46
 But this distinction has a crucial 
eschatological dimension which Scruton’s land mysticism does not allow for. The 
pre-political unity of a people is not accessible now as if the political could be simply 
separated from the popular existence. The present life is, in this sense, always 
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political. Scruton knows this but, although sensitive to Christian political thought, he 
does not draw out the possibility of human emancipation from diverse political 
identity into the eschatological freedom of the kingdom of God. The deep structure 
of Augustinian thought which distinguishes the city of God from the city of this 
world keeps alive the distinction of society from political authority by witnessing to a 
post-political era which will dawn at the second advent of Christ. A community’s 
political affections may thus not only reflect their pre-political self-conception but 
also their post-political destiny. Scruton’s criticisms of the self-deceptive serenity of 
the political sphere are well-directed but do not go far enough. 
 
The need for clarity 
 
There is a common and striking omission in both Scruton and Habermas, namely a 
lack of attention to the very nature of ‘affect’, ‘affection’ or ‘emotion’. We have seen 
this already in Scruton’s Burkean vagueness but now we will see it in more detail in 
the discussions surrounding constitutional patriotism. In reflecting on his own 
contribution to the discussion, Markell summarises the problem: 
 
I have treated “affect” very flatly as a whole and have not addressed differences 
among affects, much less the possibility of a plurality of affects towards a single 




Markell attempts to remedy this conceptual omission in a single page of his article 
before turning to an illustrative example in Habermas’ commentary on racist 
violence in Germany, which, though its interest in locality is promising, does not 
achieve detailed conceptualisation. Markell recognises that political theory has not 
                                                 
47
 Markell, P., ‘Making Affect Safe for Democracy?: On “Constitutional Patriotism”’, 54 
 
 237 
considered negative affect in great depth but does not address the nature of affection 
itself.
48
 Jan Muller does better by recognising the importance of moral psychology to 
constitutional patriotism. However, his two page account climaxes with a casual yet 
dogmatic statement that it is ‘a mistake not to recognize that cognition and emotion 
are intimately related – emotions (or at least the ones of concern in political life) are, 
after all, based on beliefs’.
49
 Just how emotions are based on beliefs and why these 
should be particularly political emotions, Muller does not take time to explain nor 
does he show how such analysis would make a difference to the interpretation of 
Habermas.  
Indeed, it seems that almost the entire debate over constitutional patriotism 
has proceeded with an insufficiently examined concept of ‘affect’. Such an oversight 
seems extraordinary when the whole point of the debate has been to overcome the 
difficulties which modern people experience when affective attachment to universal 
principles is called for. It would seem the obvious thing to begin by asking about the 
nature of affect or emotion, the path which this discussion has followed. The 
consequences of this oversight has been summarised neatly though perhaps 
unknowingly by Muller himself: 
 
…almost always discussion of liberal nationalism, constitutional patriotism, and 
similar concepts appear to come down to decisions along the lines of “Well, I take a 
little more emotion,” while someone else might say, “Well, I’ll get by – just by 
reason.” Put less frivolously, it might appear that these debates are undecidable, unless 
we actually have some very complex empirical studies that would somehow yield the 
right moral-psychological “mixture” of reason and emotion in, for instance, 
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Muller naturally recognises that such implausible studies are unlikely to be 
forthcoming and so suggests instead that  
 
one ought to be as clear as possible about which moral-psychological assumptions 
enter arguments about loyalty, attachment and belonging, how plausible they could be 




Agreed. However, although he does not fall into the trap of ‘a little more’ or ‘a little 
less’, Muller frustratingly fails to deliver a lucid, conceptual explanation of his own 
moral-psychological assumptions.  
My suggestion is that the failure of constitutional patriots of whatever kind to 
deliver such an account is a serious problem for their theories. Vague appeals to 
‘motivational anchorage’,
52
 the intimate relation of cognition and emotion,
53
 the 
‘linking up’ of attitudes and principles
54
 and ‘the production of attachment’
55
 
disguise the real lacuna which is an understanding of the nature of affections in the 
lives of ordinary people in their localised lives. Unfortunately for Scruton, his 
formulations of the nature of affection and its place in political society do not yield 
greater clarity. Although there is clear water between his account of organic pre-
political nationality and Habermas’ interrelation of facts and norms, their attention to 
the common ground of affections shares in an unsatisfying opacity. What I hope to 
show is that our theological concept of affection will illumine these matters in a way 
which both shows the true nature of the affective dimension of political existence and 
explains the conceptual difficulties which Scruton and Habermas experience. 
 
                                                 
51
 ibid. 14 
52
 Laborde, C., ‘From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism’, 594 
53
 Muller, J., Constitutional Patriotism, 63 
54
 Habermas, J., Between Facts and Norms, 499 
55
 Markell, P., ‘Making Affect Safe for Democracy?: On “Constitutional Patriotism”’, 54 
 
 239 
Luke-Acts: a study in political disengagement  
 
In order to set out this systematic response, we will attend again to Scripture and, 
specifically, the theme only partially developed in chapter three’s discussion of 
Luke-Acts, namely the affective attitudes of the Roman political authorities. Luke’s 
gospel begins as the birth of the central object of joyful understanding, Jesus, is 
about to occur. But before the birth there is a political interruption: Caesar Augustus 
has issued a decree ‘that all the world should be registered’ (Luke 2:1) and now seeks 
‘to “enrol” the people of God’ in his inventory of the world.
56
 This dull list-making 
sounds a discordant note amidst Israel’s joyful songs on the lips of Mary and 
Zechariah as they celebrate the good rule of YHWH. Moreover, it is ironic that 
Augustus is unwittingly enrolled in the service of YHWH as his bureaucracy brings 
about Joseph and Mary’s journey to Bethlehem, Joseph’s home town. While Caesar 
is far away in Rome attempting to exercise a universal empire, the God of Israel is at 
work by his Holy Spirit in the thick particularity of a maiden’s womb and then in the 
promised locality, the town of David. 
Thus Roman rule is depicted from the outset as distant yet seeking universal 
domination through coercive action in the particularities of Joseph, Mary and all 
Israel’s lives. While the people of God experience the joy of Jesus throughout Luke 
and Acts, the Roman authorities maintain an almost entirely affectively detached 
attitude towards the acts of God occurring in their midst and towards the people of 
God before their courts of law. Their affective distance from the realities they rule 
renders them incapable of effectively understanding and representing the people. 
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Their disengagement is not to be confused with an unwillingness to judge on 
disputed matters of religious doctrine, a reasonable position to which both Gallio and 
Festus adhere (Acts 18:14-15, 25:19). Rather Luke’s narrative highlights their 
indifference to wrongdoing, whether in actual offences or in false accusations, and 
their systemic inability to effect right judgment. Their detachment is thus a refusal to 
be affectively committed to right judgment among the particular people over whom 
they hold political authority. 
Pilate is emblematic of this disengagement in the gospel during the trial of 
Jesus. Like Gallio, he shows no affection or deep understanding of the events he 
presides over. He shows no indignation at the injustice which the Jews demand nor 
any joy in giving them what they want. In terms of the concept of affection 
developed to this point, he fails to participate affectively in value and so fails in 
reflection and deliberation. In the end, he goes against his own decision by simply 
acquiescing to the Jews’ demands and, in so doing, makes a wrong judgment both 
against Jesus and in favour of Barabbas, a man whom Luke pointedly observes was 
imprisoned for insurrection and murder, offences which directly oppose the pax 
Romana which Pilate was charged with maintaining. Pilate’s inability to act 
according to his own mind is the heart of the problem of his agency.
57
 His failure 
between decision and action, in the context of Luke’s other depictions of Roman 
rule, should be ascribed to his affective disengagement. Indignant condemnation of 
Jesus – or, better, condemnation of his accusers – would have been more coherent 
than his failure to participate in the drama.  
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The believers’ prayer (Acts 4:23-31) quotes Psalm 2 as an interpretation of 
the events surrounding Jesus’ trial, especially the friendly complicity of Herod and 
Pilate in the death of Jesus: 
 
Why did the Gentiles rage, 
and the peoples plot in vain? 
The kings of the earth set themselves, 
and the rulers were gathered together, 
against the Lord, and against his Anointed. 
 
As we have seen, Pilate was characterised by anything but ‘snorting rage’ in the trial 
narrative. The main point of the reference to the Psalm must therefore be in the 
cooperation of Roman and Jewish authorities, including Herod, in the execution of 
Jesus. Indeed, this is where Acts 4:27-28 focuses. Pilate emerges not as enraged but 
as detached, a depiction made all the more obvious by the fury and rage of the 
religious authorities and occasionally non-Roman Gentiles in both Luke and Acts. As 
a detached observer, he cannot understand what is happening and so is debilitated in 
his agency, unable to be committed to the course of action on which he had decided. 
Roman affective disengagement is further described in Paul’s trial narrative 
which occupies a position in Acts parallel to Jesus’ trial in the gospel. Paul’s 
experience in Jerusalem is strikingly similar to Jesus’ some years earlier. For the 
Jews begin the uproar against Paul, crying out against him and furiously calling for 
his death (Acts 21:27-36, 22:22-23), while the Roman authorities who subsequently 
deal with him both in Jerusalem and in Caesarea hold their prisoner, Paul, and his 
claims about the kingdom of God, at arm’s length, just as they did with Jesus.  
First, the Roman tribune who rescues Paul from the Jewish mob is presented 
as an efficient and diligent soldier who protects Paul but cannot fathom the situation. 
In response to the Jewish rage at the mention of Gentile mission (22:20ff), the 
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tribune desires to establish the facts of the case (22:24) and prepares an examination 
by flogging. Having become acquainted with Paul’s citizenry, he is then ‘afraid’ of 
what will happen to him if his superiors discover this outrage (22:25-29). This fear of 
consequences is the tribune’s characteristic political affection. It pertains to the 
proper execution of his duty and, after the enquiry into the facts (22:30) descends 
into dangerous confusion, leads to his just action to protect Paul the Roman citizen 
(23:10). The impression left of this tribune is of a soldier who is ultimately unable to 
penetrate the confusing disputes of the Jews concerning their law (23:29) and the 
resurrection (23:6-10).  
A lack of affective engagement and participative understanding by a tribune 
might be passed off as an insignificant part of the story Luke is telling or dismissed 
as an argument from silence. But second, the conduct of Felix and then Festus, 
Agrippa and Bernice confirm that Luke is deliberately using these episodes to depict 
the nature of Roman political authority. When Paul is taken to Caesarea, Felix the 
governor is presented both as knowledgeable about the Way (24:22) and yet as 
unable to enter into either the joy of its participants or the rage of those who oppose 
it. Rather, when Paul speaks directly to Felix and his wife concerning the Way, the 
governor is ‘alarmed’ and ends the conversation abruptly (24:25). He then prolongs 
Paul’s imprisonment not through any obvious uncertainty about the truth or 
significance of Paul’s claims but rather in hope of financial reward and to gain 
favour with the Jews (24:26-27). What is remarkable about Felix is that though, 
unlike the tribune, he knows about the Way and realises its implications, he yet 
reserves himself from affective engagement in it. By leaving Paul in prison for two 
further years without conviction, Felix appears cut off from the affairs of the people 
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he is meant to govern and, though not cruel (24:23), he is clearly uncommitted to 
carrying out his particular responsibilities. 
Upon Felix’s departure as governor, the affective commitments of Festus, 
Agrippa and Bernice are examined by Luke (24:27-26:32). The trial before Festus is 
manifestly unjust in light of Festus’ favouritism to the Jews. This injustice leads to a 
systemic problem which was unanticipated by Festus, namely Paul’s appeal to 
Caesar. Justice could now not be done locally but would have to be done in Rome, 
rendering Festus, Agrippa and Bernice effectively powerless to carry out the 
practices of the law. The inadequacy of the justice of an empire with universal 
aspirations is thus highlighted by Paul’s judgment against its local representatives. 
Luke chooses to draw attention to this by recounting how Festus, who is ‘at a loss’ 
(25:20) concerning the details of the case in which he is effectively a lame duck 
ruler, asks for Agrippa’s help in establishing charges on the basis of which Paul is to 
be sent to Caesar, though his interest is primarily in the form rather than the 
substantive justice of the matter (25:24-27).  
 The climax of this trial narrative is unsurprisingly inconclusive. The universal 
law of appeal to Caesar prevents these local Roman rulers from taking the just course 
of action, namely the release of Paul (26:32). Although, like Pilate, they come to the 
right decision about his innocence, they are, like Pilate, unable to act justly, though 
for different reasons. They are disengaged, ineffective in action and powerless before 
the higher, universal authority of Caesar. The message of Luke is that, despite all 
appearances, Roman authority, bereft of the affective commitment and engagement 
which might enable understanding and local, just judgment, is deeply ineffective. 
There is other supporting evidence of a similar affective disengagement from the 
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particularity of people’s lives on the part of Roman authorities. The proconsul 
Gallio’s callous disregard for the fate of the synagogue ruler who is beaten in front of 
his own tribunal is just one and adds to the picture which Luke is establishing in 
Luke-Acts as a whole (18:12-17) – the remarkable fact that Seneca, the famous Stoic, 
was Gallio’s cousin should not be forgotten.  
This overall depiction of political authority can act as a resource for questions 
of political theory and practice in the twenty-first century. We do not have in mind a 
naïve and unqualified parallel between the Roman Empire and modern institutions of 
national and international political authority. The focus is on how the representatives 
of the Roman Empire were unable to participate wisely in the trials of Jesus and Paul 
precisely because of the universal legal structure and political culture which 
dominated their consciousness, prevented affective engagement and disabled 
effective, right judgment. Although Pilate found Jesus not guilty and although none 
of Festus, Felix, Agrippa and Bernice could find anything against Paul, yet right 
judgment was not effected: the one was executed and the other was unjustly 
imprisoned and then sent to Rome unnecessarily and without intelligible charges. 
The structure of Roman rule, which gained its authority from a source at a great 
physical and cultural distance from the particularities of Palestinian life, rendered its 
own local representatives unable to engage affectively in substantive issues or to 
commit, following reflection and deliberation, to particular judgments. The Roman 
structure of law and representative authority militated against those beginnings of 







What then would characterise representative and legal institutions which do provide 
a suitable environment for affective understanding to play its proper role in political 
life? Our study of constitutional patriotism and Luke-Acts suggests that the 
connection between such institutions and the locality they serve is vitally important. 
Luke-Acts has illumined the significance of the failure of distant authority to 
authorise the enactment of justice when local representatives do not or cannot engage 
in localised affective understanding. In the modern setting, such a difficulty is to 
some extent related to territorial boundaries whether within nation-states – as when 
we say that “the man in Whitehall” does not understand the affairs of Scotland – or 
between nation-states – as when we say that the European Court of Human Rights 
overturns established English customs and legal precedents (we recall, for example, 
the case of the metric martyrs).  
An interchange between Richard Miller and Nigel Biggar shows how 
Christians have taken divergent approaches to the meaning of national, territorial 
boundaries. Miller argues that Christians should construe their lives primarily in 
terms of metaphysical boundaries so that their loves are cosmopolitan and 
indiscriminate rather than constricted by historically changing, political boundaries. 
He argues against Christian natural law accounts which ‘privilege local loyalties and 
loves’ and proposes instead a ‘critical principle, one that scrutinizes local customs 
from the perspective of transcendence.’
58
 Such a position frees Christians to focus 
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love on those who are genuinely poor in any area of the globe rather than only their 
local neighbours who share a territory with them.  
According to Biggar, such an approach appeals to the apparent downgrading 
of natural loves in the gospels and to the Protestant message of indiscriminate grace 
to sinners. The substance of Biggar’s response to Miller and this line of Christian 
thought is a clear restatement of the divinely authorised creatureliness of localised 
loves. He argues that the ‘original dependence of any human individual on an 
historical community’
59
 gives rise to a basic natural law duty of gratitude and love to 
that community which has cared for the individual as he or she has come into the 
world and lived in it. This gratitude is one aspect of a national loyalty which, in the 
modern setting, is necessarily defined by territorial borders. In the terms of chapter 
three, national loyalty is a wondrous awe which takes form in gratitude towards past 
and present political representatives and other public servants who, through 
dispositions on behalf of society, preserve the defence and peace of the realm. Within 
the territory, since doing all of the common good is not possible for any one person, 
each should seek to pursue that part of the common good which is practical for him 
and then trust that God is providentially drawing these contributions together. It 
follows that the most natural people to whom we should do good and to whom we 
owe gratitude are our benefactors from our own people in our own place. However, 
what 
 
…one owes one’s family or nation is not anything or everything, but specifically 
respect for and promotion of their good. Such loyalty, therefore, does not involve 
simply doing or giving whatever is demanded, whether by the state, the electoral 
majority, or even the people as a whole…True patriotism is not uncritical…
60
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Biggar goes on to argue that the purpose of national loyalty or ‘patriotism’ can never 
only be for the good of one’s own nation but rather that local loves are the fertile soil 
in which more wide-ranging loves may grow. His point is 
 
…not that we should grow out of national identity and loyalty and into a 
cosmopolitanism that, floating free of all particular attachments, lacks any real ones, 
but rather that, in and through an ever-deepening care for the good of our own nation, 
we are drawn into caring for the good of foreigners…Notwithstanding the tensions 
that may arise between national loyalty and loyalties that are more extensive, there is 




Ultimately, Biggar bases his carefully qualified support of national loyalties in God’s 
approval of specific national identity in the Jewishness of Jesus and the events of 
Pentecost. On the one hand, Jesus did not seek to transcend particularly Jewish loves 
but rather embodied them perfectly in the incarnation. Jesus and the apostles’ 
teaching did not downgrade localised loves (of family etc.) but rather reoriented them 
according to Scripture and in relation to other more wide-ranging loves. On the other 
hand, the Holy Spirit at Pentecost spoke all the languages of the world to both Jews 
and Gentile proselytes and thereby affirmed the global, diverse particularity in which 
God may be glorified.
62
 Arguing in this way, Biggar hopes to show that Miller’s 
strictly cosmopolitan love is not only theologically unnecessary but also practically 
implausible. 
Biggar’s account provides further conceptual resources for understanding the 
narrative of Luke-Acts and specifically the affective disengagement of rulers. For 
their loyalty was primarily to Caesar and Rome rather than to the local area they 
governed and so they were not affectively oriented to participate effectively as 
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judges in the land. Felix’s indifference was a function of the combination of the 
Roman Empire’s universal ambition to conquer territory and its lack of natural 
loyalty to the territory it governed. Festus’ inability to release Paul, on account of his 
appeal to Caesar, was the result of God’s judgment on Rome’s failure to rule 
righteously in the land of Israel.  
 
Constitutional patriotism reconsidered 
 
It is now possible to reconsider the difficulties which emerged in our analysis of 
constitutional patriotism. Our focus will be on how a clarification of the concepts of 
affect or affection and their relation to locality enables a better formulation of the 
nature and role of patriotism.  
 
Two initial comments 
 
First, we observe that there are two major lines of congruence between Habermas, 
Biggar and the thesis which this discussion has been proposing. The first congruity 
lies in our joint repudiation of a certain form of ethnocentricity. The preceding 
chapters’ contrast between particular orders of value and the true moral order of the 
world combined with their scepticism about the epistemological competency of 
personal or national virtue not only aims at similar targets to Habermas’ concern that 
no particular nation or ethnic group should believe itself to be the supreme arbiter of 
morality, but also fits well with Biggar’s highly qualified support for a national 
loyalty when critically framed within the concern for the common good of all 
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nations. All these approaches share a concern for ensuring that those who form a 
particular, national, moral community exercise critical judgment upon it. 
The second congruity is that affection should be connected with reflection 
and deliberation. Although Biggar only alludes to this by saying that true patriotism 
is not ‘uncritical’, the larger thrust of his essay indicates that it is precisely by 
affection for our own people and place that we come to reflection on the common 
good of all and deliberation concerning what right action should be done towards the 
larger common good. In Habermas, the connection is more explicit since the post-
national consciousness which constitutional patriotism supports only takes 
substantive form in the ongoing deliberative communication of the community. This 
deliberation is not a totally radical form of criticism as the ‘critical constitutional 
patriots’ might suggest. Rather, the more modest question Habermas tries to answer 
is, as Laborde says, ‘what will motivate people to engage in the self-critical, other-
regarding practice of deliberation in a democratic community’.
63
 In the end, this 
discussion will not side with one school of Habermasian thought or another. Whether 
or not the neutralist reading or the critical reading of Habermas is the correct one is 
not the central concern. Instead, it is enough to see that both Habermas and this 
discussion argue that affection or affect is a crucial feature of human moral 
psychology which organises common, political reflection and deliberation. Although 
we will shortly have cause to criticise exactly how the connection is made between 
affection, reflection and deliberation, there is at least some common ground. 
Furthermore, Habermas, through his appeal to memory and history, also believes that 
political affect in the form of constitutional patriotism is sustained through careful 
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attention to the past rather than forgetfulness of it. Constitutional patriotism is only 
continued through critical reflection on – in his case – German and European history. 
This claim, in outline form at least, has some similarity to our account of affection 
and memory in chapters two and three. 
Second, there is a lack of congruence between Habermasian accounts of 
constitutional patriotism and the cognitive-epistemological account of affection 
which has been developed here. Habermas himself is not committed to the sheer 
rationalist individualism of the freezing Kantian heights; rather, his theory of 
communicative action depends on the mutuality of interpersonal relations and a life 
between facts and norms. But neither he nor his interpreters explain what kind of 
thing they believe ‘patriotism’ to be as an affective phenomenon. We look in vain for 
serious definitions of ‘loyalty’, ‘emotion’ or ‘affect’. For Habermas, the question is 
not central because he has bigger political fish to fry, namely the archaic, sacralised, 
conventional patterns of life which are apparently holding us back from post-national 
consciousness. Nonetheless, this does not excuse him from the task of accounting for 
the affective dimension more fully.   
The omission of a systematic account of political attachment is a serious 
problem. For this lacuna throws into question the relationship between, on the one 
hand, the affective attachment to universal principles through the particular legal 
facticity of nation-states and, on the other, the deliberative, potentially post-national, 
democratic consciousness which should accompany such attachment. The great 
difficulty arises with respect to how and whether political affect can achieve what 
Habermas and others expect it to achieve. It is not obvious that affect is competent to 
be attracted to or recognise universal norms even when instantiated in 
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supplementary, particular, traditional, public legal forms. Communitarians have 
criticised just such a connection between emotions and universal norms, arguing that 
 
universal principles are incapable of establishing a fixed political identity…[and that] 
a political identity must come from, and be sustained by, a force already prevalent 





However, even this criticism has failed to show just why affect (or ‘affection’) is 
unable to fulfil the role which Habermas and others have suggested it can and should 
fulfil. For it falls short of showing just why affections will struggle to recognise 
universal principles. 
Civic nationalists do a little better. They hold that the nation-state is the limit 
of human community and that the post-national move is a mistake, that liberal 
democracy within nation-states can be properly fuelled by a limited nationalism, that 
‘universal principles cannot by themselves sustain any particular polity’ and that ‘if 
we want democracy to survive, we need to flesh it out with the strong feelings and 
emotions involved in a national tradition’.
65
 But this claim is not developed in such a 
way as to integrate emotion convincingly into political society nor to show how a 
nation’s own principles can be properly connected to emotion. Instead, there remains 
a conceptual vagueness whereby Lacroix can say that according to ‘civic nationalists, 
human beings are made up of passions as much as reason.’
66
 This vagueness is 
unfortunate because it cedes the appearance of wisdom to hyper-rationalist, highly 
technical political theories which would disregard the affective dimension entirely 
and produce patterns for political society which fail to reflect how life is really lived.  
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 The difficulty here is the consistent lack of clarity about the relationship of 
reason and emotion (‘affection’). The general tenor of debate is that, since reason 
alone cannot organise or explain political societies, we must settle for reason and 
emotion somehow going together to make up a national or post-national 
consciousness which will sustain common action within and between nations. The 
preceding chapters, drawing on the theory of emotions, should by now have shown 
that, although total clarity is not available concerning the nature and role of 
affections, more clarity is available than is often supposed. Diagnosis of the causes of 
this consistent lack of clarity is more complex but needs to be attempted in order to 
discover what may be learnt from this very important scholarly debate and how that 
learning might be serviceable in the practical affairs of political society. 
 
Three critical remarks 
 
To these ends, we return to our account of political affection and consider three 
responses to the difficulties faced by constitutional patriotism. First, while it is right 
to applaud constitutional patriotism’s connection of affect, deliberation and norms in 
general terms, the idea of citizens experiencing allegiance to universal, constitutional 
norms and principles through which they are stabilised and energised as a 
deliberative community both moves dangerously quickly from affect to norm and 
places reflection and deliberation in the wrong position. For instead of reflection and 
deliberation following affection and then leading to the discernment, articulation and 
practical application of norms, it is expected that people will be attracted directly to 
universal norms through the affective dimension of constitutional patriotism, thus 
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opening up the possibility of a deliberative community who already share definite 
norms. In other words, norms which are transcendent and universal are thought to be 
accessible to affect in an immediate way without reflection and deliberation. 
Moreover, although its epistemological and cognitive aptitude is not explored, 
allegiance is assumed to be the necessary and fitting precursor and accompaniment to 
what is obviously a cognitive activity, namely democratic deliberation. 
Habermas’ account comes closest among rival versions of constitutional 
patriotism to avoiding this characterisation. For his highly subtle thesis allows for the 
tension of facts and norms to be held in order that the thick particularity of national 
legal constitutions might be a stepping stone, as it were, to an allegiance to universal 
principles. On Habermas’ thesis, affect is not immediately connected with universals 
but rather is mediated by the facticity of an historical legal constitution and 
democratic culture which sufficiently instantiates those universal norms in a system 
of ‘specific rights [that] stem from the decisions of a historical legislature.’
67
 In other 
words, the redirection of affect takes the route of historical particularity on its way to 
universal norms. By seeking to take facticity seriously in this way, Habermas hopes 
to close the gap and hold the tension between facts and norms in such a way that a 
post-national consciousness can come to birth even within the worn-out and 
declining institution of the nation-state. However, although Habermas believes that 
constitutional patriotism may overcome the “democratic deficit” – the deficit in 
democratic participation and thus of governmental legitimacy – by enabling post-
national principles to be recognised more explicitly in localised institutions, there is 
no indication as to how it might overcome what we might call the “affective-
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epistemological” deficit – the lack of affective understanding of universal principles 
which would draw a person towards reflection, deliberation and action with others 
according to these principles. The gap which exists here is not well disguised by 
phrases already critiqued above such as ‘motivational anchorage’,
68
 ‘coupling’ and 




The mistake which these rather mechanical – even metallic – phrases betray 
is that diverse adherents to constitutional patriotism have taken affections for granted 
rather than explored their role in human morality and political relations. They have 
seen the gap in their thinking – between norms and motivations – and have chosen 
words which express the need to close this gap by the artificial means of links and 
couples and anchors. Thus my critique is not a case of Muller’s description of the 
discussion at large (“I’ll have more emotion please”) but rather explores a conceptual 
absence which interprets the various constitutional patriotisms as unstable and 
unreliable routes to the intersubjectively coordinated political consciousness they 
seek. The instability of constitutional patriotism lies in the fact that political affect is 
not able to connect people to the universal constitutional principles that are to 
provide fundamental stability for deliberation. Moreover, it is not absolutely clear 
whether stability is really found only in the universal constitution or also in particular 
legal facticity without which motivational anchoring would not be possible. Thus 
there are two potentially incommensurable poles to stability, the stretched tension 
which Habermas, with admirable modesty and honesty, was willing to name. 
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This instability arises because of an opposition to what Biggar described as 
creaturely natural affection. The result is an abandonment of common, political, 
practical reason, a loss dubbed the ‘democratic deficit’ but identified by George 
Weigel in a variety of more earthy ways including the unwillingness of Europeans to 
repopulate their territories themselves and their concomitant willingness to destroy 
large numbers of their unborn neighbours.
70
 This would seem to be the true 
democratic deficit of the twenty-first century, the people’s lack of commitment to the 
continuation of their own civilisation and their disempowered unwillingness to 
participate in and sustain their traditions. The opposition to natural affections may be 
analysed through Nigel Biggar’s defence of national loyalties. The cosmopolitan 
rights grounded in universal constitutional principles which are the ultimate objects 
of constitutional patriotism are parallel to Miller’s cosmopolitan loves. Biggar claims 
that these universal loves undermine localised natural loves, which, in our terms, are 
the natural participation of affections in the people, land and objects which are near 
at hand. There is no need to claim that there are no universal laws or norms; indeed, 
the natural law of gratitude which Biggar’s thesis is built upon is just such a law. Nor 
do we claim that Richard Miller believes that all people have rights to his 
indiscriminate love; he knows that no one has a right to grace.  
Rather, the suggestion is that an allegiance to universal principles or an 
indiscriminate love for all people destabilises the creaturely, limited moral agent 
whose practical reasoning should begin with affections leading to moral reflection 
and that such affections should not overreach themselves in attempting participative 
understanding of all people but rather should be focused first (though not 
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exclusively) on those who are near at hand. This creaturely limitation consists in our 
inability to live beyond the generic, teleological, spatial and temporal moral order 
and local reflections of it in traditional orders of value. Such limitation does not stem 
from the curse of Genesis but rather is the given way in which humans are invited to 
live together before their Creator and Redeemer. The implausibility of Miller’s 
proposal lies in the idea that we can love the whole world equally which, on our 
terms, would mean equal affective understanding of the whole world. Affection apart 
from knowledge is not a kind of way in which we are given to love. Its cosmopolitan 
disinterestedness results in not feeling much for anything in particular. In a similar 
way, constitutional patriotism’s ‘allegiance’ is at odds with our account of ‘loyalty’ 
in that it fails to recognise the personal quality of representative institutions. Loyalty 
to a representative person is the creaturely form of political life. That person shows 
us the reasons or norms by which our common life is governed. The incursion of the 
demand for allegiance to universal, political principles, even via the facticity of 
historical traditions and institutions, short-circuits the task of being a creature within 
traditional, political orders of value and the moral order and thus opposes the 
necessary and natural, participative attraction of affections towards representatives, 
neighbours and the common goods of our locality and so undermines the stability 
which locality brings.
71
 Christ’s resurrection vindicated the localised life of natural 
affections within the moral order, thereby reaffirming its mode of stability. It did not 
do so uncritically as we shall see but it did at least achieve this. 
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Second, the account of Roman authority in Luke-Acts shows that, from very 
early on, the church understood that the gospel of joy through the representative 
ministry of Jesus Christ would be impenetrable to a far away political authority 
which claimed universal jurisdiction over lands and peoples it did not adequately 
represent and thus from whom it would not receive that affective recognition which 
draws people into reflective, deliberative action. The thick particularity of the 
incarnation, whereby God dwelt not in every nation but in one nation and tradition 
alone, set the pattern for the activity of representative authority which was developed 
in chapter three. Although there can be no unqualified parallel between the Roman 
Empire of the first century and Habermas’ proposed continental political authorities, 
it is not inappropriate to sound some notes of caution not least because of the 
amorality of some of Habermas’ own proposals which we considered above. 
Habermas’ account of the interdependence of facts and norms seeks to address ‘the 
incapacity of practical reasons alone to motivate moral action, a gap that only a 
system of legal sanctions can fill.’
72
 Neither customary practices, nor mere 
knowledge of what is right nor conscience can motivate moral action according to 
Habermas and so what is required is the supplement of legal sanctions which offer 
incentives and threaten punishments.73 Markell reckons that this self-interested, 
consequentialist rationale for obedience to law amounts to ‘wholly amoral motives’ 
for moral action. Habermas must agree with Markell’s assessment since his universal 
moral principles are intended to be the true motivation for action while legal facticity 
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is a necessary but compromised addition which only ‘supplements post-conventional 
morality in a manner effective for action.’
74
 Thus, until the post-national, post-
conventional consciousness has become widespread, amoral self-interest is an 
essential part of Habermas’ recommendation for moral action.
75
  
The strained difficulties which characterise Habermas’ amoral way of holding 
the tension between facts and norms may be helpfully contrasted with the design of 
ancient Israel’s life wherein laws concerning, for example, the just treatment of the 
poor, were read to the people during the festival of the Booths in the sabbatical year 
(Deuteronomy 16:13-17, 31:9-13). Affections are first focused on the fruits of the 
land shared by the community of the people before being drawn to the Torah which 
sets the normative and narrative context for their reflection and deliberation about 
what should be done for the common good. The difference between these Israelite 
affections and the affect of constitutional patriotism is threefold: first, there is no 
attempt to abstract the norms of the law from the particular narrative of a people’s 
life; second, affection’s aptitude for enabling reflection and deliberation is focused in 
joyful recognition of the fruits of the land, in the context of the memory-laden Feast 
of booths, rather than on the norms of the law as such; third, the consequences for 
obedience and disobedience in the form of blessings and curses are essentially 
integrated into the law covenant as a whole rather than framed as a compromised 




 Such a position seems to open the door, however unintentionally, to the worst parts of Hobbes’ 
account of representation and citizenship wherein the validity of juridical sanctions is interpreted 
wholly through the self-interest of the citizen who is under judgment. Hobbes distinguishes between 
the responsibility to obey the laws of nature (and a fortiori, the dependent laws of human society) in 
foro interno and the trumping of that responsibility by the right of self-preservation in foro externo 




supplement which motivates obedience through calculating self-interest.
76
 In this 
way, divine law (as a form of positive law for a particular community) is woven into 
the narrative, moral psychology and territory of a people. There is no tension 
between facts and norms – the valleys and the heights – since there is only the land, 
the law which is organically fitted to the land and its people and the Lord who is 
present with them. The tension lies instead between the Torah and the stubbornness 
of the people who refuse to accept its wisdom. 
Such a contrast invites a challenge as to how the ritual practices of an ancient 
near-eastern people might have any bearing on the exercise of political authority in 
the twenty-first century world of globalised markets, radical pluralism and mass 
communication. Roger Scruton’s account of the relation of English law to the 
English land provides resources towards answering these challenges and dovetails 
with Biggar’s approval of localised affectivity. The account turns on the peculiar 
concept of trust in English law whereby property such as land is held in trust by a 
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trustee on behalf of the deceased’s children. It is a form of ownership that ‘consists 
entirely of duties, with no personal rights.’
77
 The principle of equity protects the 
inheritors of the trust from injustice in a way that the law itself cannot. As a result of 
this law, the 
 
idea of ownership as a duty seeped into the national consciousness, and provided a 
model for the relation between the English and their country. Throughout the 





According to Scruton, English patriotism was interpreted as holding land in trust on 
behalf of the dead and those who are yet to be born. It was in the particularity of 
family inheritance of land and property that an affectivity was fostered which 
provided the ‘consciousness’ for the participation of a nation as a whole in its 
inheritance in such a way that reflection and deliberation on right action was 
energised. Trust is thus constituted by patriotic affection in that shared affection for 
the land is the common understanding whereby those past, present and future share 
that land. This concept of affective trust will be of great significance for chapter five. 
The central conceptual feature of Scrutonian patriotism which sets it apart 
from constitutional patriotism is that it begins with affective attachment to that which 
is near-at-hand in our homes, heritage and hopes rather than far away on the level of 
universal principles. Such patriotism involves an imaginative recognition of unity (if 
not harmony) between past, present and future participants in the land. It is a form of 
understanding which welcomes in grateful joy the inheritance which has been 
bequeathed and then proceeds to engage in moral reasoning after that initial affective 
recognition. Thus in Scrutonian patriotism, ‘stability’ is found in home, land, law and 
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tradition – the valleys we know and love – rather than in a constant, impractical 
movement between valleys and heights. Such an account shows the politically 
beneficial possibilities of the kind of ethnocentricity which constitutional patriotism 
critiques. It shows how the deepest energies of communal agency are drawn out not 
by that which is far away but by that which is near at hand, that which we can see, 
hear and hold. In such patriotism we see the element of truth in Scheler’s elision of 
perception and affection – that we recognise value partly as it resides within the 
visible, audible and tangible forms that our locality takes. 
 If we turn again to the passage from ancient Israel to the twenty-first century, 
we see that Scruton’s interpretation of trust in English law has strong parallels to 
Israelite practice and shows one form of response to the rise of globalisation. For the 
movement towards judgment in both Israelite and English law is energised and 
directed through affective participation in the land as explained by its past, present 
and future. England is not, on any reasonable view, a covenanted people in the same 
way as Israel was God’s chosen, covenanted people – no prophets have foretold a 
Messiah to be born in Windsor nor yet one arising from Middlesbrough in Yorkshire, 
the way to the sea, along the Tees. “Can anything good come from there?”, ask the 
people of Sunderland and Westminster alike. (No doubt good can come from 
Middlesbrough – but not an Anointed King!) The point instead is that natural 
affections, which Biggar argued for over against Miller, are present in both ancient 
Israelite and contemporary English settings. This should not surprise us for, whether 
God is acting in general or special grace, he always deals with people in the thick 
particularity of their lives and within the created, vindicated moral order. Thus the 
goodness of this aspect of English law is good precisely because it reflects God’s 
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design for the life of peoples – embodied in Israel and fulfilled in Jesus – namely that 
their laws are not formulated apart from the particularity of their lives but rather are 
judgments concerning their lives within their localities, town and cities, judgments 
which emerge from within the logic of inheritance and tradition and through 
intersubjective affective epistemology.  
However, matters cannot be left to rest there for, as Biggar says, true 
patriotism has a critical dimension which is conscious of the susceptibility of human 
creatures to idolise their own nation’s tradition, customary morality and virtues. 
Scrutonian patriotism tends towards a peculiar eschatology, construing many as one, 
differentiating and associating a community’s dead, living and the yet unborn almost 
entirely or entirely within the thick matrix of their particular tradition. In stark 
contrast to a Habermasian eschatology, which envisages the human future as post-
national, Scruton’s patriotism depends on an account of humans whereby their 
destiny is substantially or entirely explicable within the terms of their locality and 
tradition. Though, contra Nussbaum, the transcendent has a place, it is very closely 
aligned with the tradition it transcends. Commenting on the development of England, 
Scruton claims that ‘the Church became identified with the national mind – a web of 
knowledge, culture and social aspiration, laid like a net over the countryside, 
trapping and uniting the forms of local life.’
79
 ‘Like patriotism, of which it was a 
part, the English religion had been placed beyond question.’
80
 In the extreme case, to 
which Scruton sometimes tends, the particular order of value, self-vindicated by age, 
virtue or strength, and the created, vindicated moral order are brought so close 
together as to be largely indistinguishable: Christian religion is gently subsumed into 
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patriotic affection. Such self-vindication is mocked by the ravages of time and 
comprehensively denied not only by the radical challenge of the Kingdom of God 
before whom earthly rulers must cast their crowns but also by chapter two’s critique 
of epistemological dependence on communal virtue.  
True patriotism, an affective attentiveness to tradition and inheritance may 
construe past, present and future participants in the land as a differentiated unity but 
will always be critically alert both to the significance of human life which surpasses 
nationality and to the possibility that what is actually good may be quite different 
from what particular national virtues and tradition define as good. Moral reasoning is 
always moral learning and a critical patriotism will always be attuned to learn 
something new and surprising rather than settle for myths of national virtue which 
offer no helpful resources for practical reasoning about right action in the present. 
Ironically, constitutional patriotism, despite its attempt to combine facticity and 
normativity, has so diminished the value of locality while failing to show how its 
own procedures of liberal democracy could sustain the detailed criticism which is 
required to prevent the dark side of nationalism from emerging that it cannot 
effectively engage with the thick particularity of local justice, thereby failing to 
represent adequately popular anger and joy and so fuelling the worst forms of 
nationalism, the very reverse of what it intended to achieve.
81
  
 As a result of this examination of Habermas through Deuteronomy and 
Scruton, it is possible to say that positive law which is not primarily rooted in the 
locality which it governs will run the risk of opposing the affections of the people of 
that place. The English law of the English land has become effective partly through 
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the affective recognitions of a people over time. Such an approach removes the 
possibility of the kind of ‘gap’ between facts and norms which led Habermas to pin 
his hopes for obedience to positive law solely upon prudential calculation of 
consequences. For instead of facticity as a whole being a Habermasian supplement to 
universal law, affections within locality are Burkean ‘supplements’ which support 
and make intelligible the affectively rich common law of the land.
82
  
Our approach might be thought of as communitarian inasmuch as it seems to 
hold that ‘political identity’ arises through   
 
a force already prevalent within men’s hearts [and] by the internalisation of a national 
tradition and of a common substantial culture.
83 
 
However, that would be to underplay the important theological dimension to this 
account. For, ultimately it is not a political identity that is at stake here. The point of 
constitutional patriotism was to provide political principles that could criticise pre-
political ethnocentricities in order to develop post-national political identity. 
However, the purpose of our thesis is to provide theo-political principles that can 
criticise political idolatries in order to discover, protect and enable a provisional 
political identity and an ultimate eschatological identity. Such a proposal would 
resource a truly critical patriotism which can hold a nation together internally in such 
a way as to bring benefit to other nations even those which are far away.  
Third, our concept of affection can effectively address not only the thesis of 
constitutional patriotism but also the changed global situation which constitutional 
patriotism was designed to address. Habermas’ claim is that the emergence of ‘new 
forms of organization for continental “regimes”’ will mean the gradual 
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disappearance of the old nation-state model, along with its ‘inefficient’ mustering 
point, the United Nations, which cannot provide the requisite deliberative framework 
to face the challenges of the 
 
globalization of commerce and communication, of economic production and finance, 





In other words, the challenge which Habermas poses is whether nation-states can be 
moral communities in the global age or whether they must now be superseded. Since 
the new moment presents problems which transcend territorial borders in a way 
never before imagined, and since critical distance on conventional morality and 
ethnic consciousness through post-conventional morality and post-national 
consciousness is the route to the ‘rationalization of collective identities’, it seems to 
Habermas that the political supersession of nation-states by larger political units is 
now not only necessary but positively desirable. At this point, it is right to ask some 
practical questions concerning the plausibility of Habermas’ proposal. They stem 
from a concern for the normal, everyday life of the peoples of the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Poland, France and the other nation-states within the European Union.
85
 
The questions can be focussed through the account of creatureliness given by 
Nigel Biggar and through the account of moral community given by Oliver 
O’Donovan. These two Regius Professors of Moral and Pastoral Theology at the 
                                                 
84
 Habermas, J., ‘The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship’, 
105-107 
85
 A focus on the European Union is not meant to suggest that practical difficulties will not arise 
elsewhere if the realisation of a post-national consciousness were seriously pursued – one has only to 
ponder its application in the so-called African Union or the radical conventional morality and 
consciousness which persists in the United States of America – but rather because it is in the crucible 
of recent European history that this conception has developed. But see also Nussbaum, M., For Love 




University of Oxford, one present and one past, diverge to some extent in the style 
and tenor of their scholarship, but seem to converge on substantial matters, not least 
on the significance of popular moral unity. O’Donovan argues that to ‘see ourselves 
as a people is a work of moral imagination’ which interprets the reality of the 
practical engagements of ordinary life. These practical engagements are defined as 
‘the reality of what we are given to be and do together.’
86
 Note the passive voice here 
for it coheres well with Biggar’s emphasis on the creaturely givenness of our 
obligations to our family and our community which call forth our gratitude. Such 
formulations reflect a rich doctrine of God’s sovereign Providence and suggest that 
we are not thrown into the world but rather placed and sustained.  
From here, the eschatological, Augustinian distinction between an Eden 
without human politics, the present where political authority serves society and the 
Kingdom of God enables the insight that the givenness of social life is not made by 
political authority but discovered by it.
87
 But a contractarian vision precisely reverses 
this order by giving political authority the task of identity conferral and rendering all 
social communications as aspects of a single political vocation. The crucial oversight 
which this led to, according to O’Donovan, is  
 
a false suspicion of the ordinary, a doubt of human nature as known in the simple 
communication of food, wisdom, and affection. It could not see that a common good 
could be composed of such humble engagements, and thought the only worthwhile 





Such an analysis, which accords with Biggar’s affirmation of creaturely 
localised loyalties and scepticism of Miller’s impractical and too-demanding call to 
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indiscriminate loves, invites further exploration. Human epistemology rooted in the 
‘communication of…affection’ is one way of framing the intersubjective concept of 
affection which has been explored in this thesis. The move which has not been fully 
made by O’Donovan to this point is to explore the inner workings of such 
communication in political relations. However, now that they have been explored 
here, it is possible to see how O’Donovan’s thesis bears on the account of post-
national consciousness which Habermas has recommended. For O’Donovan’s 
proposal is that collective agency will only be practically conceivable and possible if 
it is imaginable by the people who are the agents. For to 
 
see ourselves as a people is to grasp imaginatively a common good that unifies our 
overlapping and interlocking practical communications, and so to see ourselves as a 




As we have already seen, an affective epistemology gives some definition to 
what might qualify as the ‘largest’ such agency. On the one hand, the ‘supplement’ 
of facticity was included by Habermas not in order to enable people to be enriched in 
their affective understanding of their own locality but rather that their consciousness, 
routed through such facticity, might evolve into a post-national democratic 
consciousness that could give allegiance to universal constitutional principles and 
legitimate post-national, continental, political institutions. However, on the other 
hand, if affections are cognitive, basic to human epistemology, modest in their 
epistemological aptitude and, by natural justice confirmed through special revelation, 
primarily attracted to that which is near at hand, localised and particular, then we 
should be cautious to assert that the energies which make collective agency both 
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conceivable and possible either ought to or could energise a collective agency which 
is post-national.  
The impracticality of post-nationality would thus be partially attributable to 
its inability to sustain an affective epistemology which can initiate a people’s unity in 
representative collective agency. In the absence of such an affective epistemology we 
would expect to find not only that which characterised the Roman rulers of Acts, 
namely a disengagement from doing justice in particular situations but also that 
which currently characterises many inhabitants of Western Europe today, a 
disaffection from European political authorities, the epistemological-affective deficit 
we mentioned earlier. As O’Donovan says, the 
 
danger of dreaming up abstract schemes of political union on paper – a danger never 
far from the European Union – is that they do not accord with the way the member-




Political representatives who operate at the level of the European Union struggle to 
draw affective attachment from those they represent. However well-intended their 
activities, they are inevitably distanced from their constituency. Lacking localised 
affections to supplement, correct and aid laws, the representatives are driven to make 
more laws in order to effect the changes they desire. If there is such a misalignment 
between political authority and social communications, what remains is that which 
Luke exposed in the books of Acts, namely a massive but ineffective juridical 
structure which is not adequate to hear and attend to the pleas for justice concerning 
the affairs over which it legislates. On this pattern of political judgment, local 
jurisdiction is subordinated to a centralised final court of appeal, whether in Rome or 
Brussels.  
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Again, it must be emphasised that this is not an attempt at an unqualified 
equation of the obscene brutality of the Roman Empire with the European Union’s 
much more civilised attempts to bring effective and peaceful government to Europe, 
following two world wars and, specifically, the Holocaust. The analogy is on a 
conceptual level and pertains precisely to the inadequate or poorly conceived 
attention to the springs of human collective agency which are inescapably affective. 
For in the European Union today we do not see deep affective understanding 
between representatives and represented. Territorial affiliations and affinities which 
form people’s sense of being at home in their lands are thought to be out-dated or, 
worse, dangerously ethnocentric, by influential political theorists such as Habermas. 
However, as the preceding discussion has indicated, it is the limitations on our 
loyalties which are given with our creatureliness and supported by national 
boundaries that make possible our freedom affectively to understand one another and 
to participate by those same affections in the reflective, deliberative, practical 
communications which we share and enact together for the common good. 
Representation, which makes possible the flourishing life of political societies, is the 
major casualty of undermining such affective understanding. The ill-health of 
representation today puts in jeopardy not only the collective agency of peoples but 
also their willingness to defend the communications in which their common life 
consists, and on which the European Union itself depends. A renewal of localised 
representation and law combined with a more respectful attitude towards that 
renewal from continental authorities would seem to be the more practically plausible 
response to the undoubtedly challenging times of global communications which lie 
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ahead rather than the development of psychologically incoherent, practically 




We have now considered threats to our political life which arise through poorly 
conceptualised views of human affection. It is hoped that, in light of such 
observations, institutions such as the medical guild discussed earlier may be better 
understood and protected by political authority. Our rather bleak assessment of the 
problems facing such institutions should be weighed against the more hopeful 
perspective that people’s affective participations in their land, culture, tradition and 
institutions are more enduring than some have supposed and less amenable to 
redirection towards far-away authorities and abstract principles than some political 
theorists have imagined. Thankfully, it has not proved easy to persuade people to 
give up some known-and-loved ways of entering into their practical communications. 
Memory, though sometimes a false friend, yet has power to sustain affective 
understanding.  
There remain some final questions. Habermas, with admirable honesty, raises 
the ‘troubling’ question of ‘whether democratic opinion- and will-formation could 
ever achieve a binding force that extends beyond the level of the nation-state.’
91
 He 
fears lest the hold of ethnocentricity is too strong and will in the end defeat the 
European project. Such a confession forms the last sentence of his essay and leaves 
behind a pregnant ambiguity: whether failure in this regard would be due to the 
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incorrigibility of a putative European public or the impracticability of the post-
national project itself. We have suggested that both may be the case. People do 
idolise their nations but living peacefully and harmoniously without an ‘us’ 
differentiated from a ‘them’ seems morally unthinkable. We sympathise with 
Habermas’ reasonable affections and hear his troubled cries. Our common concern, 
despite our differing views, is for the peaceful life of nations. But the chief question 
of this thesis now is not how to achieve allegiance to universal norms but rather how 
to renew affective wisdom in diverse localities in order that the common good might 
be pursued. So we must now enquire as to what source for renewal of affective 
understanding might bring much-needed (half-)light to darkened minds and 




Chapter 5: Christian political affections 
 
According to Scruton, the ‘phantom’ political existence of the heights ‘poisons our 
attachment to the realities through which we might, in our fallen condition, live and 
find fulfilment.’
1
 His elegy is no antidote but instead summons us to discover one. 
But where should humans look to find healing and renewal for their political 
affections and how might such change be effected in a genuinely intersubjective and 
localised way? We shall seek answers to these questions through consideration of the 
Holy Spirit’s work in and through the body of Christ as it is expressed in diverse 
local churches. In the course of so doing we shall seek to show how the concept of 
affection weaves together the thought of leading contributors to Christian theology in 
the churches local to the United Kingdom such as Bernd Wannenwetsch, Brian 
Brock, Oliver O’Donovan, David Ford and the late Dan Hardy. 
 
Transmission and transposition 
 
Bernd Wannenwetsch laments that in modern society, ‘everything has its place – 
except for political worship’. On his view, worship of God is political in the primary 
sense that it is the worship of God who ‘ruleth on high’ by a local congregation who 
are themselves a ‘public.’
2
 Worship by such a public is the context in which 
Christian ethics, including the political ethics of churches, may be formed. Moreover, 
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worship is not only formative for churches but rather the ‘complex and pluriform 
political life [of churches then] spills over, so to speak, into the secular polis.’
3
  
Unfortunately modern society largely fails to accommodate political worship 
and so has allowed politics itself to become an idolatrous object of worship. This 
happens when ‘the two secular states [oikonomia and politia] detach themselves from 
their relationship to worship’ and ‘assume a cultic character’.
4
  A politics which is 
not conscious of and receptive to the significance of Christian worship has deeply 
idolatrous tendencies. As we have seen, the risk of idolatry permeates much modern 
political discourse, whether in an extreme form of national patriotism or in the post-
nationalism of constitutional patriotism. 
 There is a need, therefore, for a political conception which is less likely to 
encourage such idolatry and yet might attract support beyond those who are 
favourable to ‘political worship’ because of personal religious conviction. A 
suggestion of where this might be found emerges, perhaps surprisingly, in Jürgen 
Habermas’ thought. Wannenwetsch explains how Habermas recognises 
 
the role of religion’s character as a public of its own…neither seeing it as an undefined 





On Habermas’ view, religion, like literature and art, is a place where political 
problems are first experienced in the form of social trauma. That glimpsed 
experience may then be transmitted to the political public in a way which supports 
political discourse.
6
 In our terms, the affective beginnings of understanding which 
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reside in intersubjective experiences of trauma (and celebration!) reside first and 
foremost in publics which are essentially unrelated to coercive politics. Although not 
distinguishing it essentially from artistic activities such as painting, Habermas 
recognises that the ‘transmitter’ contribution of a distinctively religious public, such 
as a church, to political society lies in its identity as a formed rather than 
manufactured public. The distinction between these two kinds of public lies in 
whether the public is given identity or has to create it for itself. The body of Christ’s 
self-conception is that it does not have to pursue its own identity but rather is given 
identity by ‘the founder Spirit’.
7
 As such it is a public but unlike the manufactured 
publics of political parties and interest groups. It stands apart from such publics as a 
‘transmitter’ of the communications in which political society consists, able both ‘to 
stabilize and extend civil society and public, and to assure themselves of their own 
identity and ability to act.’
8
 In the terms of this discussion, churches’ renewal of their 
own common life is logically prior to the stabilising, enriching service they can 
perform in society. Churches’ communication of affective understanding within their 
own communities is the necessary precondition for the transmission or sharing of 
affective wisdom in order to assist wider political society’s communications in the 
goods they share in common. 
 Wannenwetsch rightly sees that the exclusion of the act of worship has 
materially damaged the vital processes of arriving at consensus in political society at 
large.
9
 Referring to the biblical image of the diversity of languages following the 
hubris of Babel, he observes that ‘the need for communicative endeavour and 
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consensual processes can be perceived in a positive sense as humanity’s Babylonian 
inheritance.’
10
 These processes – however necessary in a world of plural moral 
languages and outlooks – are radically threatened by the ever-present hermeneutic of 
suspicion which has undermined ‘basic trust’ which is  
 
the political basis for which there is no substitute, either through a constitutional 
guarantee of participatory rights, or through the procedural provision of ideal 





Wannenwetsch is especially concerned about trust in words but sees that such trust 
‘must be based on experiences in everyday life’, a phrase which we interpret as the 
ordinary, affective experiences which we investigated and celebrated in chapter four. 
With respect to Habermas at least, our findings from the discussion of constitutional 
patriotism cohere with Wannenwetsch’s assessment. 
Wannenwetsch alludes to the passionate quality of social trust inasmuch as 
trust exposes itself to an experience of suffering. In its openness, it is ‘neither 
knowledge nor ignorance, neither certainty nor naivety.’
12
 Our earlier discussion of 
trust in English land law suggests an appropriate next step: namely to claim that 
affections are themselves constitutive of social trust in the form of enduring, shared, 
participative understandings which open up discussion rather than closing it down. 
Social trust arises precisely in the shared affective understandings which characterise 
any institution where people (for example) sorrow, rejoice or fear together 
concerning the common objects which concern their common good. Memory held in 
the tradition of the institution maintains these affections in bonds of trust, providing 
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an agreed stable place from which a community may proceed into common reflection 
and deliberation. Without bonds of trust, there is neither an intersubjective nor a 
stable starting point for political life but only the hermeneutics of suspicion. The 
shared enduring affections which constitute trust provide a preliminary consensus 
concerning how to begin to understand the world. 
With this affective interpretation of trust in mind, we consider the claim that 
 
the irreplaceable political service which the Church can offer to the ‘body politic’ (in 
the literal sense) is to show how in a political organism joint ways of arriving at 




Wannenwetsch defines joint convictions in terms of the ‘homology’ or ‘consensus’ 
which may occur in and through political worship. The church has the ‘task of 
arriving at consensus as a gift.’
14
 The way to such an ordered and graciously given 
institutional life is ‘the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus’ (Rom. 8:2) which 
governs the practices of the institution. He describes how 
 
the Spirit that lends assurance gives the openness which is required for a really free 
discourse. Its ecstatic mode of efficacy breaks down hard and fast positions, and 
permits new unwonted experiences. Of course this openness has its necessary frontiers 




This openness makes consensus possible and its basis is the assurance that the Spirit 
brings. Objectively, that assurance rests on the justifying actions and words of God.
16
 
Assurance is experienced subjectively in memory and received by faith as the Spirit 
brings back in the present what God has said and done in the past thereby offering an 
                                                 
13
 ibid. 299 
14
 ibid. 26 
15
 ibid. 301-2 
16
 Cf. Brock, B., Singing the Ethos of God, 138: ‘the foundation for any true human knowledge is 
God’s decision to look away from our sins in forgiveness and instead to see us as we were created to 
be.’ Cf. 186ff. 
 
 277 
opportunity for a fresh renewal of faith. This source of stability is precisely what is 
necessary for openness to the future as opposed to knowing ‘in advance’ the nature 
of the good life. The Spirit brings that openness, breaking down inapposite ideas of 
what is good and right.  
Wannenwetsch’s account of political worship is by no means an abstraction. 
Rather the ‘whole Church is represented in its Catholic completeness’ in every act of 
worship by any two or three gathered together.
17
 The localisation of political worship 
is thus essential to churches’ task of transmission. Our account of affection enables 
further clarification of Wannenwetsch’s position. For we have said (a) that affections 
are constitutionally open to discovery of the newness that can yield intersubjective 
consensus (b) that intersubjective affectivity which the Spirit achieves in the church 
is often initially accomplished precisely through moments of breakthrough such as 
Barnabas’ joy at the faith of the Gentiles (c) that trust is built during the process 
whereby differing affections are discussed and verified and that (d) affections are 
most basically attracted and stabilised within localities. Here then is the way that 
churches offer ‘a basic clue to political life’
18
 concerning joint agreements and 
action. Trust is formed, quite specifically, through intersubjective affectivity as 
affections are experienced, shared, discussed and verified in a local context.
19
 
Christian affections, learnt from the Spirit in churches, contribute to social trust as 
salt preserving trust from suspicion and as light illumining the epistemological path 
which trust may take.  
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Performing this service is not straightforward because it is hardly the case 
that people come to consensus quickly and easily either in the church or in the world 
at large. Nonetheless the church has resources to meet the ‘trust deficit’ which are 
unavailable to the world but which enable a provisional and partial reestablishment 
of trust within the world. For inasmuch as a church has established both common 
objects concerning which affective understanding is attracted and patterns of worship 
wherein those affections may become intersubjective, it may build and share trust 
within itself and throughout its neighbourhood. In Wannenwetsch’s terms, the church 
consists of ‘real people, who live and act in both contexts as those who are equipped 
with experiences of consensus.’
20
  
Local churches’ service of trust-transmission, now redefined in terms of 
intersubjective affection-transmission, may be understood through the deeply 
Lutheran concept which Wannenwetsch describes as ‘transposition’. This move turns 
the tables on Habermas by denying the equivalence of religion to art or literature and 
by repositioning religion, especially the Christian religion, as the source of wisdom 
about political life rather than an ‘early-warning’ system for political problems. 
Transposition centres human life in the work of the Holy Spirit through the body of 
Christ. In transposition, a Christian ‘lives in Christ through faith, in his neighbour 
through love.’
21
 All the good which Christ has is transposed to the Christian by the 
Holy Spirit. Since an abundance has now been given to the Christian in her salvation 
through marriage to Christ, the Christian’s life is a surplus which can be given to 
serve her neighbour. In contrast to political philosophies which have an inner logic of 
scarcity and deficiency, transposition works from God’s abundance to the 
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neighbour’s necessity. In this way, the transposition to the neighbour neither 
overwhelms the genuine otherness of the neighbour nor is detached from him 
because governed solely by procedural rules, the dangers common to discourse ethics 
and Rawlsian contractarianism. For the focus is precisely on the neighbour’s need 
when construed in the context of God’s abundance.
22
  
Wannenwetsch does not fully develop the affective form of the transposition 
though hints at it by referring to the Samaritan’s ‘passion for the neighbour’ and 
Jesus’ ‘chief emotion’, compassion.
23
 His main emphasis is that action towards the 
neighbour will involve emotions consonant with the abundance or ‘fullness of 
God’.
24
 He writes that  
 
Because this transposition into the other is not a matter of a special skill, but is a 
phenomenon springing from abundance, Paul can also speak quite unreservedly about 
an emotional indwelling in the other: ‘If one member suffers, all suffer together with 




This participation in the other by emotion is not an easy thing since ‘in the emotional 




We may adapt Wannenwetsch’s account by first observing that transposition 
does not necessarily involve a neighbour’s need. As 1 Corinthians 12:26 says, there 
is a transposition which involves honouring and rejoicing, affections not attracted by 
need. Thus we may say that an affective transposition into the neighbour’s condition, 
whether one of need or plenty, is the beginning of understanding concerning what 
would constitute right action towards the neighbour. Transposition is thus an 
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attracted recognition of the condition of a feature of the moral order, construed 
through a particular church’s order of value. Second, we observe that, although 
politics is often about addressing need or righting wrong and so ‘need’ is what 
affective transposition will often recognise, need is not the basic category of the 
world. Instead, there is a deep ‘logic of overflow’ within the world, a claim 
consonant with Wannenwetsch’s account of abundance. Ford and Hardy claim that 
the ‘resurrection of the crucified Jesus Christ is this logic at the heart of 
Christianity.’
27
 Following the intense concentration of death upon Jesus at the cross, 
the abundance of life has been made available through his resurrection. This is now 
the ‘basic reality’ of all existence.
28
 Thus a Christian account of need does not revert 
to Nussbaum’s overly negative account in which emotion was always directed 
towards the out-of-control which is eudaimonistically needed by the self. The initial 
understanding which constitutes Christian compassion or sorrow is not eudaimonistic 
but rather framed within the larger canvas of the abundant moral order vindicated by 
Christ. 
This ‘logic of overflow’ is the key to seeing how Christian political affections 
can serve the public good and assist the establishment of public trust.
29
 For Christian 
affection construes the neighbour’s condition in terms of the abundance of creation 
vindicated by Christ. This is a further expression of the eschatological pattern of 
association and differentiation which we explored in Edwards. Affection recognises 
that pattern by engaging in the neighbour’s need or plenty to understand it in terms of 
the abundant life given in Christ. Affections which understand the world in terms of 
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abundance can offer strong epistemological support towards the maintenance and 
correction of social trust. For while Rawls made mistrust basic to life through his veil 
of ignorance and while Habermas’ account led to detachment from the localised 
sources of trust, affective understanding of the world in terms of the abundance of 
Christ’s resurrection undercuts the reason for mistrust. Instead, these affective 
attachments form the trust which benefits churches and their neighbourhoods. 
 
Faith in God as the wellspring of joyful praise  
 
What then is the source and form of Christian political affections such that they both 
bring renewal within local churches and generate social trust which can serve the 
institutions of society? To answer this, we enquire again into the nature of ultimate 
stability for creaturely affections. Addressing God, Augustine recalled how ‘you 
remain immutable above all things, and yet deigned to dwell in my memory since the 
time I learnt about you.’
30
 While he was yet ‘unlovely’,
31
 God loved him and made 
his home in Augustine’s ‘storehouses’. God’s gracious initiative provided an ultimate 
but strange stability for his memory, experienced as shattered deafness, panting, 
hungering and thirsting. The sweetness of God’s love both brought him a provisional 
rest and peace and set him on fire for eternal rest and eternal peace.
32
  
The subjective, creaturely grasp, whereby God’s gracious, stabilising, 
initiative is welcomed, is what Christian orthodoxy has called faith. Such faith is an 
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awakened clinging to the God who has already taken the initiative to know us and 
dwell with us. Ford and Hardy comment helpfully that the 
 
first cognitive content of faith is the knowledge that we are known and that this 





God’s passionate knowledge of us is primarily located in the ‘crucifixion and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ…the wisdom of God in its greatest concentration.’
34
 God 
has wisely and mercifully taken the initiative by participating in our creaturely life in 
order to save us. The inner, gracious logic of this initiative indicates that it can only 
be known by God’s gift of faith. To know that we are already intimately known-and-
loved by God suggests that our knowledge of his knowing-and-loving comes from 
God in the form of an awakening to himself. By faith we awaken to recognise the 
passionate, participatory knowledge which God already has of us through his Son.  
Such an awakening to God in faith involves at least some articulable 
knowledge of who God is and what He has done. For example, we come to know by 
faith that He is One God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and that He is our Maker and 
Redeemer. Such knowing we call here “dogmatic” knowledge. By “dogmatic”, we 
mean no less than the sense of the normal, theological usage. Faith is dogmatic in 
that it involves knowing to some extent the nature of the object of faith: that He is, 
for example, sovereign, good, just and merciful. But we do mean more than that 
obvious usage. For “dogmatic” faith entails a certain valuation of the object of faith. 
In Oliver O’Donovan’s words, dogma is ‘doxa, an act of praise, in which the being 
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and work of God is the first and last thing on our lips.’
35
 To which insight we add 
that the act of praise, whereby, for example, we sing or declare the wonders of the 
death and resurrection of the Son of God, is partially constituted by an affective 
recognition by which we mean an attracted, evaluative, affective understanding. 
Political worship, in Wannenwetsch’s sense, is centrally (though not solely) 
constituted by the practice of praise
36
 and thus we can say that affective 
understanding is central to political worship within the institution of the church in its 
diverse local expressions. 
Dogmatic faith thus involves the worshipful practice of praise which 
expresses affective understanding. The central affective understanding to which 
praise gives expression is joy. For joy recognises the good we praise as good. In 
praise, we celebrate the abundant goodness of God and his works and thus the 
affective understanding most appropriate to praise is joy. Moreover through joy, we 
are drawn in an interested admiration into participation in God and his world. Joyful 
attraction is energised by the graciousness of God’s initiative towards sinners in need 
of grace. Joy is thus praise’s primary affective understanding for it recognises in 
attracted admiration the abundant goodness of God and his works. This goodness is 
attractive both as good-in-itself and good-for-us because of our need for the 
goodness of God, his world and his redeeming grace. 
Thus the revelation of God’s grace ‘enables our knowing to be always 
praising’
37
 since a faith-based knowing of goodness will always involve praising that 
goodness, a praising which is inextricable from a joyful understanding of the object 
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of praise. Faith clings to the God who has already grasped us and knit himself into 
the world in the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus for the sake of our salvation. 
That affections spring from such a faith accounts for the strange stability hinted at in 
Augustine’s experience. For the affections of such faith would be attracted to Jesus 
Christ precisely and centrally with respect to his salvific, incarnate sufferings and 
resurrection. Thus, inasmuch as they are attached to Christ, such affections would be 
conditioned by his experience of both the fallenness of creation in his body on the 
tree and the firstfruits of the vindication of creation at his resurrection. The 
hungering, panting and thirsting of Augustine reflects precisely such participatory 
faith.  
 
Joyful praise as the beginning of political ethics 
 
This analysis of faith, praise and joy has implications for our political concerns. 
Wannenwetsch observes that Hannah Arendt’s account of political initium may be 
fruitfully reinterpreted with respect to political worship in terms of God’s gracious 
initiative that creates a people which He then governs.
38
 We receive the initiative by 
faith and recognise it in a joy expressed through praise. This move interprets Oliver 
O’Donovan’s claim that the practice of praise is ‘a kind of proving or demonstration 
of the fact of God’s kingly rule’.
39
 A congregation’s intersubjective, joyful, praise 
recognises that God’s government is good for the congregation. Joyful praise 
welcomes as good the merciful, kingly rule of YHWH over his people in the 
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crucified and risen Christ. This correlation between God in his kingly rule and the 
joy of his people is the deepest possible form of representation. For praise of God is 
the height of welcome and is appropriate only to the One who is worthy of praise 
both in himself and, as Lord and Saviour, as the One who holds out the secure 
promise of a future for his people. The one who achieves representation for us is 
Jesus Christ. Recognition of him in joy, through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, 
proves the identity of the people of God, as we saw in Luke and Acts.  
This representative correlation is achieved by the same Holy Spirit ‘by whom 
we cry “Abba Father”’ and who ‘himself bears witness with our spirit that we are 
children of God’ (Romans 8:15-16). Joyful praise proves the identity of the people as 
the people of God but their identity is not construed in a worldly political fashion 
since they praise not as craven slaves but as free and joyful sons and daughters, heirs 
of God and co-heirs with Christ (Romans 8:17). The joyful praise of free children 
transmits to the world the kind of life which is possible for humans under political 
authority (i.e. the authority of God). A church is thus conceived ‘not as a safe haven 
from the world but as the focal point of a praising people caught up in Christ’s 
service to the world.’
40
 Her praises are joyful utterances which enable the children of 
God to be the city on a hill, as they awaken in faith to praise that which is abundantly 
good, thereby overflowing with the epistemological light of joy both to one another 
and to the peoples of the world who walk in darkness. 
The transmission of this intersubjective joy is the service which churches may 
render to meet the deficit in trust which characterises political society. For, as we 
saw, trust consists in shared affective understandings. The contribution to political 
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society of joy expressed in praise is its recognition of what is good, a recognition 
which, if appropriately adopted by wider society, will build or rebuild trust. Society 
at large is substantially constituted by its ability to enjoy the goods it shares in 
common. This common joy in common goods is the essential constituent of a 
political community for it establishes the bond of trust which enables people to 
proceed into reflection and deliberation confident that there is a provisional 
consensus concerning the nature of the good. Although wider society may not rejoice 
as churches do in the saving work of Jesus Christ, yet it may join in the churches’ joy 
as it is transposed into common goods of society’s life, such as harvest, marriage, 
children, voluntary social care, state welfare provision and peaceful neighbourhoods. 
The churches’ joy in these objects depends ultimately on the Spirit who can preserve 
joy when it is threatened with suspicion and fear. As a fruit of the Spirit, this 
Christian joy also has distinctive wisdom about the significance of the objects in 
which it rejoices. The transposition of the churches’ affections into such goods may, 
therefore, suggest to wider society distinctively Christian reasons for rejoicing, thus 
opening up an apologetic opportunity. On a simple level, one thinks of the bolstering 
of the Women’s Institute by a Christian joy in children as God’s gifts thereby 
warding off the onset of a culture of fear directed towards children as impositions on 
autonomous lives. Such joy preserves consensus about common goods, thereby 
building social trust. 
As well as acting as a preservative, Christian affections may also disturb, 
renew or correct patterns of social trust. By way of example, consider the 
transformation of the tone and leadership of the UK Conservative Party since 2005 
with regard to poverty. The phenomenon dubbed ‘hug-a-hoodie’ by the media was 
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really an outgrowth of the “Compassionate Conservatism” which is receiving a 
sophisticated, evidence-based make-over through Iain Duncan Smith’s Centre for 
Social Justice.
41
 It is precisely a turn in understanding from fear to compassion 
through the Roman Catholic Duncan Smith which has revealed the deep ambivalence 
within the modern Conservative Party concerning the growing underclass in UK 
society. His Antiochene experience happened in Easterhouse, Glasgow, where he 
was awakened to the enormous need which exists in many parts of Britain today. It 
was Antiochene for it recognised, as Barnabas did, the deep significance of being one 
nation. He wisely construed the condition of Easterhouse in terms of the rest of the 
nation. But it is taking time for this affective light to illumine and change the 
understanding of many conservative party members for whom fear of difference is 
often the beginning of their hermeneutics of suspicion. The new trust which may 
arise from this turn in affective understanding will be key to the ability of 
Conservatives to build a social trust which lasts more than one election cycle.  
This analysis highlights the importance of distinguishing between social trust 
and Christian faith. Wannenwetsch comments that ‘in the experience of the 
communion of worship a political identity for Christian citizens can be developed 
which is socially hard to domesticate’.
42
 The reason for the untamed quality of 
Christian political identity, under Christ’s rule in the midst of earthly cities, is that 
faith is not domestic in origin but is a divine bestowal by the Holy Spirit. Faith in the 
word of God which characterises the worship of believers is effective in preserving 
or creating social trust and overcoming suspicion.
43
 The potential of Christian faith 
lies in its ability to resist deception because it has learnt to hold fast to the entirely 
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truthful word of God disclosed definitely in Jesus Christ.
44
 What follows from faith is 
the affective understanding which achieves the work of renewing social trust. Thus 
social trust is constituted by affections rather than being preliminary to them. 
Christian faith’s special contribution to public service is to hold fast to the centre of 
all publics, namely Jesus Christ in whom all things hold together. From such faith 
springs a joy which resources social trust with the understanding it needs for its 
preservation and flourishing.  
It is in this way that joyful praise is the beginning of political ethics. The 
Holy Spirit, in leading our joy to Christ in whom all creation holds together, enables 
as true and as wide a recognition of the pluriform good as is possible for 
epistemologically fallen human beings. Joy’s expansive quality is predicated on its 
objects, God in Christ and God’s creation, the frame of reference within which moral 
investigation should proceed.
45
 This joy is perfectly suited to initiate the widest 
possible range of moral reflection and deliberation, including that which pertains to 
political ethics.  
Following such reflection and deliberation, that which is good is known more 
deeply and so the reasonable response for Christians is a return to joyful praise. 
O’Donovan comments that ethics 
 
belongs in between this first and last word of praise; its significance derives from its 
mediating position. Its task is to inform, out of praise and for the sake of praise, the 
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Lacoste observed that affective understanding has the first word in ethics but was 
reticent to speak about the last word. His eschatological modesty was appropriate to 
his philosophical task. But an exercise in Christian moral theology can speak with 
more confidence about joyful praise at the beginning and the end. Joyful praise is 
indeed penurious in its initiation of our understanding concerning the goodness of the 
Lord and his works. But what follows joy is reflection and deliberation whereby the 
good and the right are specified in more detail. Ethics thus offers a dogma-dependent 
way of returning to dogmatics with better reasons for praise. This is the form of 
moral learning which can only arise in the midst of Christian joy expressed in the 
praise that springs from faith in Christ. 
Praise can, of course, express joy in many things apart from God and his 
works especially in the context of political ethics. Augustine recounts the range of 
apparently praiseworthy deities which filled the Roman imagination. He shows how 
these many ‘gods’ attended the various functions and aspects of human and earthly 
life: one god for the emission of seed, one god for its implantation, another to bring 
sensibility to the foetus and so on. Augustine’s relentless examination of these gods 
and their roles demonstrates the incoherence of their mutual interrelation and indeed 
the incoherence of the idea that one god in particular, Jupiter, is able to be all the 
gods in himself. The moral judgment is that because the objects of their praise were 
incoherent, their ethical life was fragmentary at best.
47
  
What may we say to specify in more detail the contrasting nature of the 
Christian joy expressed in praise which is transmitted and transposed into political 
society’s common life? Its object, as we have seen, is the most comprehensive 
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available, namely the One God of the universe and his works in creation and 
salvation. On account of this expansive quality, it has both a pervasive effect on 
other affections and a wider field of attraction than other affections. The joy by 
which Christians begin to understand the common goods of political society values 
those objects in a way that makes compassion, grief, hatred, fear and shame 
concerning those objects intelligible. Evaluations of goods are necessary if 
evaluations of ills are to have any cognitive content. It follows that the ills which 
grief, hatred, fear and shame recognise may also be construed by joy in terms of 
abundance. Joy thus frames the way that other affections make their beginnings. Joy, 
by initiating our understanding of the objectively good God and his works, 
recognises the widest pluriform range of the good within which other affections may 
intelligibly participate. For this reason, we hold that compassion is not the paradigm 
political emotion in the way that Martha Nussbaum maintained. Rather, joy is the 
overarching affection which frames the way that compassion recognises need. 
Compassionate transposition into that need is thus not enough but must be 
accompanied by joyful transposition which construes need in terms of abundance, 
looking hopefully towards the end while at the beginning. Joy makes no pact with 
scarcity, death and need but rather celebrates the truth of the logic of overflow. When 
Markell complained that modern political theory had struggled to understand the 
multiplicity of affections towards a single object, he was unwittingly describing the 
failure of such theory to make joy the overarching political affection. Christian joy’s 
ability to understand goods and ills in terms of abundance makes it the suitable 
accompaniment to all other affective understanding, thereby explaining the 
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multiplicity of affections towards a single object. The loss of joy in political theory 
may be traced to such theory’s exclusion and diminution of political worship. 
If this is what joy is and what joy does, then how is it sustained? 
Wannenwetsch focuses our minds on the practice of praise in communities which are 
clearly ‘temporal, not a-temporal’.
48
 He resists a super-theory which would make it 
possible to know the essence of worship since this 
 
would actually make the constitutive character of the Church’s worship superfluous, 
this constitutive character being the fact that men and women have to attend and 




This leads on to the important claim that ‘Christian ethics always has to take its start, 
over and over again, from the event where human beings are grasped by the self-
communication of God’,
50
 that is, from grace. We may echo this by saying that 
beginning in joyful praise requires renewal ‘again and again’ because of the very 
nature both of the expansive object of joy (God and his works) and the stubborn 
subjects of joy (those who have faith in God). The Spirit of God leads this renewal of 
participation, knitting those who praise once again into God and his works. He does 
this by overcoming our suspicious stubbornness with the assurance that God is good 
and that we are the free and forgiven children of the King. Our joy is not only 
penurious in understanding but weak in its intensity and short-lived in duration. 
Joyful praise as the beginning of political ethics needs constant renewal by the Spirit 
lest the light fade and darkness return. 
Addressing the experience of worship which nourishes the proving and 
testing of God’s will, Wannenwetsch comments that this ‘capacity for judgement 
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pales as this very experience recedes.’
51
 He has in mind especially the service of 
baptism as the root of renewal. Unfortunately, we cannot enterprise here an extended 
discussion of the sacraments. Suffice to say that the capacity for judgment can be 
renewed in the ongoing joyful praises of those who remember in faith the dying and 
rising of Christ into which they have been knit by water and the Spirit. In this way, 
the life of moral judgment which has begun through joyful praise of God is 
continually renewed in joyful praise. Joy is the beginning of affective renewal 
whereby the understanding is opened up afresh to the goodness of the moral order, 
the God who created it and the works of that same God. As creatures – even as new 
creatures – there is a tendency for understanding to become dull over time. The 
refreshment which joy brings is absolutely necessary to those who are feeble in their 
affections and unable to sustain that proper affective understanding which can in turn 
preserve, illumine or establish social trust. By the Holy Spirit, joy expressed in praise 
opens people afresh for wise participation in the death and life which baptism 
symbolises. 
In summary, just as dogmatics should precede and govern ethics, so should 
joy precede and govern other affections which are themselves the beginnings of 
ethics. If we saw in chapter two the epistemological priority of affection for ethics in 
the world in general, we see here the epistemological priority of joy for the ethics of 
the church in particular. Joy at the beginning of ethics is an attraction into what is 
already going on in creation and redemption.
52
 In just this sense it is pre-reflective 
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while being at the same time cognitive, a first taste of the goodness of God and his 
creation as we begin on the road towards right action. Joy is also the post-reflective, 
post-deliberative end of understanding since God, our ultimate object of joy, is both 
beginning and end. 
 
Sharing in joyful praise of the crucified and risen Christ  
 
Having established the pattern whereby Christian affections have political influence 
through their contribution to the establishment of trust, we turn to explore more 
deeply the heart of Christian political affectivity by seeking to describe the subjective 
experience which correlates to God’s passionate identification with us in the cross 
and resurrection, the work of salvation which makes faith possible. Such a 
description will further clarify the way that Christian political affections contribute to 
the maintenance and development of trust in political society. 
The apostle Paul informs the Philippians that he wishes to know Christ ‘and 
the power of his resurrection and the fellowship of sharing in his sufferings’ (Phil 
3:10).
53
 We understand from this that the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus 
disclose to us God’s intention for human existence until the eschaton. The knowledge 
Paul seeks must be discovered through the thick particularity of sufferings and Spirit-
inspired, powerful living. Knowing the sufferings and resurrection of Jesus defines 
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to join the chorus already underway.’ 
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the nature of the life into which followers of Christ are knit. The beginning of 
knowing, as we have seen, is joyful praise. As the risen Christ attracts our joyful 
praise, we enter into a mysterious yet revealed reality defined by the contours of his 
eternal yet incarnate existence. We may grasp the gestalt of the contours in a moment 
but to understand the inner workings requires an active, thoughtful lifetime of 
penetrative investigation. Since such dogmatic knowing is the beginning of ethics, 
the crucified and vindicated Christ is where Christian ethics must begin. Since the 
resurrection vindicates creation, it is also through such knowledge that the true moral 
order is discovered. Thus to praise the crucified and risen Christ is to begin to 
understand in joy the ethics which are appropriate to the whole world under his rule. 
To see more clearly, we now examine the way that affections are correlated 
to Christ’s death and resurrection in Paul’s second canonical letter to the 
Corinthians.
54
 In 2 Corinthians 1:3-11, Paul describes the shared life of Christian 
believers who begin in joyful praise. The opening words of praise or blessing (v3) 
initiate a meditation upon the way that the church’s common life participates in 
Christ’s death and resurrection. Paul envisages God comforting the afflicted church 
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(v4a); God’s comfort results in a communicative sharing in comfort amongst those 
who are afflicted and in need of comfort (v4b, 6b, 7b); that common sharing in 
comfort is paralleled with a common sharing in suffering (v7; cf. Philippians 3:10), 
both of which are rooted in Christ himself through his sufferings (v5) and his 
resurrection from among the dead (v9); finally, Paul and Timothy’s affliction is said 
to bring about the Corinthians’ comfort (v6a). So much for how the terms of this 
passage fit together. To begin to understand their meaning and relevance to the 
account of affections, we will interpret this passage by briefly exploring the use of 
‘comfort’ elsewhere in the letter, specifically Paul’s biblically unique combination of 
paraklesis (παράκλησις) with the verb parakalein (παρακαλεῖν; “to comfort with 
comfort”) which is normally found amidst richly affective passages. From here we 
will return to exposit Paul’s thought at Philippians 3:10. 
The combination occurs in 7:4-16 where Paul describes the inner workings of 
the shared comfort and affliction which was schematised in 1:3-11.
55
 God’s comfort 
of Paul is a comfort that reorders the affections of the downcast.
56
 Titus was 
comforted with comfort and intersubjectively drawn into joy by the affections of the 
Corinthians, especially their mourning (7:7). Paul and Timothy’s shared comfort 
(7:13) is thus their reordered condition whereby they recognise in joy the affections 
and the concomitant repentance of the Corinthians, especially their godly grief (7:8-
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12). The complex intersubjective affectivity sketched here results in a renewed 
communion. It seems that when Paul speaks in this context of being “comforted with 
comfort”, he is describing how the affections and actions of one part of the church 
are intersubjectively reordered through the affections and actions of others in the 
church. The comfort in which all the believers share reorders the affections through 
affliction to comfort. That comfort should be read through 2 Corinthians 1:9 as the 
comfort which God brings through Christ’s resurrection. In summary, affliction and 
comfort define the pattern within which affections are ordered in the body of Christ, 
the church as she participates in Christ’s death and resurrection. The church is 
afflicted and comforted as Christ was. As she walks through the world, the church’s 
affections follow this pattern as forms of understanding which participate in Christ 
and so in the fulfilment of the moral order. 
We can now say more about how the knowing of Christ, the power of his 
resurrection and fellowship in his sufferings are substantially affective. The 
affections of the body of Christ are affections in the midst of a fallen world. The 
people of God participate in the intersubjective affections of the body as it passes, in 
its diverse localised expressions, on its pilgrimage through the world, experiencing 
the sufferings and power which Christ experienced. Consider first the fellowship of 
sharing in Christ’s sufferings. We understand from this that the body of Christ is 
called to participate in the world as Christ did, without conformity with its sinful 
fallenness but without withdrawal from its needy brokenness. This wise openness to 
the world will, as Wannenwetsch observed, involve sufferings, which are both 
similar to and distinct from Christ’s sufferings. According to Paul, grief is central to 
these sufferings. Paul was afflicted with grief because of the Corinthians’ sin (2:4), 
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mirroring Christ’s grief over the sin of Jerusalem (Luke 19:41). In his grief, he 
wisely participated in affliction ‘for your comfort and salvation.’ (2 Corinthians 1:6) 
For with respect to one’s own sin, Paul taught that grief may take two forms: a godly 
grief producing repentance which leads to salvation without regret and a worldly 
grief which produces death (7:10). In their godly grief, the Corinthians understood 
their sin as sin in light of Paul’s grieving, tearful rebuke which attracted their own 
grief towards their sin. Instead of hardening their hearts, the Corinthians mournfully 
participated in their own sinfulness, construing it in terms of God’s grace in Christ 
and proceeding thence to the reflection, deliberation and action in which repentance 
consists. Paul’s grief was verified by the Corinthians’ affective, intersubjective 
recognition of the wrong which they had done. Thus the goal of the whole movement 
was not the beginning in grief but the conclusion of the enterprise in earnest 
repentance (7:12). This is how Paul’s affliction is for the sake of their comfort.  
Both Paul’s and the Corinthians’ differing forms of grief genuinely shared in 
the sufferings of Christ since they were understandings of sin which were in accord 
with the salvific death of Christ vindicated in the resurrection. Worldly grief is not of 
this sort. It is not attracted to and does not understand the meaning of the cross and 
so ends only in the death of the sinner not the death of Christ for the sinner. That is 
the path of despair and presumably, this is what Paul fears may happen to the 
severely chastened sinner (2:7b). In contrast, Paul and the Corinthians were knit 
more deeply into Christ’s death and resurrection through their shared but 
differentiated grief and so experienced the comfort which follows such affliction. 
Their fellowship consists in a common affective understanding of Christ’s death that 
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leads to repentant sanctification through Christ’s Spirit and ends by sharing in 
comfort through Christ’s resurrection.  
This claim points towards how Paul and the Corinthians share in the power of 
Christ’s resurrection. The comfort which their affections are patterned after has a 
deeply existential quality. When Paul was experiencing an affliction in Asia which 
threatened his very life, he relied on the God who raises the dead (1:9). The 
deliverance God wrought at that time was a foretaste of further deliverances and, 
implicitly, the final comfort of their own promised resurrection (1:10). We have seen 
the significance of the resurrection with respect to the grief of repentance. The 
resurrection as existential promise conditions godly grief concerning suffering, 
persecution or the death of fellow believers. Such grief is not without hope (1 Thess. 
4:13). It specifically construes a death in terms of the resurrection to come, 
understanding it as the gateway into life rather than its permanent conclusion. Thus, 
when Paul claims that in ‘all our affliction, I am overflowing with joy’ (7:4), he is 
reflecting the pattern we observed earlier, namely that joy defines the meaning of 
other affective experiences, interpreting even grief over the sufferings, deaths and 
sins of other members of the body. Moreover, not only is Paul joyful but he 
overflows with joy, inviting and attracting others to share intersubjectively in a 
renewed understanding of the world.  
What makes the intersubjective affectivity which accords with the suffering 
and power of Christ possible is the work of the Holy Spirit who not only knits people 
into Christ but stabilises them within Christ and so within the moral order. This Spirit 
has, as Paul repeatedly affirms, been given by God into the hearts of believers as a 
‘guarantee’ (arrabon; ἀρραβῶν; 1:22, 5:5; cf. Ephesians 1:14). The description of the 
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Holy Spirit as a guarantee or first instalment is congruent with the account of 
affections as the beginnings of understanding. A guarantee in normal market 
relations points forward to a promised fulfilment of what has already begun. It brings 
a measure of stability to what are otherwise unstable situations, such as contracts of 
exchange. If the Holy Spirit himself is the guarantee, then the God who has promised 
has also given himself as a pledge of what He has promised. The self-donation of 
God himself brings stability to the affections of those knit into Christ. Spirit-led 
affections in the fallen world are the enduring first light of the knowledge of the 
glory of God, the dawning of wisdom.  
The stability which the Holy Spirit now brings to affections which follow 
from faith is a stability of memory. Both the presence and content of a deposit 
reminds the parties involved of what has happened as well as pointing forward to 
what is yet to come. The Spirit’s work, as we learn from John, is to achieve this by 
reminding believers of what Jesus had said concerning his life, teaching, death, 
resurrection, glorification and the coming age (John 14). In this way, the Holy Spirit 
offers to the church the same stability of affection that Christ knew, the strange 
stability of participating in the crucifixion and resurrection that Augustine 
experienced and recounted. Stability for Christians is thus not meant to be an 
unchanging resilience or an unmoved stagnancy which withdraws from deep 
engagement with fallen reality and redemption. Rather Christian stability emerges 
through being knit into the fallen but vindicated creation by the Spirit within the 
broken, resurrected body of Christ. 
The presence of the one Spirit throughout the body provides the possibility of 
enduring intersubjective, affective understanding. However, as Wannenwetsch 
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observes, a simple homology does not always follow from the givenness of the unity 
of the church by the Spirit. He comments that as 
 
the practice of a shared language, worship makes possible the political formation of 
conviction in the direction of consensus. It does so in a way which is barely 
conceivable in the present confusion of incommensurable moral languages. But here 
there is a surprising point. The univocity which worship makes possible does not make 




The church will not simply be characterised by agreement but has the ability to 
negotiate disagreement within a common framework. Wannenwetsch is not speaking 
here directly about affections but his approach can be fruitfully adapted in that 
direction. For, from the beginning, it has not been claimed that diverse individuals’ 
affections will necessarily agree concerning the value of the object of their 
understanding. As Lacoste said, ‘is not the most self-evident thing about our feelings 
precisely the fact that we need to discuss them?’
58
 So the enduring affective 
understanding is made available within the context of common praise but consensus 
will be won out of intersubjective affection only in the discussion, reflection and 
deliberation which follow affection.  
 How does this account of the affections of the body of Christ concern social 
trust? Simply put, social trust is given wise content by the affections of the body of 
Christ, precisely inasmuch as local churches are participating by faith in Christ 
crucified and risen. The Spirit, given as a pledge, generates affective understanding 
which has the endurance to enable steady transposition of believers into Christ by 
faith and steady transposition (transmission) of the church into the world in affective 
understanding. In this way, the pledge of God in the body of Christ sustains trust 
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between men in political society. Such an account forms the affective interior of 
Wannenwetsch’s claim that as 
 
a public established and restored in worship, the Church represents the truth of a 
‘constituted’ public, on which the public of civil society must draw if it is not to be 




Civil society must draw on – or rather be drawn in by – the affections of the Church, 
the city of light on a hill, if it is to preserve social trust. So when Wannenwetsch says 
that the world has a double becoming – first, as a world hostile to God and second as 
turned from hostility to reflection of the Creator’s will
60
 – it is the second form of 
becoming which Christians’ affections will hopefully enable. Local churches 
experience an ‘empowerment for political life’
61
 in their affections by the Spirit.  
Christian political affections may of course provoke hostility from the world. 
Yet the hope is that the world will be drawn into the way of seeing what the church 
offers and so be knit more truly into the world as it is and into Christ in whom the 
world holds together. Thus they may share in the intersubjective affections which 
accord with the wisdom of God. As Brock puts it, ‘the renewal of humanity through 
the Spirit generates ripples of moral renewal throughout the social fabric.’
62
 Wise 
affections spring as fruit from faith by the power of the Spirit and this ‘fruitfulness 
is…the restoration of connectivity to a creation suffering from its lack’.
63
 The 
affections of churches, patterned by the affliction and comfort of Christ’s death and 
resurrection, offer the beginnings of reconnections between the people walking in 
darkness and the wisdom of God for life in this world and the world to come. In 
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Luther’s terms, ‘the blessed [are] as mobile conduits of the divine springs in a world 
dried out by sin’s refusal of reciprocity’.
64
 Such springs of affection well up from 
faith, making the dark stubbornness of the world visible and offering to it the 
beginnings of a new life begun now in half-light. The intersubjective union of these 
mobile conduits in a local institution is what we are calling the local church. It is 
through these localised centres of affective wisdom that representation, law and 
nationhood may be critically renewed. 
 
A threat to trust 
 
If affections are ordered in institutions, institutions consist in practices and the body 
of Christ is the institutional community which experiences the most stable affections, 
then it will seem to some that what we are proposing here is congruent with a form of 
virtue theory whereby the stability of affections is achieved by their habituation into 
virtues through common institutional practices. Robert Roberts moves in this 
direction when he claims that ‘Christian virtues are, in large part, a matter of being 
disposed to a properly Christian joy, contrition, gratitude, hope, compassion and 
peace’. These ‘emotion-virtues’ are ‘fruits of the Holy Spirit’ which could only arise 
either through intentional habituation or through the direct action of God for which 
humans must passively wait.
65
 He strongly favours the former option on the grounds 
that the self-knowledge we have concerning the nature of emotions can be put to 
good use to promote their habituated occurrence as virtues. Although approaches 
which construe affections in terms of virtues have already been found wanting in 
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light of the attractive quality of the good created order, the power of memory and the 
participative nature of affection, it will be instructive to consider again the question 
of virtue but this time from an explicitly political and ecclesial perspective. 
As we have seen, a common turn for those Christians who think of emotions 
in terms of virtues is towards the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Stanley 
Hauerwas.
66
 We will consider Hauerwas in particular because of his explicitly 
theological approach. Virtues, Hauerwas informs us, are achieved through common 
practices. His account of the failure of universal moral theories ‘to train our desires 
and direct our attention’
67
 is the central critical dynamic in his most comprehensive 
book, A Peaceable Kingdom – A Primer in Christian Ethics, which will be the focus 
of our study. His constructive claim is that we ‘can only act within the world we can 
envision, and we can envision the world rightly only as we are trained to see’ and 
that ‘we cannot see the world rightly unless we are changed, for as sinners we do not 
desire to see truthfully.’
68
 Training involves initiation into skills of faithful living 
whereby one can envision ‘the world as it is, namely God’s creation’ and learn that 
‘at the center of creation is a cross and resurrection.’
69
  
Although this last claim has a surface similarity to my account, the structure 
of thought as a whole is quite different and, I suggest, considerably less adequate. 
The core problem is his virtue epistemology which only appears in a systematic way 
later in the book. However, its traces are detectable not only in the quotations above 
but also in the second chapter where his debt to Iris Murdoch leads him to say that it 
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is habituated virtue which gives to humans moral vision.
70
 Objections to this 
epistemology have already been considered and found compelling in chapter two. A 
further objection, reflecting a tendency in Christian virtue theory, is that, in the 174 
pages of A Peaceable Kingdom, the Holy Spirit is only mentioned twice. This is 
particularly significant for our purposes in light of the role of the Spirit in attracting 
and sustaining the affective understanding which follows from faith and contributes 
to social trust. On the first occasion, Hauerwas quotes the great Mennonite John 
Howard Yoder who writes: ‘Christian ethics calls for behaviour which is impossible 
except by the miracle of the Holy Spirit.’
71
 Hauerwas does not comment on the 
mention of the Holy Spirit here and uses the quotation to explain how non-violence 
leaves space for the ‘possibility of miracles, of surprises, of the unexpected.’
72
 One 
may grant that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of surprises without saying that this is the 
sum of his activities. For example, nowhere in the book do we find Hauerwas 
claiming that the Holy Spirit is the One who convicts us of our sin or is the 
stabilising guarantee of our inheritance. Rather, he seems to be merely the one we 
need to step in when non-violent resistance meets the threats and violence of the 
world.  
On the other occasion the Spirit is mentioned, Hauerwas states that the 
starting point for entering a life of non-violence is ‘the assurance that God has made 
his peace a present reality through his spirit.’
73
 The lack of a capital letter for ‘spirit’ 
might not be significant in other contexts but here it suggests a neglect of the 
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significance of the Holy Spirit for ethics. Specifically, in the context of the book and 
our argument here, it suggests that the sources of a stable, ecclesial moral 
epistemology can be understood very well without the need to mention God the Holy 
Spirit. As a follower of MacIntyre, Hauerwas has naturally turned instead to tradition 
and virtue. This is precisely the move which Aristotle would make. Hauerwas’ 
account is of course un-Aristotelian in that it is centred on Jesus. But it is precisely 
Aristotelian in that it is deeply committed to the human project of the formation of 
the self by habituation and to the kind of moral vision which is dependent on virtue 
epistemology.  
The heart of the problem emerges very clearly in the claim that if 
 
it is true that I can act only in the world I see and that my seeing is a matter of my 
learning to say, it is equally the case that my “saying” requires sustained habits that 
form my emotions and passions, teaching me to feel one way rather than another. We 
are therefore quite right to think that questions of feeling are central for determining 





On this view, the reason that feelings are important is not because they are attracted 
to and understand the world beyond ourselves but because they inform us about our 
own character which in turn helps us to work out how to act. This is a return both to 
the virtue epistemology we found implausible and, in part, to the eudaimonism of 
Nussbaum which we found unsatisfying. The alternative proposed here has been that 
it is the object of our affections which is decisive for affections’ significance to 
moral reasoning. The Holy Spirit’s special operations in believers attract their 
affections into participative understanding of the world. Their affections gain 
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stability primarily through engagement in the world, its Maker and the believer’s 
memory.  
What then of social trust? As we have seen, the central political affection is 
joy, which is focussed not on individual or communal character but on the common 
objects of joy. This is not to say that an awareness of one’s own or one’s 
community’s predictable tendency to repeated good actions is of no relevance to 
moral reasoning. Indeed, a critical consciousness of an institution’s practices seems 
essential to that end. Rather, it is to affirm that the affections’ contribution is not 
limited to what is already in the person but is substantially dependent on the 
creaturely moral order in which the person lives and the Creator God. Neither does 
this claim fall prey to Roberts’ criticism of those who simply depend on some direct 
unmediated activity of God. For if we reckon on God working by his Spirit through a 
wide variety of creaturely objects to attract our affective understanding, then 
affections are neither simply summoned directly by God nor simply habituated by 
our own efforts. The point is that virtue epistemology threatens rather than supports 
churches’ contribution to the renewal and sustenance of social trust. Instead of joy in 
the common goods of churches and political societies, Hauerwas’ approach would 
leave us with affections which are internally self-referential not publicly 
communicable and beneficial. The missiological and apologetic power of affective 
understanding would be neutralised. 
The deep reasons for this threat to trust are implicitly challenged from 
another direction by Brian Brock. He comments that 
 
the conduits of God’s grace are kept open when believers have a clear view of their 
sinful divergence from Christ and thus are conscientious in confessing these 
divergences; yet when they observe their merits, they see only Christ’s. God’s way 
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‘God’s way into the world’ is his way of leading people out of sin and into the life of 
the Spirit. The Hauerwasian tendency to focus on the formation of the self blocks up 
the conduits of grace meeting sin and calling forth political worship characterised by 
joyful praise. Hauerwas looks for stability in the self’s virtue rather than solely in 
Christ and in the Holy Spirit who gives the simultaneous vision of Christ’s merit and 
the self’s sin (simul iustus et peccator). The root of this tendency lies in Hauerwas’ 
treatment of justification and sanctification.
76
 He claims that ‘justification is only 
another way of talking about sanctification’, that ‘the language of “sanctification” 
and “justification” is not meant to be descriptive of a status’ and that justification ‘is 
but a reminder of the character of that story [of Jesus] – namely what God has done 
for us by providing us with a path to follow.’ In just a few pages, Hauerwas 
dismisses, without argument, classic Protestant thinking on justification and 
sanctification and, most significantly for our purposes, reflection on the nature of 
faith. He claims that ‘faith is not so much a combination of belief and trust, as simply 
fidelity to Jesus’.
77
 This means that Romans 5:1, quoted immediately afterwards, 
should be interpreted as ‘Therefore, since we are justified by fidelity, we have peace 
with God through our Lord Jesus Christ.’ Instead of faith being explicitly dependent 
on Christ by the work of the Holy Spirit, Hauerwas offers ‘fidelity’ which, according 
to his rationale, is a virtue formed as a habit within the practices of the church. Such 
a move would run counter to our claim that political ethics follows the joyful praise 
which preserves social trust inasmuch as it springs from dependent, clinging faith. It 
                                                 
75
 Brock, B., Singing the Ethos of God,, 226-7 
76
 Hauerwas, S., The Peaceable Kingdom, 91-95 
77
 ibid. 93 
 
 308 
is a reversion to an ‘argument of impenitence’ whereby virtue and tradition become 
the arbiters of moral goodness and rightness. By contrast, we claim that the Holy 
Spirit calls people out of corrupted visions of goodness and virtue and into the 
repentant life that begins in joyful praise of the One who is Good and whose works 
are good.  
Where the Spirit is, there is the freedom to be the joyful children of God. But 
the Spirit is found where faith is found in the justifying word of God. Neither the 
Spirit nor the justifying word is found in Hauerwas’ peaceable kingdom. And 
therefore, there is not the joy which is the beginning of true ethics, that joy which 
arises from those who have experienced the justifying righteousness of God and who 
therefore do not turn inwards to their character as the source of moral wisdom but 
outwards by transposition into Christ by faith and the world in affective wisdom. 
Perversely, in attempting to emphasise the importance of a lived life of fidelity, 
Hauerwas has cut himself off from the roots of Christian good works (and indeed the 
Christian character which the Holy Spirit can bring). He recognises the dangers of 
‘self-righteousness’
78
 but leads people towards the perils of stubbornness. Thus, 
contra Wynn and Lauritzen, Hauerwas does not present a helpful route into 
considering the emotions in the context of a whole life.
79
 
 This argument against Hauerwas shows the worth of a detailed discussion 
concerning the affections which characterise the free children of God in their 
common life of affliction and comfort participating in the death and resurrection of 
Jesus. Emotion has been central to much virtue theory ever since Aristotle. Christian 
virtue theory, such as Hauerwas’, has been a response to the lack of modern 
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Christian interest in the intersubjective life of the community and the inner life of 
each believer. But the account of affection given in this thesis undercuts the need to 
be yoked with Aristotle by showing the true pattern of personal and communal moral 
psychology. We have shown that there is a way of taking affection very seriously 
without having to construe it in terms of a virtue theory of habituation and character 
formation. Thus chapter two’s criticism of Aristotle was not an arbitrary starting 
point but rather a recognition of the threat of neo-Aristotelianism both to the way 
ethics is conducted in the church and to the work of affections in political society at 
large. 
 The constructive account of the place of affections in local churches will 
instead be illumined by thinking of Christ himself as the “evangelical institution” 
whereby intersubjective affective recognition is properly ordered. Just as Israel 
participated within the festive institutions, so local churches today participate in 
Christ who has been instituted by God as Lord and Saviour by being lifted up on a 
cross, raised up from the grave and given all authority. Christ crucified, raised and 
installed as King on God’s holy hill (Psalm 2) is the common good in whom local 
church communities repeatedly participate in a structured way. The structure is not 
essentially the ordered, communal practices of a church (its liturgy) but is already 
provided by the Holy Spirit and Christ’s very afflicted and comforted being in and 
through whom churches have fellowship in his sufferings and know the power of the 
resurrection. But the liturgy of a church can helpfully reflect this structure so that 
people are assisted in coming to the common good in an appropriately affective 
manner. This is most decisively achieved by the preaching of God’s word and by the 
ministry of the sacraments in conformity with that word. Other features of the 
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church’s life – its wide and subtle range of good deeds in all spheres of civic life, its 
sung worship, its formal and informal patterns of prayer (to name but a few) – are 
authorised and governed by these two essentials.  
 Truly Christian affections are structured and directed towards understanding 
within this institution which is Christ, consisting of the head and the body, a single 
harmoniously differentiated organism inhabited and intersubjectively united by 
Christ’s Spirit. Just as Israel was united as a differentiated harmony at the feast, 
understanding the land in joy, so the whole world may now be united in diverse 
unity, understanding Christ in joyful praise. Thus the beginning of ecclesial ethics is 
the praise of Christ, the institution in whom the church lives. The ongoing beginnings 
of ecclesial ethics are in the affections which are called for by the word of God with 
respect to the body of Christ in accordance with the leading of the Holy Spirit. The 
overflow of local churches’ affections renews the affective understanding of the 
localities and political societies where they dwell as pilgrims. 
 
The return to praise: ethics, politics and dogmatics  
 
The discussion in this chapter has described a movement from faith in God to joyful 
praise of God and his works as the beginning of ethics. That praise recognises the 
outline of ethics, within which affections participate in the pattern of the object of 
praise, namely the crucified and resurrected Jesus. The beginnings of ethics in such 
affections gain their ultimate stability through the presence of God in the current 
experience and memory of God’s people. This God comes in gracious initiative 
supplying them with a knowledge of himself which is first grasped in clinging faith. 
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Thus there is a movement from grace to faith to joyful praise to the ordering of all 
affections as the beginnings of ethics.  
In closing, we observe that God’s promise of an eschatological life of 
restored affections opens up the possibility that praise is the last word as well as the 
first. For just as the transition from dogmatics to ethics was accomplished by the act 
of joyful praise so too the transition back from ethics to dogmatics comes through 
praise. This last movement does not at all suggest that dogmatics is ultimately 
dependent on ethics – the reverse has been the argument of this chapter. Nor does it 
suggest a real separation of dogmatics from ethics. However, it does indicate that 
ethics finds its place within dogmatics just as it is situated within the passage from 
praise of God and his works in the beginning to praise of God and his works at the 
end. Ethics may explore the depths of God’s goodness, the wisdom of his law, the 
wonder of his works of creation and salvation; ethics may do so precisely with a 
view to clarifying the nature of the object of praise and so engendering that richer 
praise in the end. Ethics which has begun in praise is therefore at the service of 
praise.  
Accordingly, politics – as a dimension of ethics – also has a place within 
dogmatics. The political worship of the church is seen partially in its affections of 
faith which appear as shafts of half-light throughout political societies. Not only does 
such light draw attention to itself as a public – the catholic public of the Spirit which 
is open to all the world – but also it hints at how political authority should itself 
operate. Thus one can observe how the ‘model for the political process is still the 
council of the apostles in Jerusalem’.
80
 Inasmuch as it reflects that model of the 
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Spirit’s work, politics, while deeply ambivalent, may play a role in the movement 
from praise to praise. Chapter three focussed not so much on the council itself but 
rather on the work of the Spirit in preparing people affectively for this council 
through the joy and gladness of affective recognition. The reality of the body of 
Christ – now Jew and Gentile – was discovered affectively. This discovery obliged 
the church to reflect and deliberate ethically in order to reach consensus and action. 
The Spirit is given that the light of Christ may be seen today not only in the 
affections of the church but also in the reflections, deliberations and actions which 
follows such affections. The responsibility of the world is to be attentively drawn to 
this light and to enter into the faith from which the light proceeds. 
 The church returns to dogmatics having gone through the experience of ethics 
and politics. Its praises have been clarified through this experience so as to become 
deepened, more articulate understandings of God and his works. Ethics has been told 
that ‘God is good and God acts’. Ethics, begun in affections, ‘can fill [this dogma] 
with content.’
81
 This happens as the understanding which has begun in joy, grief or 
fear leads on into a knowledge of the moral order in Christ and action which accords 
with that order. But just as affections are not monarchical in their epistemological 
power so too all ethical enquiry does not offer the absolute clarity of logical 
necessity. Rather, ethics offers a ‘sufficient certainty’ about the good and the right 
which enables a return by approximating analogy to a deeper understanding and 
praise of God and his works.
82
 This second joyful praise, constantly repeated and 
renewed in this life, is the foretaste of the permanent joyful praise which 
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characterises the understanding of those whose faith in God receives its reward 






The joy of all the earth 
 
Clap your hands, all you nations; 
shout to God with cries of joy. 
How awesome is the Lord Most High, 
the great King over all the earth. 
 
God has ascended amid shouts of joy 
The Lord amid the sounding of trumpets. 
Sing praises to God, sing praises; 
sing praises to our King, sing praises. 
 (Psalm 47:1-2, 5-6; NIV) 
 
Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised, 
in the city of our God! 
His holy mountain, beautiful in elevation, 
is the joy of all the earth, 
Mount Zion, in the far north, 
the city of the great King. 
(Psalm 48:1-2; ESV) 
 
We have been enquiring about the nature of human affections, their role in morality 
and their place in politics. To conclude our account, we turn finally to the permanent 
joyful praise which will permeate the life of the only permanent political community, 
the city of God. The chief characteristic of this city is the presence of God who is 
seated on his throne (Psalm 47:8). He has gone up into the city (47:5) in the same 
way as the ark of the covenant was brought up into Jerusalem by David with shouts 
of joy (2 Samuel 6:12-15). In Psalms 47 and 48, all the nations are called to 
recognise in joy the awesome King who has founded the political community into 
which the elect of all nations are to be gathered as one. They are summoned to praise 
God with joyful claps, shouts and songs (Psalm 47:1). They are called to the holy 
mountain of the far north, the city of the great King (48:2). This place, where God is 
present, is where the joy of all the earth is found. That joy is, like all affections, 
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defined in relation to its intentional object. True, stable, right understanding consists 
of joy in the God of this mountain-city. On the Christian account, the ascension of 
Jesus Christ into the far north, the Hebrew vision of the heavenly city (cf. Isaiah 
14:13), is the fulfilment of Psalm 47’s expectation. The great joy of those who saw 
Jesus go up into heaven (Luke 24:50-53) mirrors the shouts of joy which surrounded 
God’s ascension in the Psalm. The joy of all the earth is focussed solely on the God 
and the Lamb to whom the throne belongs (Revelation 22:3). 
However, this one joy for all the earth is not yet the current international 
experience. The nations of the world are characterised by highly diverse forms of 
affective understanding. Their affections follow different orders of value, rejoicing, 
sorrowing, hating, fearing and being ashamed in many different ways. Yet even these 
orders of value stand in an intelligible relation to the created moral order and, 
through it, to one another. For the goods of the created order are stable in their 
generic and teleological relations and it is these goods which the nations evaluate in 
affective understanding. Thus, in the midst of the diverse orders of value, we have 
seen that local churches in the nations of the world may guide the affections of each 
particular community into common goods thereby sustaining the social trust on 
which political society depends. In this way, the churches prefigure the possibility of 
united affectivity. But even this is far from the cries of Psalms 47 and 48 and a pale 
reflection of the true recognition which will accompany the unveiling of the city of 
God. Despite but also because of that distance, these Psalms add depth to the 
affective account of political worship which we have endeavoured in the preceding 
chapter. For they place the work of local churches in the largest possible 
eschatological context. The joy of local churches within their specific locality is the 
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first light of the joy of the whole earth and thus of the utmost significance. No doubt 
those churches and their localities are full of unreasonable affectivity which values 
wrongly what God has made. Nonetheless, the city of God on the holy mountain is 
even now glimpsed down in the valleys of this present age through attention to the 
life of the Spirit in the body of Christ and in his providential operations amidst the 
diverse cities of men. But the holy mountain is not like the freezing Kantian heights. 
Instead it is the destination of our thick, creaturely existence, continuous and yet 
discontinuous from it just as the resurrected Christ was recognised and yet strangely 
unrecognisable. And so the valleys of this life are not the Scrutonian valleys of land 
mysticism but rather are preliminary reflections of the land to come, never complete 
either as an account of themselves or what they may become but always pointing 
forward to the mountain-city. To speak of a life between facts and norms, as 
Habermas did, was to speak with the anguished insight of humanity in tension, 
struggling unwittingly to live with a godless politics in a world where the post-
national dream is scattered and smashed again and again in the cold, dark night of a 
thousand petty arguments and tribalisms.  
How different with the city of God, the holy mountain, where God dwells! To 
that one place the nations will gather in a single community. In continuity with the 
past there will be representatives from every tribe, tongue and nation (Revelation 
7:9). But in wonderful discontinuity all those who gather will recognise in joy only 
one Ruler in a life beyond fallen human politics. Sing praises to the King of this 
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